

1979-07-18

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Departementsrådet Hirdman

Utrikesdepartementet

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Förtroligt

Amerikanska Wallenberg-papper
 (\$ bil.)

Broder,

I handbrev till Mats Bergquist 1979-05-02 har Du uttalat intresse för att erhålla kopior av de amerikanska handlingar i Wallenberg-ärendet som Sveriges Radios London-korrespondent, Sven Strömberg, använt för artiklar i DN plus av eventuellt ytterligare material från de amerikanska arkiven, som den svenske journalisten inte kommit åt.

Sedan vi på sin tid anmälde detta i State har man nu snabbt procederat därefter att Sverige-desken i slutet av förra veckan kunde tillställa oss:

./.

i kopia närslutna förtroliga skrivelse 1979-07-10 till mig från Richard S. Thompson på Sverigedesken, varmed överlämnas

./.

1) likaledes i kopia närslutna skrivelse, 1979-06-13, från Mr Clayton E. Mc Mamaway, Deputy Asst Secretary, Bureau of Administration till Mats Bergquist, åtföljd av en uppsättning i duplikat av de dokument som - i sin helhet eller delvis - ställdes till Strömbergs förfogande,

./.

./.

2) en annan uppsättning dokument som innehåller den fullständiga texten till de dokument som endast i vissa delar blev föremål för delgivning med Strömberg resp till de handlingar som undanhölls honom.

Dokumentation under 2) är alltså "classified" och överlämnas till svenska regeringen för förtrolig kännedom.

Bengt Borglund



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

CONFIDENTIAL

July 10, 1979

13 /
Mr. Bengt Borglund
Minister
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.
Embassy of Sweden
Washington, D. C.

MR. BERG		
JUL 10 1979		
MR.	MR.	MR.
P	2	Eu

Dear Mr. Charge:

I refer to the request by Mr. Mats Bergquist of your Embassy on May 11 for the documents concerning Mr. Raoul Wallenberg which had previously been released to Mr. Sven Stromberg under the Freedom of Information Act, and also for any further material that could be supplied beyond that released to Mr. Stromberg.

Attached is a letter from Mr. Clayton E. McManaway, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Administration, addressed to Mr. Bergquist, which transmits a duplicate set of the documents supplied to Mr. Stromberg.

Also attached is another set of documents which includes (1) the complete texts of documents which were released only in part to Mr. Stromberg, and (2) documents which were withheld from Mr. Stromberg. These documents remain classified and are furnished to your government in confidence.

I hope this material will be of assistance in your efforts to clarify the fate of this authentic hero of World War II.

Sincerely,

Richard S. Thompson
Richard S. Thompson
Officer in Charge
Swedish Affairs

Enclosures:
As stated.

CONFIDENTIAL



Reg.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 13, 1979

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JUL 12 1979		
AVD. <i>P</i>	GR <i>~</i>	MA <i>~</i>

M

Dear Mr. Bergquist:

You have expressed an interest in the documents concerning Raoul Wallenberg (FOI Case No. 820-005), which were released under the Freedom of Information Act to Mr. Sven Stromberg, of the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation.

I am enclosing a duplicate set of the documents, as released in full or in part to Mr. Stromberg, along with a copy of our letter addressed to him.

If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to call on me.


Sincerely,

Clayton E. McManaway
Clayton E. McManaway
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Administration

Enclosures:

As indicated.

Mats Bergquist, Esquire,
Counselor for Political Affairs,
Royal Swedish Embassy,
Washington.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520 Ref: FOI Case No. 820-005

August 9, 1978

Mr. Sven Stromberg,
c/o Swedish Broadcasting Corporation,
1200 National Press Building,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Stromberg:

I refer to your letter of March 28, 1978, to Mrs. Barbara Ennis, Direction, Freedom of Information Office, in which you request, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) copies of all correspondence in the Department of State's files from 1949 onward, on Raoul Wallenberg, missing Swedish diplomat.

A total of 41 documents were referred to the Bureau of European Affairs where they have been reviewed and the following determinations made.

Twenty-eight (28) documents (numbered 1-12, 14, 20-22, 24-27, 31 and 33-39 for internal purposes only) may be released.

Also, portions of documents Nos. 16-18, 29 and 32 may be released. The deleted portions of documents Nos. 16-18 and 32, and the entire texts of documents Nos. 13, 19, 23, 28 and 30 must be withheld under Section 5(B)(1) of Executive Order 11652, as containing properly classified information or material furnished by a foreign government and held by the United States on the understanding that it be kept in confidence.

The deleted portions of document No. 29 must be withheld under Section 5(B)(1) [explained above] and Section 5(B)(3) of the Executive Order, as containing properly classified information disclosing a project or specific foreign relations matter, the continuing protection of which is essential to the national security.

The material withheld is, therefore, exempt from disclosure under Section (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552).

A member of the Freedom of Information Staff, Bureau of Public Affairs, will contact you regarding the released documents.

Three documents (Nos. 15, 40 and 41) have been referred to another agency for concurrence, with the request that they reply directly to you.

You should be aware that, under the Freedom of Information Act, you have the right to appeal our determinations to the Council on Classification Policy, under the Department of State's regulation on appeals, a copy of which is enclosed.

Sincerely yours,

Richard D. Vine
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs


Enclosure:

Appeals Regulation

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EMBASSY OF SWEDEN
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.



MEMORANDUM

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①

A Swedish citizen, Mr. Raoul Wallenberg, who was attached to the Swedish Legation in Budapest, disappeared during the street fighting that took place before the Soviet Army finally captured the city in 1945. All efforts to find Wallenberg have been in vain.

In a concentration camp outside Moscow a Swedish newspaper man, Mr. Edward af Sandeberg, who was interned there but released soon afterwards, in April 1946 met a Rumanian national who stated that he had seen Wallenberg working in a factory outside Moscow in the beginning of 1946. Sandeberg could only remember that the Rumanian was called "Carl" by his fellow-prisoners in the camp. "Carl's" best friend was a young American, Rudolph Samebolt, who had been arrested by the Russians in Austria. Sandeberg and Samebolt were released at the same time and travelled together from Moscow to Frankfurt/Oder, where Samebolt was arrested once more by the Soviet authorities. When Sandeberg arrived in Berlin in May 1946, he notified the American Military Police about the detention of Samebolt. Sandeberg says that another American, John Gibran, was on the same train. A viceconsul at the American Embassy in Moscow, Wallace, had arranged the necessary permits for the two Americans. Sandeberg believes that Samebolt might know the exact address of the Rumanian, who is said to have been released

601.5864/9-1850

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in May 1946. Through the Rumanian it might be possible to learn what finally happened to Wallenberg.

The Swedish Consulate General in Berlin has, with the help of the American Occupation Authorities, tried to find out the address of Samebolt. This attempt failed, however, and the Consulate was advised that the matter should be taken up with the Department of State.

It might be added that in April 1947 a step brother of Wallenberg's, Mr. Guy von Dardel, visited the Honorable Arthur H. Vandenberg, United States Senate. Mr. Vandenberg was thereafter in touch with the Department of State and received a letter from the then Acting Secretary, Mr. Dean Acheson, dated April 23, 1947, a copy of which Mr. von Dardel received.

Washington, D.C., September 18, 1950.

~~RESTRICTED~~
UNCLASSIFIED

F732331-1777

Office Memorandum• **UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**TO : PD - Mrs. Shipley
DS - Mr. Hunt ✓FROM : BNA - Mr. Hulley *BNA*SUBJECT: Whereabouts of U.S. citizens who may have information concerning **RAOUL WALLENBERG**.*memo to BNA Hulley - BNA*
BK:mg 10-27-50
10/26/50 (2)

In connection with the long-continued efforts of the Swedish Government to locate Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish Embassy in its memorandum of September 18, 1950 (copy attached) asked the assistance of the Department in attempting to locate an American named **RUDOLPH SAMEBOLT**. It also is possible that another American, **JOHN GIBRAN**, might have information concerning Wallenberg or Samebolt. Although Wallenberg was at various times reported with the Soviet Army or in the Soviet Union, nothing definite has been heard from him since January 1945.

Because Wallenberg had the support of the U.S. War Refugee Board in his efforts on behalf of the victims of fascism in Hungary, and in view of the interest of his step-brother in this country, the Department has endeavored so far as practicable to assist the Swedish efforts since 1945 to ascertain the fate of Wallenberg. Therefore, in an effort to follow up the present lead, it is requested that you have a thorough check made of your respective files for information concerning the Americans **SAMEBOLT** and **GIBRAN**. From the information in the attached memorandum it would not appear that either man was a member of the armed forces nor that further efforts to trace Samebolt with the help of U.S. military authorities in Berlin would be likely to yield positive results. Should the files of the Department reveal no information concerning either Samebolt or Gibran, we have in mind sending an inquiry to the Embassy in Moscow.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of September 18, 1950.

~~RESTRICTED~~
UNCLASSIFIED

EUR:BNA:GGH:lliker:hw

UNCLASSIFIED

E782221-1778

MEMORANDUM

A Swedish citizen, Mr. Raoul Wallenberg, who was attached to the Swedish Legation in Budapest, disappeared during the street fighting that took place before the Soviet Army finally captured the city in 1945. All efforts to find Wallenberg have been in vain.

In a concentration camp outside Moscow a Swedish newspaper man, Mr. Edward af Sandeberg, who was interned there but released soon afterwards, in April 1946 met a Rumanian national who states that he had seen Wallenberg working in a factory outside Moscow in the beginning of 1946. Sandeberg could only remember that the Rumanian was called "Carl" by his fellow-prisoners in the camp. "Carl's" best friend was a young American, Rudolph Samebolt, who had been arrested by the Russians in Austria. Sandeberg and Samebolt were released at the same time and travelled together from Moscow to Frankfurt/Oder, where Samebolt was arrested once more by the Soviet authorities. When Sandeberg arrived in Berlin in May 1946, he notified the American Military Police about the detention of Samebolt. Sandeberg says that another American, John Gibran, was in the same train. A viceconsul at the American Embassy in Moscow, Wallace, had arranged the necessary permits for the two Americans. Sandeberg believes that Samebolt might know the exact address of the Rumanian, who is said to have been released in May 1946. Through the Rumanian it might be possible to learn what finally happened to Wallenberg.

The Swedish Consulate General in Berlin has, with the help of the American Occupation Authorities, tried to find out the address of Samebolt. This attempt failed, however, and the Consulate was advised that the matter should be taken up with the Department of State.

It might be added that in April 1947 a step-brother of Wallenberg's, Mr. Guy von Dardel, visited the Honorable Arthur H. Vandenberg, United States Senator. Mr. Vandenberg was thereafter in touch with the Department of State and received a letter from the then Acting Secretary, Mr. Dean Acheson, dated April 23, 1947, a copy of which Mr. von Dardel received.

Washington, D.C., September 18, 1950.
Embassy of Sweden.

Office Memorandum

UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

F732221-1777

TO : PD - Mrs. Shipley
DS - Mr. Hunt ✓FROM : BNA - Mr. Hulley *BNA*

SUBJECT: Whereabouts of U.S. citizens who may have information concerning RAOUL WALLENBERG.

memo to BK:mg - BNA
BK:mg 10-27-50
DATE: 10/26/50

In connection with the long-continued efforts of the Swedish Government to locate Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish Embassy in its memorandum of September 18, 1950 (copy attached) asked the assistance of the Department in attempting to locate an American named RUDOLPH SAMEBOLT. It also is possible that another American, JOHN GIBRAN, might have information concerning Wallenberg or Samebolt. Although Wallenberg was at various times reported with the Soviet Army or in the Soviet Union, nothing definite has been heard from him since January 1945.

Because Wallenberg had the support of the U.S. War Refugee Board in his efforts on behalf of the victims of fascism in Hungary, and in view of the interest of his step-brother in this country, the Department has endeavored so far as practicable to assist the Swedish efforts since 1945 to ascertain the fate of Wallenberg. Therefore, in an effort to follow up the present lead, it is requested that you have a thorough check made of your respective files for information concerning the Americans SAMEBOLT and GIBRAN. From the information in the attached memorandum it would not appear that either man was a member of the armed forces nor that further efforts to trace Samebolt with the help of U.S. military authorities in Berlin would be likely to yield positive results. Should the files of the Department reveal no information concerning either Samebolt or Gibran, we have in mind sending an inquiry to the Embassy in Moscow.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of September 18, 1950.

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UNCLASSIFIED

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

F783331-1776

DATE: October 27, 1950

TO : BNA - Mr. Benjamin M. Hulley

FROM : DS - E. J. Madill *EJM*

SUBJECT: Your memorandum of October 26 concerning the whereabouts of persons who may have knowledge of Raoul Wallenberg

DS' records show that in despatch 1617, September 10, 1947 Moscow reported that John Gibran departed March 15, 1946 en route to the United States through Germany with USSR repatriation organization. His address in the United States was given as 50 Anderson Street, Union City, New Jersey, the home of his sister, Mary G. Andrews.

According to this despatch a Rudolph Sambolt, no address in United States given, departed April 9, 1946 through Germany with USSR repatriation organization. On June 21, 1946 this same Rudolph Sambolt executed an application for a repatriation loan at Berlin on which he stated that he was born September 9, 1924 at Coreapolis, Pennsylvania. His sponsor was given as John Sambolt, Coreapolis, Pennsylvania. He arrived at New York July 15, 1946 on the SS MARINE FLASHER. A notation on his card in DS' records states: "10-2-46 See copy of confidential memorandum to FC from FBI sent to AEC (Albert E. Clattenburg, former chief of DS) by Mr. Neal of FC". If you believe that this memorandum would be of assistance to you perhaps SY would be in a position to furnish it.

5-D-251
This document released to
public per *M. J. J. J. J.*

12/5/75

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : BNA - Mr. Hurley

DATE: November 3, 1950

FROM : PD

SUBJECT: F130-Wallenberg, Raoul

5-D-251 12/5/75

This document released to
public per *M. J. J. J.**File 998*

FW 601.5864/9-1850

With reference to your memorandum of October 26, 1950 regarding the whereabouts of two American citizens, Rudolph Samebolt and John Gibran, who may have information concerning Raoul Wallenberg, you are informed that a search of the files of this Division fails to disclose a record of Samebolt or Gibran.

RSH
RUTH SHIPLEY

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*f. 601.5864/9-1850**Ant Bn*
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MEMORANDUM

601.5864/9-1850

With reference to the memorandum of the Swedish Embassy dated September 18, 1950, there is the following information in the files of the Department of State concerning the address of Rudolph Sambolt, who may have knowledge relating to Raoul Wallenberg.

It was reported in September 1947 by the American Embassy in Moscow that a Rudolph Sambolt had left the Soviet Union on April 9, 1946. On June 21, 1946, he applied at Berlin for repatriation to the United States, giving his birthplace as Coreapolis, Pennsylvania, and his birthdate as September 9, 1924. His sponsor was given as John Sambolt, Coreapolis, Pennsylvania. Despite the difference in spelling it seems likely that this is the man about whom the Embassy inquired.

Rudolph Sambolt,

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Rudolph Sambold, apparently not the same individual mentioned above, wrote to the Department of State on July 11, 1947, concerning passage to the United States from Vienna for his family. His address at that time was Post Office Box 24, Freedom, Pennsylvania. Another letter from Rudolph Sambold, referring to property in Austria, was dated January 6, 1948, and came from 524 Locust Place, Sewickley, Pennsylvania.

Of possible interest to the Embassy is the address given by John Gibrán when he left the Soviet Union in March 1946 for repatriation. This address was in care of his sister, Mary G. Andrews, Fifty Anderson Street, Union City, New Jersey.

Department of State,

Washington, November 20, 1950.

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

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EMBASSY OF SWEDEN
WASHINGTON 8, D.C.

No. 466



5-D-251

This document released to
public per *M. J. G. H. R.*

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DC/R



The Ambassador of Sweden presents his compliments to
the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to
acknowledge with thanks the receipt of the memorandum of the
Department of State, dated November 20, 1950, concerning Mr.
Raoul Wallenberg.

EUR: BNA: P. A. Hilliker

Washington, D.C., November 27, 1950.

*Referenced to note dated Sept 18, 1950
601.5864/9-1850*

*Regarding the disappearance of
Raoul Wallenberg who was
attacked by the Swedish Legation
in Budapest in 1945*

601.5864/11-2750

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EMBASSY OF SWEDEN
WASHINGTON 8, D.C.

*Handed by K+B
to Mr. Rogers Mar 21, 51*

5-D-251 12/5/75

This document released to
public per M. J. [illegible]

MEMORANDUM.



*Ans. prep d. 5/1/51
EUR: BNA-G. G. [illegible]*

Would it be possible to learn from the files of the War Refugee Board the approximate amount of the sum or the sums which through the then American Legation in Stockholm were paid out to Raoul Wallenberg for his actions in Budapest at the end of the war? These questions were at the time handled by the attaché at the Legation, Iver C. Olsen, who represented the War Refugee Board.

Washington, D.C., March 21, 1951.

*See #177
Swedish Embassy
601.5864/5-1151*

*ECA-Bang
H. Johnson
could meet*

*Olsen expected back soon - Call Thailand
Deskr ECA, Mr. Bidding
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: March 21, 1951

SUBJECT:

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 12/5/75

PER M Jeralbek OFFICE EIR

FADRC FOI CASE NO. 5-D-251

PARTICIPANTS: Erik Boheman, Ambassador of Sweden

Mr. G. Hayden Raynor, Director, BNA

Mr. Benjamin M. Hulley, Officer in Charge, Northern European Affairs

COPIES TO:

EUR, E, RA, BNA
American Embassy, Stockholm.

The Ambassador came to leave a memorandum on the disappearance of Wallenberg in 1945.

He then talked about his recent visit to Sweden where he had contributed a good deal to the discussions on the control of exports to the East. He had just received a message to the effect that exclusive of ball bearings out of 300 million kroner worth of exports to the East last year only 2 million worth were goods on the International List. (He called it the Embargo List.)

He talked about the growing problem of inflation in Sweden and the high level of employment and production. Mentioning the raw materials committee on wood-pulp which is now proposed, he said that Sweden had been opposed to such a committee. Swedish producers, of course, enjoy high prices now prevailing as this brings in foreign exchange. He spoke of the effect which the committee on certain non-ferrous metals had had in lowering the price of tungsten by suspending orders until a general program was set up.

He mentioned the problem of the 38th parallel in Korea and appeared sympathetic with our general attitude toward it.

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Hayden Raynor

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5-D-251

This document released to
public per Mjorubek

12/5/75

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of the memorandum from the Embassy of Sweden dated March 21, 1951, in which information was requested concerning payments made by Mr. Iver C. Olsen to Raoul Wallenberg.

Mr. Olsen recalls that during the period when he represented the War Refugee Board in Stockholm, he made three separate payments, indirectly, to Mr. Wallenberg. Except for the first of these, he states that the payments were made by depositing money in the Stockholm Enskilda Bank in Mr. Wallenberg's name, or possibly in a joint account held by Mr. Wallenberg and himself.

According to Mr. Olsen the first payment, in the amount of 10,000 kronor, was made in cash to Mr. Wallenberg through a third person in Stockholm. This was for the purpose of financing Mr. Wallenberg's preparations and travel to Budapest.

The second and third payments Mr. Olsen believes were in the amounts of 50,000 and 200,000 kronor deposited in the Enskilda Bank.

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601.5864/3-2151

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Bank. He states that the latter amount was contributed by the American Joint Distribution Committee and that, since Mr. Wallenberg used very little of it, the remainder was later returned to the Committee.

It is believed that the above-mentioned transactions could be verified by reference to the receipts and other records which are now in the Archives of the United States. However, Mr. Olsen suggests that, except in the case of the small initial payment, an exact and more complete statement of payments and withdrawals would be available from the Enskilda Bank.

Department of State,

Washington,

May 3, 1951.

S/S - CR

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
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
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EMBASSY OF SWEDEN
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

Nr.172.



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Memorandum.

The Embassy of Sweden acknowledges the receipt of the memorandum from the Department of State, dated May 3, 1951, and has the honor to express its best thanks for the information courteously given concerning certain payments made by Mr. Iver C. Olsen to Raoul Wallenberg.

Washington, May 11, 1951.

This document released to
public per M. J. J. J. J.

125175 5-D-251

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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MESSAGE

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EMBASSY OF SWEDEN
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION
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No. 217.

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 12/5/75
PER Mgerabek OFFICE EW
FADRC FOI CASE NO. 5-D-251

See 601.5864/5-1151
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
DC/1

Memorandum.

Reference is made to previous memoranda from this Embassy concerning Raoul Wallenberg.

It would be of the greatest interest to learn whether what has transpired in the case of Robert A. Vogeler could be of any use in this connection; specifically, whether Vogeler at any time in Hungarian prisons heard anything which might shed a light on Wallenberg's whereabouts. Vogeler is reported to have said during his first press interview after his release that while the preliminary interrogation was being carried on with him in a Budapest prison, he met a foreign fellow prisoner who was a very good linguist.

Washington, D.C., July 10, 1951.



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601.5864/7-1051

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(11)

INCLASSIFIED

No.217.

Memorandum.

Reference is made to previous memoranda from this Embassy concerning Raoul Wallenberg.

It would be of the greatest interest to learn whether what has transpired in the case of Robert A. Vogeler could be of any use in this connection; specifically, whether Vogeler at any time in Hungarian prisons heard anything which might shed a light on Wallenberg's whereabouts. Vogeler is reported to have said during his first press interview after his release that while the preliminary interrogation was being carried on with him in a Budapest prison, he met a foreign fellow prisoner who was a very good linguist.

Washington, D.C., July 10, 1951.



*To Embassy of Sweden***REGISTERED**

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DECLASSIFICATION DATE 12/5/75
PER MJewell OFFICE Eu
FADRC FOI CASE NO. 5-D-251**UNCLASSIFIED****MEMORANDUM**

The receipt is acknowledged of the Embassy's memorandum No. 217, dated July 10, 1951, concerning the possibility that the experiences of Robert A. Vogeler while in an Hungarian prison might assist in efforts to learn the whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg.

The Department has not yet completed its interviews with Mr. Vogeler, who is at present on an extended vacation in the western United States. The Embassy is informed, however, that Mr. Vogeler has stated to the Department on several occasions that he was held incommunicado from the time of his arrest until the time of his release.

When Mr. Vogeler returns from his vacation, the

Department

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UNCLASSIFIED

601.5864/7-1051



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Department will be very glad to discuss the Wallenberg case with him and to ask him for his recollection of any facts which may be pertinent to this subject.

Department of State,

Washington, D.C. July 31, 1951.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM 63 Department of State

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FROM: Stockholm

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 413, October 27, 11 a.m.

Control: 13994

Rec'd: October 27, 1955
9:57 a.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 413, REPEATED INFORMATION MOSCOW 11, BUDAPEST 2.

Raou
Secretary General Foreign Office informs me Swedes with public opinion greatly exercised about Wallenberg case on basis of stories from recently released Soviet prisoners are now planning to press case to a showdown. If Russians do not produce Wallenberg or a satisfactory explanation of what happened to him, Swedes will probably publish White Book regarding case. Secretary General indicated Swedish Foreign Office had a well-documented case of what happened to Wallenberg, beginning with his conviction by Soviets as American spy, and that publication of White Book would probably cause even greater storm in Sweden than shooting down of two Swedish planes in 1952. He said American Jews greatly interested in case because of Wallenberg's help to Jews. He does not think Wallenberg has been liquidated but that he may have died.

CABOT

LMS:REM/5

OFFICE
OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER

LW 10

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JAN 17 1956

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601.5864/10-27-55

Dear Mr. President!

RESPECTFULLY REFERRED
TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE

Released
(14)

I hope that your
Secretary will read this
important letter for you

The Assistant to the President

Central
Files

Please - next time - when you
Mr. President write to General
Zhukoff - ask him if he
can help the Swedish
prisoner, Raoul Wallenberg
to be a free man and come
home to Sweden
can help - please do that
and you will be the most
wonderful person in the world.
God bless you!

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 11 1955
PM 4 38
CSNW
FILED

Miss Linnea Gryn
6435 Winderm. Rd
Seattle 5; Wash

P.S. I am a Swedish teacher and
have been 2 years in U.S.

601.5864/11-955

Recd

D.S.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Dear Miss Grym:

After consideration at the White House, your letter to the President has been sent to the Department of State so that we might also see your comments. Thank you for making them available.

Sincerely yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:



John P. Meagher
Chief
Public Services Division

Miss Linnca Grym,
6435 Winderm Road,
Seattle 5, Washington.

March 30 1956

Dear Miss Grym:

After consideration at the White House, your letter to the President has been sent to the Department of State so that we might also see your comments. Thank you for making them available.

Sincerely yours,

For the ~~Acting~~ Secretary of State:

John P. Meagher
Chief
Public Services Division

Miss Linnea Grym,
6435 Winderm Road,
Seattle 5, Washington.

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DEPARTMENT OF
STATE

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TO:

Mr. John P. Meagher
(SEV)

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☐ APPROVE & RETURN
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☐ COMMENT & RETURN
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☐ HOLD
☐ INITIALS NEEDED
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☐ INVESTIGATE & REPORT
☐ JUSTIFY
☐ KEEP ME ADVISED
☐ LEGAL MATTER
☐ MEMO REQUIRED
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☐ RECONSIDER
☐ RECOMMEND ACTION
☐ RECORD
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☐ REWRITE
☐ SEE ME
☐ SIGNATURE REQUIRED
☐ TAKE ACTION
☐ TRANSFER
☐ TYPE
☐ VERIFY
☐ REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF

REMARKS:

I question that Miss
Gryn has any allegiance
to our Government, ~~and~~
~~would suggest~~, and would
suggest an appropriate
revision of the final
sentence.

FROM

W.D. Chase (SCA)

21 December 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. A. Sidney Buford, III
Director, Office of Libraries and
Intelligence-Acquisition

SUBJECT: Information Concerning Raoul WALLENBERG

1. Your memorandum of 3 November 1955, addressed to Mr. T. L. Beyer, Central Intelligence Agency, has been referred to this organization for reply as the Strategic Services Unit is charged with responsibility for liquidating the affairs of the Office of Strategic Services. A thorough review of our files as well as consultation with former officials of the OSS have resulted in the firm conclusion that WALLENBERG was in fact never employed by U. S. intelligence in any capacity. The following background information concerning subject was developed in the course of our research, which, however, may be of assistance to your Department.
2. During World War II WALLENBERG, while in Stockholm, was in contact with Mr. Iver C. OLSEN who was then stationed at the American Legation as Financial Attache, as a representative of the Treasury Department; secondly, as an OSS representative; and thirdly, as Stockholm representative of the War Refugee Board. It is understood that it was solely in this latter connection that WALLENBERG had dealings with OLSEN who was later instrumental in the selection of WALLENBERG for the mission to Budapest.
3. Following WALLENBERG's assignment to the Swedish Legation in Budapest he was supplied by OLSEN with funds for use only in assisting Jews in Hungary. These funds were made available to WALLENBERG through an account opened by the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) in the Stockholms Enskilda Bank, Stockholm. OLSEN drew on this account whenever WALLENBERG indicated a need for additional funds. The funds were then forwarded through Swedish Foreign Office channels. With the exception of 10,000 Swedish kronor which were given to WALLENBERG from the President's secret fund, all other funds came from the account in Stockholm and were used only in connection with refugee work.
4. Subsequent to WALLENBERG's disappearance in Budapest, the Stockholm account was closed, and the remaining balance, which is understood to have been fairly considerable, was returned to the JDC. Fuller

FW
601.5864/12-2855

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : BNA - Mr. Edward Crowley

DATE: December 28, 1955

FROM : OLI - Henry Lee *HR*

SUBJECT: Information on Raoul WALLENBERG

15

Attached is a memorandum from the Strategic Services Unit in response to our request for a further investigation of Wallenberg's possible connection with United States Intelligence.

As you know, CIA has previously informed us that its files contain no information concerning Wallenberg.

Reading over this report I feel there are still a few loose ends in the case, but believe this is all that can be done through CIA. Perhaps reference to the War Refugee Board records can give you a final clarification.

Please let me know if we can do anything more to assist you in this matter.

Attachment:

cc of memo to AEBuford dtd 12/21/55
from Strategic Services Unit, subj:
Information concerning Raoul WALLENBERG.

EXHIBITION COPY

DEC 29 PM 4 10

OFFICE OF
STRATEGIC SERVICES
UNIT*Serial 6101-5894/12-2855-*

Prescribed by RA/T

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documentary details of OLSEN's dealings with WALLINBERG are said to be found in a 3 volume TOP SECRET report on War Refugee Board Activities in Sweden, of which your Department is believed to hold a copy.

SIGNED

GARDNER B. MacPHERSON
Executive Officer
Strategic Services Unit

AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL
(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF : Joint Weeka No. 6, February 8, 1957.

February 25, 1957

DATE MAR - 1 1957

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44 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.	I N F O	RM/R-2 041-8 1/0-1 1/0 P-1 P-1 L-2 C.I.A.-15 OCB-1 USCIA-10 Army-4 Navy-3
	REC'D	OTHER		
	3/4			

SUBJECT: Soviet Union Alleges Raoul WALLENBERG Died in 1947.

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Summary

No story in contemporary Swedish history has received the press and radio play given the Soviet allegation that missing Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg died in a Moscow prison in July 1947. Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko handed a note to Swedish Ambassador SOHLMAN on February 6, 1957, explaining that after an intensive investigation "the conclusion should be drawn" that Raoul Wallenberg died of a heart condition on July 17, 1947, according to a physician's report to Minister of State Security ABAKUMOV (liquidated in the Beria purge). The Soviets blamed Abakumov for concealing Wallenberg's fate and expressed their regrets. Prime Minister Erlander presided over a press conference at 4 p.m. on February 7 at which Foreign Minister Undén and former Foreign Office Secretary General Arne Lundberg were present to give the details of the Soviet reply on Wallenberg to the Swedish press. The news was first released to the Swedish public by radio at 7 p.m. on February 7. An official Swedish Government declaration issued on February 7 stated, "It must be regretted that the Soviet reply contained such meager information." Strong doubts were voiced throughout the Swedish press about the veracity of the Soviet account which was deprecated as "too convenient" in fixing Wallenberg's death at the point Swedish evidence concerning his whereabouts in Russia stopped. A white paper is to be published amplifying the material given to the press on February 6, (this press background material forms the basis of the main story that follows).

1. The Soviet Memorandum of February 6, 1957.

The Soviet reply of February 6, 1957, was the first definite news from Moscow on Wallenberg's fate since his disappearance in 1945. A long series of Swedish notes and inquiries over the past eleven years had gone either unanswered by the Soviet Government or resulted in flat disclaimers of any knowledge of Wallenberg's whereabouts or fate. This long overdue Soviet reply of February 6, 1957, was based

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exclusively on a report said to have been found in the archives of a Moscow prison hospital and addressed to the former Soviet Minister of State Security Abakumov according to which Wallenberg was believed to have died from myocardiac infarct (coronary thrombosis). The body was said to have been cremated without autopsy. Wallenberg's imprisonment and the false information concerning him that had previously been supplied to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and from it to the Swedish Government was said to have been the result of Abakumov's "criminal activities", (Abakumov was executed in the Beria purge in 1954). The medical officer of the Ljublanka Prison who reported Wallenberg's death to Abakumov died in May 1953, according to the Soviet memorandum. No more documents or testimony on the Wallenberg case could be traced in the Soviet Union, the memorandum stated and it concluded with a few words of regret and sympathy addressed to the Swedish Government and to Wallenberg's next of kin. (Enclosure No. 1).

A Swedish Government declaration published simultaneously with the release of the text of the Soviet memorandum strongly regretted the meagerness of the information on Wallenberg's fate. Furthermore, the Swedish Government declared it expected that any further material in the case that might be found in the Soviet Union would be immediately communicated to Stockholm. (Enclosure No. 2).

2. Background Material Summarizing Swedish Government's Material on Wallenberg.

The essence of the huge amount of material in the Swedish Government's possession - mainly in the form of testimonies by German, Austrian and Italian prisoners of war released from Russia in recent years - tracing Wallenberg's whereabouts in Russia up to the middle of 1947 was handed to the press at the Government's press conference, and the full material will appear in the form of a white paper to be published toward the end of February. This material, previously submitted to the Soviet Government in connection with Prime Minister Erlander's and Interior Minister Hedlund's visit to Moscow in March-April 1956, does not include testimonies kept secret because of wishes expressed by those having testified who still have relatives or friends in Soviet-controlled countries, nor does it include material which, in the opinion of the Swedish Foreign Office, is of a nature as to cause serious consequences to other people if made available to the Russians.

The files on the Raoul Wallenberg case are reported to be the largest on any one subject ever amassed by the Foreign Office.

A list of the major Swedish diplomatic actions taken by Sweden in recent years in the Wallenberg case, and the Soviet replies, is attached. (Enclosure No. 3).

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Desp. No. 964
From Stockholm

Since February 1952, after more concrete material on Wallenberg's imprisonment in Russia had been obtained through testimonies by former prisoners of war, at least 15 written and 34 oral notes and reminders had been delivered by Sweden in Moscow, without result until the Soviet note of February 6, 1957.

The material made public by the Foreign Office includes testimonies by 19 ex-prisoners of war, mainly German, Austrian and Italian, who either shared prison cells with Wallenberg and/or his Hungarian chauffeur LANGFELDER (also missing since January 1945) or who claim they were in communication with him by prison code ("tapping") in the Ljublanka and Lefortovskaya prisons in Moscow. These various testimonies have been checked and correlated, but they all end in July 1947, the last date any of these prisoners had any contact with Wallenberg.

Two Justices of the Swedish Supreme Court testified on March 2, 1956, that they had studied these various testimonies and had come to the conclusion, independently of one another, that Raoul Wallenberg was taken into custody by the Russians and had been kept prisoner in the Soviet Union. Their testimony coincided to such a degree on essential points that under Swedish law, it constitutes binding evidence. This finding by the two Swedish Justices was included in the material supplied by Prime Minister Erlander to the Soviet Government in Moscow in March-April 1956.

Of special significance, and underscored by the Foreign Office, all of those who shared cells with Wallenberg and/or Langfelder at different times were especially questioned by the Russians during the month of July 1947 concerning their knowledge of Wallenberg and his experiences, in Budapest and in Soviet captivity; after these interrogations they were all placed in isolated cells with no means of communication with other prisoners. In the words of the Foreign Office: "The treatment accorded these prisoners after they had been questioned suggests that the Soviet authorities sought to prevent as far as possible any further spreading of knowledge of the Swedish diplomat."

Testimony given by other ex-prisoners of war claiming contact with Wallenberg even after July 1947 is also known to be in the possession of the Swedish Foreign Office but has not been included in the material released for publication because of lack of full and definite proof of its accuracy. Also, numerous alleged testimonies have been discarded as falsifications.

The unparalleled Swedish public and press concern over Raoul Wallenberg's fate kept alive over the past twelve years demands explanation, for it has been a significant factor in Swedish-Soviet relations.

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From Stockholm

Wallenberg's special mission in Budapest - he was not a career diplomat, but enjoyed diplomatic status as Secretary of Legation - was to seek to save Hungarian Jews threatened with annihilation by the Szalasi regime. By his energy, initiative and courage, it is estimated he saved the lives of some 20,000 people. "No other Swede in our history has had the opportunity in such a direct and personal way to save human lives by the thousands", said former Secretary General of the Foreign Office Arne Lundberg in his commentary over the Swedish radio on February 8, 1957.

Neutral during the war, Sweden did not experience, as many of the belligerent nations did, mass disappearance of nationals, so that the fate of one single Swedish citizen, particularly one engaged in humanitarian relief work, went to the heart of the general public.

Sweden acted as protective power for the Soviet Union in Hungary during the war and for that reason expected sympathetic treatment of her diplomatic personnel by the Russians, (for a short time, when the Red Army marched into Budapest, Wallenberg appears to have acted as Swedish Chargé d'Affaires)..

The blunt Soviet denials, over all these years, of any knowledge of Wallenberg's whereabouts or very existence aroused to an increasing extent Swedish indignation as belief turned into conviction that Wallenberg was held prisoner in Russia, with all that this entailed of suffering and horror.

Another aspect of this growing indignation among the Swedish public concerned the implied suspicion that the Foreign Office had not at an early stage conducted its investigations concerning Wallenberg with the necessary concern. Apparently on this assumption, a special committee of private citizens was formed (including relatives and friends of Wallenberg's) to conduct its own search for the missing diplomat and, in general, to speed up and activate the official investigations. Swedish officialdom did not relish this implied criticism of its efforts, and there were occasions of direct clashes between the Wallenberg Committee and, notably, Foreign Minister Undén who appears to have attached more faith in the Soviet assurances that could discover no information about Wallenberg than subsequent events warranted. In any event, public impatience with the negative Soviet attitude increased through Undén's apparent inclination, at least until 1951/52, to accept the Soviet version that Wallenberg was not to be found on Russian territory.

As Italian, German and other prisoners of war began to be released from Russia, toward the end of 1951, reports came through which appeared accurate about Wallenberg being or having been in Soviet imprisonment, and from then on, apparently with the Wallenberg Committee as a driving force, the Foreign Office pursued the case with added energy. Primarily responsible for this renewed activity was

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Arne Lundberg, who became Secretary General of the Foreign Office in 1951, and who is known to have taken on the Wallenberg case with strong personal interest and resourcefulness. A new series of notes were addressed to Moscow, beginning with a démarche of February 11, 1952, but the Soviet reply, when given at all, was always a reference to Vice Foreign Minister Vishinsky's note of August 18, 1947, disclaiming any knowledge of Wallenberg and his whereabouts.

A turning point occurred in April 1956 when Prime Minister Erlander visited Moscow. He had then occasion to present the Swedish views in person to Bulganin, Khrushchev and Molotov, and he extracted from them the promise that an exhaustive investigation would be made to ascertain Wallenberg's fate.

Again, however, the Russians saw fit to try the Swedish patience, for despite repeated reminders it was not until ten months later, on February 6, 1957, that the Soviet reply was given, stating that Wallenberg, on the strength of the meager evidence supplied, could be expected to have died in the Ljubanka Prison in Moscow on July 17, 1947.

3. Swedish Press Skepticism Toward Veracity of Soviet Explanation of February 6.

The long-overdue Soviet reply definitely did not satisfy Swedish opinion. Press commentaries were unanimous in describing the Soviet evidence, comprising one single document issued by a person now deceased and addressed to another also deceased (executed), as inadequate. The press also pointed to the vague, almost non-committal wording of the Soviet note, which stated there was "reason to look upon the document as referring to Raoul Wallenberg" and that "the conclusion should be drawn that Wallenberg died in July 1947". Main emphasis in the commentaries, however, was placed on the "convenient" timing of Wallenberg's alleged death with the testimonies in Swedish possession whereby Wallenberg was last heard of in July 1947, when prisoners of war had been interrogated by the Russians concerning Wallenberg and thereafter placed in isolated cells. The timing was also held to be interesting in view of the fact that in July 1947 Swedish Ambassador Sohlman in Moscow had made a renewed démarche to the Soviet Foreign Office, to which Vishinsky had replied by his negative note of August 18, 1947.

Although few commentators doubted that Raoul Wallenberg must now be dead, the Soviet version as to the timing and other circumstances met with profound skepticism and dissatisfaction in all quarters. Even the alleged cause of death - "myocarditic infarct" - was strongly questioned, and prominent Swedish heart specialists immediately declared this type of heart ailment highly improbable in a man of Wallenberg's age (he would have been 36 in

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July 1947).

The attempt on the part of the present Soviet rulers to cast all the blame for Wallenberg's arrest and imprisonment on the Stalinist regime and its hirelings was neither accepted by the press, which held that the treatment of an innocent neutral diplomat in the described fashion cast reflection on the whole Soviet system, with its inherent terror and disregard for human life, irrespective of who may for the moment be the rulers.

For all of the above reasons, there was a strong press urge that the Swedish Government not let the matter rest but that investigations continue in search of new evidence on Wallenberg's fate and that, meanwhile, new representations be made in Moscow demanding more information on why Wallenberg was imprisoned and what treatment he had been given.

Obviously, the Swedish Government is resolved to pursue its efforts to bring about full clarity in the Wallenberg case. This was implied in the immediate Government declaration following publication of the Soviet note on February 7 as well as by statement to the press by the Foreign Office that a Swedish reply to Moscow was under preparation.

Pending such a new Swedish démarche, Communist Ny Dag on February 19 featured an interview which its Moscow correspondent had with Gromyko; the new Soviet Foreign Minister, in which the latter was quoted as having declared that nothing further could be obtained concerning Wallenberg's fate beyond what was contained in the Soviet note of February 6, and that "the Wallenberg case should be considered closed".

Rather than quieting Swedish public opinion, this statement by Gromyko has further activated the demand here for the full story on the fate of an almost idolized Swedish citizen fallen the victim of a totalitarian police state. END OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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4. The Mystery of the Wallenberg Mission

Raoul Wallenberg, a cousin once removed of Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg, the bankers, was assigned to the Swedish legation in Budapest in 1945 in a special capacity to exercise good offices on behalf of the Jews who were being subjected to Nazi atrocities. All accounts claim that he issued Swedish documents and passports to many Jews in Hungary in order to aid them in escaping the Nazi terror. He was supplied with 260,000 Swedish crowns some time in 1945 by the United States War Refugee Board in Stockholm, (according to information in the files of Embassy Stockholm which was

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conveyed to the Swedish Government by note from the Department of State in Washington on May 1, 1951). A sum of 10,000 Swedish crowns was given Wallenberg through a third person in Stockholm to finance his travel to Budapest. Subsequent payments of 50,000 and 200,000 Swedish crowns were deposited to his account in the Stockholm Enskilda Bank. The 200,000 Swedish crown payment was given by the American Joint Distribution Committee and since Wallenberg used "very little of it, the remainder was later returned to the Committee".

A current explanation of why Wallenberg was liquidated by the Russians was because they believed he was an American spy. Rudolph PHILIPP, the Secretary of the Wallenberg Committee, (a group of distinguished Swedish citizens), once claimed that Wallenberg had been on a secret mission for President Roosevelt. Many Swedish officials have noted to the reporting officer that Wallenberg was a close friend of former American Minister Herschel JOHNSON and that he was the one who is supposed to have picked Wallenberg for his "dangerous mission".

In any event, there is no concrete evidence available so far to clarify whether or not Wallenberg was engaged in espionage activities or a secret or confidential mission for any foreign power.

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From Stockholm

Joseph Sweeney
Joseph Sweeney
First Secretary of Embassy

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Desp. No. 964
From Stockholm

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 6, 1957, BY SOVIET VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO TO SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW ROLF SOHLMAN IN THE RAOUL WALLENBERG CASE

(Translation of text as released by the Swedish Foreign Office to the press February 7, 1957)

In pursuance of the Swedish Government's request, the Soviet Government instructed the pertinent Soviet authorities to peruse the material concerning Raoul Wallenberg which had been received from Swedish quarters at the Swedish-Soviet negotiations in Moscow in March - April 1956 and also in May 1956. In the course of perusal and testing of the said material, the Soviet authorities have made a careful search of the archives which refer to the accounting for prisoners and to investigation questions ("Sledstvenye Dela"), for the purpose of finding possible information on Wallenberg. Similarly, many persons have been questioned who could have had anything to do with the circumstances mentioned in the material received from Sweden.

As a result of these measures, however, it has not been possible to find any information whatsoever concerning Wallenberg's sojourn in the Soviet Union. It has transpired that none of those heard knew any person by the name of Wallenberg. In this connection, the competent Soviet authorities have undertaken a search page by page of the archive documents from all wards in certain prisons. As a result of such search of archive documents from the health service in the Ljublanka Prison, a document has been found which there is good reason to consider as referring to Raoul Wallenberg.

This document has the form of a hand-written report, addressed to the former Minister of the State Security in the Soviet Union, Abakumov, and written by the head of the health service at the said prison, A.L. Smoltsov, reading as follows:

"I report that the prisoner Wallenberg, who is well known to you, died suddenly in his cell this night, probably as the result of a heart attack. Pursuant to instructions given by you that I personally have Wallenberg under my care, I request approval to make an autopsy with a view to establishing the cause of death.

"July 17, 1947.

"Smoltsov,

"Chief of the Prison's Sanitary Ward,

"Colonel in the Medical Service."

On this report, the following notation is found, in Smoltsov's handwriting: "I have personally notified the Minister and it has been ordered that the body be cremated without autopsy. July 17. Smoltsov."

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It has not been possible to find any other information whatsoever having the character of document or testimony, all the more since the aforementioned A. L. Smoltsov died on May 7, 1953. On the strength of what has been cited above, the conclusion should be drawn that Wallenberg died in July 1947.

Raoul Wallenberg was apparently arrested along with other persons in the area for military operations by Soviet troops. At the same time, it may be considered indisputable that Wallenberg's subsequent detention in prison as well as the incorrect information about him supplied by certain former leaders of the security organs to the Soviet Union's Foreign Ministry over a period of years comprised the result of Abakumov's criminal activities. In connection with gross crimes committed by him, it will be recalled that Abakumov, who had engaged in activities implying violation of the laws of the Soviet Union and who had sought to inflict upon the Soviet Union all kinds of damage, was executed in accordance with verdict handed down by the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government presents its sincere regrets because of what has occurred and expresses its profound sympathy to the Swedish Government as well as to Raoul Wallenberg's relatives.

Translation: NMöller

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Desp. No. 964
From Stockholm

OFFICIAL COMMENTARY BY THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT TO THE SOVIET
MEMORANDUM ON RAOUL WALLENBERG, ISSUED FEBRUARY 7, 1957.

The Soviet Government has drawn the conclusion from its investigations that Wallenberg died in a Russian prison in July 1947. The responsibility for his having been detained in prison and for the false information previously supplied is placed on the Soviet security organs and the Soviet Government expresses its sincere regrets for what has occurred.

Concerning the reply, it can be established that it is now being admitted on Russia's part that Wallenberg has been held imprisoned in the Soviet Union. In that respect, the reply tallies with the Swedish evidence material. It must be strongly regretted, however, that the reply contains such meager information. Nothing is said about the motives for Wallenberg's arrest or about his fate during the years that followed. We expect that if any new material should appear in the Soviet Union we shall immediately have it communicated to us.

To Raoul Wallenberg's mother and relatives, who for so many years have had to live in horrible uncertainty, the Russian reply must imply yet another hard blow. They have our profound sympathy.

Translation: NMöller

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EXCHANGES BETWEEN SWEDEN AND THE SOVIET UNION CONCERNING
RAOUL WALLENBERG 1945 - 1957.

Among the numerous inquiries and reminders, formal as well as informal, made by the Swedish Minister in Moscow to the Soviet Government, and by the Foreign Office in Stockholm to the Soviet Minister since 1945 concerning Wallenberg's whereabouts, the following major exchanges took place:

- 11/31/1945 Swedish note submitted to Vice Foreign Minister DEKANOSOV requesting an exhaustive account of the results of the search made by the Soviet authorities concerning Wallenberg.
- 12/12/1946 Demarche made by the Swedish Legation in Moscow giving a list of previous Swedish inquiries concerning Wallenberg.
- 8/18/1947 Soviet Foreign Ministry, following renewed Swedish representations, stated that investigations had produced no result, and that it could be presumed that Wallenberg had either been killed during the fighting in Budapest in January 1945 or had been taken prisoner by Hungarian Fascists.
- 12/11/1951 Swedish Government demanded that the Soviet Union take the necessary measures for Wallenberg's early return to Sweden.
- 4/16/1952 Soviet Government replied by stating that it possessed no further information beyond that contained in its note of 8/18/1947.
- 5/23/1952 Note submitted to Soviet Ambassador RODIONOV in Stockholm, and simultaneously through Swedish Embassy in Moscow to Vice Foreign Minister Zorin, inquiring whether Soviet Government prepared to make further inquiries if supplied with material collected in the course of Swedish inquiries.
- 8/5/53 The two Swedish demarches in Stockholm and Moscow replied to by Ambassador Rodionov advising that earlier Soviet information in the case had been "confirmed" and that any attempt to connect Wallenberg's fate with his alleged sojourn in the Soviet Union would be wholly futile.

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9/29/1954 Extensive memorandum on results of Swedish search for Wallenberg submitted to Soviet Government, based among other things on new evidence in the possession of the Swedish Foreign Office confirming earlier conclusions that Wallenberg was a prisoner in the USSR.

3/10/1956 Foreign Minister Undén handed Soviet Ambassador Rodionov in Stockholm a note detailing new material obtained following inquiries among Austrian and German citizens returned from Soviet prisons.

3/19/1956 Soviet note to Swedish Embassy in Moscow "confirming" that all statements previously made that Wallenberg was not to be found on Soviet territory were final, and declaring that nothing further could be added.

3/29 -
4/5/1956 Prime Minister Erlander and Interior Minister Hedlund conferred in Moscow with Soviet leaders and Soviet Government agreed to Swedish request for renewed investigation concerning Wallenberg on basis of new evidence and other material submitted to Moscow.

7/14/1956 Ambassador Rodionov advised the Swedish Foreign Office that information resulting from new Soviet investigations concerning Wallenberg could be expected "shortly".

9/29/1956 Swedish Embassy in Moscow instructed to lodge a new reminder with the Soviet Foreign Office, pointing out that six months had elapsed since the Soviet Government undertook to investigate new material on Wallenberg.

11/13/1956 Sharp Swedish reminder lodged with Soviet Foreign Office expressing surprise and great disappointment that Soviet promises had not yet been implemented.

2/6/1957 Soviet reply stating that Wallenberg died in a Moscow prison in July 1947.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF : Joint Weeka No. 6, February 8, 1957.

February 25, 1957

DATE MAR -1 1957

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SUBJECT: Soviet Union Alleges Raoul WALLENBERG Died in 1947.

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No story in contemporary Swedish history has received the press and radio play given the Soviet allegation that missing Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg died in a Moscow prison in July 1947. Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko handed a note to Swedish Ambassador SOHMAN on February 6, 1957, explaining that after an intensive investigation "the conclusion should be drawn" that Raoul Wallenberg died of a heart condition on July 17, 1947, according to a physician's report to Minister of State Security ABAKUMOV (liquidated in the Beria purge). The Soviets blamed Abakumov for concealing Wallenberg's fate and expressed their regrets. Prime Minister Erlander presided over a press conference at 4 p.m. on February 7 at which Foreign Minister Undén and former Foreign Office Secretary General Arne Lundberg were present to give the details of the Soviet reply on Wallenberg to the Swedish press. The news was first released to the Swedish public by radio at 7 p.m. on February 7. An official Swedish Government declaration issued on February 7 stated, "It must be regretted that the Soviet reply contained such meager information." Strong doubts were voiced throughout the Swedish press about the veracity of the Soviet account which was deprecated as "too convenient" in fixing Wallenberg's death at the point Swedish evidence concerning his whereabouts in Russia stopped. A white paper is to be published amplifying the material given to the press on February 6, (this press background material forms the basis of the main story that follows).

1. The Soviet Memorandum of February 6, 1957.

The Soviet reply of February 6, 1957, was the first definite news from Moscow on Wallenberg's fate since his disappearance in 1945. A long series of Swedish notes and inquiries over the past eleven years had gone either unanswered by the Soviet Government or resulted in flat disclaimers of any knowledge of Wallenberg's whereabouts or fate. This long overdue Soviet reply of February 6, 1957, was based

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exclusively on a report said to have been found in the archives of a Moscow prison hospital and addressed to the former Soviet Minister of State Security Abakumov according to which Wallenberg was believed to have died from myocardiac infarct (coronary thrombosis). The body was said to have been cremated without autopsy. Wallenberg's imprisonment and the false information concerning him that had previously been supplied to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and from it to the Swedish Government was said to have been the result of Abakumov's "criminal activities", (Abakumov was executed in the Beria purge in 1954). The medical officer of the Ljublanka Prison who reported Wallenberg's death to Abakumov died in May 1953, according to the Soviet memorandum. No more documents or testimony on the Wallenberg case could be traced in the Soviet Union, the memorandum stated and it concluded with a few words of regret and sympathy addressed to the Swedish Government and to Wallenberg's next of kin. (Enclosure No. 1).

A Swedish Government declaration published simultaneously with the release of the text of the Soviet memorandum strongly regretted the meagerness of the information on Wallenberg's fate. Furthermore, the Swedish Government declared it expected that any further material in the case that might be found in the Soviet Union would be immediately communicated to Stockholm. (Enclosure No. 2).

2. Background Material Summarizing Swedish Government's Material on Wallenberg.

The essence of the huge amount of material in the Swedish Government's possession - mainly in the form of testimonies by German, Austrian and Italian prisoners of war released from Russia in recent years - tracing Wallenberg's whereabouts in Russia up to the middle of 1947 was handed to the press at the Government's press conference, and the full material will appear in the form of a white paper to be published toward the end of February. This material, previously submitted to the Soviet Government in connection with Prime Minister Erlander's and Interior Minister Hedlund's visit to Moscow in March-April 1956, does not include testimonies kept secret because of wishes expressed by those having testified who still have relatives or friends in Soviet-controlled countries, nor does it include material which, in the opinion of the Swedish Foreign Office, is of a nature as to cause serious consequences to other people if made available to the Russians.

The files on the Raoul Wallenberg case are reported to be the largest on any one subject ever amassed by the Foreign Office.

A list of the major Swedish diplomatic actions taken by Sweden in recent years in the Wallenberg case, and the Soviet replies, is attached. (Enclosure No. 3).

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Since February 1952, after more concrete material on Wallenberg's imprisonment in Russia had been obtained through testimonies by former prisoners of war, at least 15 written and 34 oral notes and reminders had been delivered by Sweden in Moscow, without result until the Soviet note of February 6, 1957.

The material made public by the Foreign Office includes testimonies by 19 ex-prisoners of war, mainly German, Austrian and Italian, who either shared prison cells with Wallenberg and/or his Hungarian chauffeur LANGFELDER (also missing since January 1945) or who claim they were in communication with him by prison code ("tapping") in the Ljublanka and Lefortovskaya prisons in Moscow. These various testimonies have been checked and correlated, but they all end in July 1947, the last date any of these prisoners had any contact with Wallenberg.

Two Justices of the Swedish Supreme Court testified on March 2, 1956, that they had studied these various testimonies and had come to the conclusion, independently of one another, that Raoul Wallenberg was taken into custody by the Russians and had been kept prisoner in the Soviet Union. Their testimony coincided to such a degree on essential points that under Swedish law, it constitutes binding evidence. This finding by the two Swedish Justices was included in the material supplied by Prime Minister Erlander to the Soviet Government in Moscow in March-April 1956.

Of special significance, and underscored by the Foreign Office, all of those who shared cells with Wallenberg and/or Langfelder at different times were especially questioned by the Russians during the month of July 1947 concerning their knowledge of Wallenberg and his experiences, in Budapest and in Soviet captivity; after these interrogations they were all placed in isolated cells with no means of communication with other prisoners. In the words of the Foreign Office: "The treatment accorded these prisoners after they had been questioned suggests that the Soviet authorities sought to prevent as far as possible any further spreading of knowledge of the Swedish diplomat."

Testimony given by other ex-prisoners of war claiming contact with Wallenberg even after July 1947 is also known to be in the possession of the Swedish Foreign Office but has not been included in the material released for publication because of lack of full and definite proof of its accuracy. Also, numerous alleged testimonies have been discarded as falsifications.

The unparalleled Swedish public and press concern over Raoul Wallenberg's fate kept alive over the past twelve years demands explanation, for it has been a significant factor in Swedish-Soviet relations.

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Wallenberg's special mission in Budapest - he was not a career diplomat, but enjoyed diplomatic status as Secretary of Legation - was to seek to save Hungarian Jews threatened with annihilation by the Szalasi regime. By his energy, initiative and courage, it is estimated he saved the lives of some 20,000 people. "No other Swede in our history has had the opportunity in such a direct and personal way to save human lives by the thousands", said former Secretary General of the Foreign Office Arne Lundberg in his commentary over the Swedish radio on February 8, 1957.

Neutral during the war, Sweden did not experience, as many of the belligerent nations did, mass disappearance of nationals, so that the fate of one single Swedish citizen, particularly one engaged in humanitarian relief work, went to the heart of the general public.

Sweden acted as protective power for the Soviet Union in Hungary during the war and for that reason expected sympathetic treatment of her diplomatic personnel by the Russians, (for a short time, when the Red Army marched into Budapest, Wallenberg appears to have acted as Swedish Chargé d'Affaires).

The blunt Soviet denials, over all these years, of any knowledge of Wallenberg's whereabouts or very existence aroused to an increasing extent Swedish indignation as belief turned into conviction that Wallenberg was held prisoner in Russia, with all that this entailed of suffering and horror.

Another aspect of this growing indignation among the Swedish public concerned the implied suspicion that the Foreign Office had not at an early stage conducted its investigations concerning Wallenberg with the necessary concern. Apparently on this assumption, a special committee of private citizens was formed (including relatives and friends of Wallenberg's) to conduct its own search for the missing diplomat and, in general, to speed up and activate the official investigations. Swedish officialdom did not relish this implied criticism of its efforts, and there were occasions of direct clashes between the Wallenberg Committee and, notably, Foreign Minister Undén who appears to have attached more faith in the Soviet assurances that could discover no information about Wallenberg than subsequent events warranted. In any event, public impatience with the negative Soviet attitude increased through Undén's apparent inclination, at least until 1951/52, to accept the Soviet version that Wallenberg was not to be found on Russian territory.

As Italian, German and other prisoners of war began to be released from Russia, toward the end of 1951, reports came through which appeared accurate about Wallenberg being or having been in Soviet imprisonment, and from then on, apparently with the Wallenberg Committee as a driving force, the Foreign Office pursued the case with added energy. Primarily responsible for this renewed activity was

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Arne Lundberg, who became Secretary General of the Foreign Office in 1951, and who is known to have taken on the Wallenberg case with strong personal interest and resourcefulness. A new series of notes were addressed to Moscow, beginning with a démarche of February 11, 1952, but the Soviet reply, when given at all, was always a reference to Vice Foreign Minister Vishinsky's note of August 18, 1947, disclaiming any knowledge of Wallenberg and his whereabouts.

A turning point occurred in April 1956 when Prime Minister Erlander visited Moscow. He had then occasion to present the Swedish views in person to Bulganin, Khrushchev and Molotov, and he extracted from them the promise that an exhaustive investigation would be made to ascertain Wallenberg's fate.

Again, however, the Russians saw fit to try the Swedish patience, for despite repeated reminders it was not until ten months later, on February 6, 1957, that the Soviet reply was given, stating that Wallenberg, on the strength of the meager evidence supplied, could be expected to have died in the Ljublanka Prison in Moscow on July 17, 1947.

3. Swedish Press Skepticism Toward Veracity of Soviet Explanation of February 6.

The long-overdue Soviet reply definitely did not satisfy Swedish opinion. Press commentaries were unanimous in describing the Soviet evidence, comprising one single document issued by a person now deceased and addressed to another also deceased (executed), as inadequate. The press also pointed to the vague, almost non-committal wording of the Soviet note, which stated there was "reason to look upon the document as referring to Raoul Wallenberg" and that "the conclusion should be drawn that Wallenberg died in July 1947". Main emphasis in the commentaries, however, was placed on the "convenient" timing of Wallenberg's alleged death with the testimonies in Swedish possession whereby Wallenberg was last heard of in July 1947, when prisoners of war had been interrogated by the Russians concerning Wallenberg and thereafter placed in isolated cells. The timing was also held to be interesting in view of the fact that in July 1947 Swedish Ambassador Sohlman in Moscow had made a renewed démarche to the Soviet Foreign Office, to which Vishinsky had replied by his negative note of August 18, 1947.

Although few commentators doubted that Raoul Wallenberg must now be dead, the Soviet version as to the timing and other circumstances met with profound skepticism and dissatisfaction in all quarters. Even the alleged cause of death - "myocarditic infarct" - was strongly questioned, and prominent Swedish heart specialists immediately declared this type of heart ailment highly improbable in a man of Wallenberg's age (he would have been 36 in

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July 1947).

The attempt on the part of the present Soviet rulers to cast all the blame for Wallenberg's arrest and imprisonment on the Stalinist regime and its hirelings was neither accepted by the press, which held that the treatment of an innocent neutral diplomat in the described fashion cast reflection on the whole Soviet system, with its inherent terror and disregard for human life, irrespective of who may for the moment be the rulers.

For all of the above reasons, there was a strong press urge that the Swedish Government not let the matter rest but that investigations continue in search of new evidence on Wallenberg's fate and that, meanwhile, new representations be made in Moscow demanding more information on why Wallenberg was imprisoned and what treatment he had been given.

Obviously, the Swedish Government is resolved to pursue its efforts to bring about full clarity in the Wallenberg case. This was implied in the immediate Government declaration following publication of the Soviet note on February 7 as well as by statement to the press by the Foreign Office that a Swedish reply to Moscow was under preparation.

Pending such a new Swedish démarche, Communist Ny Dag on February 19 featured an interview which its Moscow correspondent had with Gromyko, the new Soviet Foreign Minister, in which the latter was quoted as having declared that nothing further could be obtained concerning Wallenberg's fate beyond what was contained in the Soviet note of February 6, and that "the Wallenberg case should be considered closed".

Rather than quieting Swedish public opinion, this statement by Gromyko has further activated the demand here for the full story on the fate of an almost idolized Swedish citizen fallen the victim of a totalitarian police state. END OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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4. The Mystery of the Wallenberg Mission

Raoul Wallenberg, a cousin once removed of Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg, the bankers, was assigned to the Swedish legation in Budapest in 1945 in a special capacity to exercise good offices on behalf of the Jews who were being subjected to Nazi atrocities. All accounts claim that he issued Swedish documents and passports to many Jews in Hungary in order to aid them in escaping the Nazi terror. He was supplied with 260,000 Swedish crowns some time in 1945 by the United States War Refugee Board in Stockholm, (according to information in the files of Embassy Stockholm which was

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From Stockholm

conveyed to the Swedish Government by note from the Department of State in Washington on May 1, 1951). A sum of 10,000 Swedish crowns was given Wallenberg through a third person in Stockholm to finance his travel to Budapest. Subsequent payments of 50,000 and 200,000 Swedish crowns were deposited to his account in the Stockholm Enskilda Bank. The 200,000 Swedish crown payment was given by the American Joint Distribution Committee and since Wallenberg used "very little of it, the remainder was later returned to the Committee".

A current explanation of why Wallenberg was liquidated by the Russians was because they believed he was an American spy. Rudolph PHILIPP, the Secretary of the Wallenberg Committee, (a group of distinguished Swedish citizens), once claimed that Wallenberg had been on a secret mission for President Roosevelt. Many Swedish officials have noted to the reporting officer that Wallenberg was a close friend of former American Minister Herschel JOHNSON and that he was the one who is supposed to have picked Wallenberg for his "dangerous mission".

In any event, there is no concrete evidence available so far to clarify whether or not Wallenberg was engaged in espionage activities or a secret or confidential mission for any foreign power.

5. Foreign Office Reactions on Soviet Reply.

In a general discussion of the Wallenberg case, the Assistant Director of the Political Section of the Foreign Office explained that three things about the Soviet reply of February 6, 1957, had surprised the Foreign Office. The first surprise was that any answer had been given; there existed a strong suspicion in the Foreign Office at the working level that the Soviet Union would never give any detailed sort of reply and was not expected to go beyond its previous notes saying it had no information. The second surprise concerned the language of the Soviet memorandum. Obviously, according to the Foreign Office, every word of the Soviet message had been weighed and undoubtedly went through many drafts. For such a note to use such vague language as "the conclusion should be drawn" and the lack of precision in identifying the prisoner who died as Raoul Wallenberg, means, as the Foreign Office interprets it, that the Soviet Government is still free to adopt another interpretation if it chooses. The third surprise to the Foreign Office was that the Soviet memorandum seeks to align the Swedish Government on the side of the present Kremlin regime in its denunciation of Beria.

The Foreign Office was far from satisfied with the Soviet reply to the many inquiries concerning Wallenberg. However, the Foreign Office believes it has no rational alternative now but to believe that Wallenberg is dead. It would still like to obtain more

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details of his imprisonment.

Foreign Office officials remain puzzled as to why the Soviet note was sent at this time and are still not sure of its full significance. These explanations are still under consideration: (1) it was an attempt to remove obvious misunderstandings before the new Soviet Ambassador GUSEV arrives; (2) by sending what it thought was a "conciliatory" note with an unprecedented expression of "regrets", this action becomes part of the new Soviet campaign to woo the Nordic countries; (3) this "patently contrived" account, delivered to stop further inquiries, was a Soviet Foreign Office miscalculation of how seriously the Swedish people considered the Wallenberg case; and (4) the explanation given by the Soviet Union is true, and the Soviet Foreign Office sent the information as soon as it obtained it. Whatever the explanation, Bureau Chief opinion insists that as a result of the Soviet reply alleging that Wallenberg died in a Moscow prison, Swedish-Soviet relations have been significantly worsened.

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For the Ambassador:

Joseph Sweeney

Joseph Sweeney
First Secretary of Embassy

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Desp. No. 964
From Stockholm

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MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 6, 1957, BY SOVIET VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO TO SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW ROLF SOHLMAN IN THE RAOUL WALLENBERG CASE

(Translation of text as released by the Swedish Foreign Office to the press February 7, 1957)

In pursuance of the Swedish Government's request, the Soviet Government instructed the pertinent Soviet authorities to peruse the material concerning Raoul Wallenberg which had been received from Swedish quarters at the Swedish-Soviet negotiations in Moscow in March - April 1956 and also in May 1956. In the course of perusal and testing of the said material, the Soviet authorities have made a careful search of the archives which refer to the accounting for prisoners and to investigation questions ("Sledstvenye Dela"), for the purpose of finding possible information on Wallenberg. Similarly, many persons have been questioned who could have had anything to do with the circumstances mentioned in the material received from Sweden.

As a result of these measures, however, it has not been possible to find any information whatsoever concerning Wallenberg's sojourn in the Soviet Union. It has transpired that none of those heard knew any person by the name of Wallenberg. In this connection, the competent Soviet authorities have undertaken a search page by page of the archive documents from all wards in certain prisons. As a result of such search of archive documents from the health service in the Ljublanka Prison, a document has been found which there is good reason to consider as referring to Raoul Wallenberg.

This document has the form of a hand-written report, addressed to the former Minister of the State Security in the Soviet Union, Abakumov, and written by the head of the health service at the said prison, A.L. Smoltsov, reading as follows:

"I report that the prisoner Wallenberg, who is well known to you, died suddenly in his cell this night, probably as the result of a heart attack. Pursuant to instructions given by you that I personally have Wallenberg under my care, I request approval to make an autopsy with a view to establishing the cause of death.

"July 17, 1947.

"Smoltsov,

"Chief of the Prison's Sanitary Ward,

"Colonel in the Medical Service."

On this report, the following notation is found, in Smoltsov's handwriting: "I have personally notified the Minister and it has been ordered that the body be cremated without autopsy. July 17. Smoltsov."

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It has not been possible to find any other information whatsoever having the character of document or testimony, all the more since the aforementioned A. L. Smoltsov died on May 7, 1953. On the strength of what has been cited above, the conclusion should be drawn that Wallenberg died in July 1947.

Raoul Wallenberg was apparently arrested along with other persons in the area for military operations by Soviet troops. At the same time, it may be considered indisputable that Wallenberg's subsequent detention in prison as well as the incorrect information about him supplied by certain former leaders of the security organs to the Soviet Union's Foreign Ministry over a period of years comprised the result of Abakumov's criminal activities. In connection with gross crimes committed by him, it will be recalled that Abakumov, who had engaged in activities implying violation of the laws of the Soviet Union and who had sought to inflict upon the Soviet Union all kinds of damage, was executed in accordance with verdict handed down by the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government presents its sincere regrets because of what has occurred and expresses its profound sympathy to the Swedish Government as well as to Raoul Wallenberg's relatives.

Translation: NMöller

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Desp. No. 964

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OFFICIAL COMMENTARY BY THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT TO THE SOVIET
MEMORANDUM ON RAOUL WALLENBERG, ISSUED FEBRUARY 7, 1957.

The Soviet Government has drawn the conclusion from its investigations that Wallenberg died in a Russian prison in July 1947. The responsibility for his having been detained in prison and for the false information previously supplied is placed on the Soviet security organs and the Soviet Government expresses its sincere regrets for what has occurred.

Concerning the reply, it can be established that it is now being admitted on Russia's part that Wallenberg has been held imprisoned in the Soviet Union. In that respect, the reply tallies with the Swedish evidence material. It must be strongly regretted, however, that the reply contains such meager information. Nothing is said about the motives for Wallenberg's arrest or about his fate during the years that followed. We expect that if any new material should appear in the Soviet Union we shall immediately have it communicated to us.

To Raoul Wallenberg's mother and relatives, who for so many years have had to live in horrible uncertainty, the Russian reply must imply yet another hard blow. They have our profound sympathy.

Translation: NMöller

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EXCHANGES BETWEEN SWEDEN AND THE SOVIET UNION CONCERNING
RAOUL WALLENBERG 1945 - 1957.

Among the numerous inquiries and reminders, formal as well as informal, made by the Swedish Minister in Moscow to the Soviet Government, and by the Foreign Office in Stockholm to the Soviet Minister since 1945 concerning Wallenberg's whereabouts, the following major exchanges took place:

- 11/31/1945 Swedish note submitted to Vice Foreign Minister DEKANOSOV requesting an exhaustive account of the results of the search made by the Soviet authorities concerning Wallenberg.
- 12/12/1946 D marche made by the Swedish Legation in Moscow giving a list of previous Swedish inquiries concerning Wallenberg.
- 8/18/1947 Soviet Foreign Ministry, following renewed Swedish representations, stated that investigations had produced no result, and that it could be presumed that Wallenberg had either been killed during the fighting in Budapest in January 1945 or had been taken prisoner by Hungarian Fascists.
- 12/11/1951 Swedish Government demanded that the Soviet Union take the necessary measures for Wallenberg's early return to Sweden.
- 4/16/1952 Soviet Government replied by stating that it possessed no further information beyond that contained in its note of 8/18/1947.
- 5/23/1952 Note submitted to Soviet Ambassador RODIONOV in Stockholm, and simultaneously through Swedish Embassy in Moscow to Vice Foreign Minister Zorin, inquiring whether Soviet Government prepared to make further inquiries if supplied with material collected in the course of Swedish inquiries.
- 8/5/53 The two Swedish d marches in Stockholm and Moscow replied to by Ambassador Rodionov advising that earlier Soviet information in the case had been "confirmed" and that any attempt to connect Wallenberg's fate with his alleged sojourn in the Soviet Union would be wholly futile.

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From Stockholm

9/29/1954 Extensive memorandum on results of Swedish search for Wallenberg submitted to Soviet Government, based among other things on new evidence in the possession of the Swedish Foreign Office confirming earlier conclusions that Wallenberg was a prisoner in the USSR.

3/10/1956 Foreign Minister Undén handed Soviet Ambassador Rodionov in Stockholm a note detailing new material obtained following inquiries among Austrian and German citizens returned from Soviet prisons.

3/19/1956 Soviet note to Swedish Embassy in Moscow "confirming" that all statements previously made that Wallenberg was not to be found on Soviet territory were final, and declaring that nothing further could be added.

3/29 -
4/5/1956 Prime Minister Erlander and Interior Minister Hedlund conferred in Moscow with Soviet leaders and Soviet Government agreed to Swedish request for renewed investigation concerning Wallenberg on basis of new evidence and other material submitted to Moscow.

7/14/1956 Ambassador Rodionov advised the Swedish Foreign Office that information resulting from new Soviet investigations concerning Wallenberg could be expected "shortly".

9/29/1956 Swedish Embassy in Moscow instructed to lodge a new reminder with the Soviet Foreign Office, pointing out that six months had elapsed since the Soviet Government undertook to investigate new material on Wallenberg.

11/13/1956 Sharp Swedish reminder lodged with Soviet Foreign Office expressing surprise and great disappointment that Soviet promises had not yet been implemented.

2/6/1957 Soviet reply stating that Wallenberg died in a Moscow prison in July 1947.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

989

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

March 5, 1957

REF : Embassy Despatch No. 964, Feb. 25, 1957;

DATE

Joint Weeka No. 8, Feb. 21, 1957.

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	3/11	CIA-15 OCB-1 USIA-10 Army-4 Navy-3 Rev-3 OSD-4

SUBJECT: Sharp Swedish Note to Soviet Union Regarding Russian Memorandum of February 6, 1957, on Wallenberg Case.

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The Swedish Government sent a sharply worded note to the Soviet Union on February 19, 1957, in answer to the Russian memorandum of February 6th which contained the information that Wallenberg had died in a Soviet prison. In unusually strong critical language the Swedish Government implied that it did not consider the Soviet Union's answer satisfactory. To make sure that there could be no misunderstanding of its position, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs released the full text of the Swedish note to the Soviet Union to the press on February 20, 1957, a copy of the translation of this note distributed by the press section of the Foreign Office is attached as Enclosure No. 1.

The Swedish note of February 19 laid full responsibility for detaining Raoul Wallenberg in a Soviet prison and for giving incorrect information to the Swedish Government about Wallenberg on the Soviet Government. It pointedly denied that the Soviet Government could shift responsibility for these actions onto any now deceased Soviet Security Agency officials. Furthermore, the note made a specific point of the fact that "Swedish public opinion is justly shocked by what has occurred in this matter". Expressing doubt that all traces of Wallenberg in Soviet imprisonment had been obliterated, as the Soviets claimed, the Swedish Government's note requested that any further details obtained be communicated to it, and it reserved the right to send additional material concerning Wallenberg to the Soviet Government.

The entire Swedish press, including the Communist Ny Dag, on February 21st headlined the story of the Swedish note, (although delivered in Moscow on February 19th by Ambassador Sohlman, publicity did not result until the evening of February 20). The overwhelming majority of the press commended the Government for the sharp tone of its note and ran editorials again deploring the Soviet treatment of Wallenberg.

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Disp. No. 989

From Stockholm

If the Foreign Office had not put out a strong note and given publicity to it, there is little question but that there would have occurred a public disagreement between the Wallenberg Committee (made up of distinguished Swedish citizens) and the Foreign Office which would in turn have placed a political strain on the Government. As it turned out, the Government has had the support of a remarkably united public opinion in insisting that the last word has not been said on the Wallenberg case and that further and more energetic Soviet investigations are required to shed full and accurate light on Wallenberg's disappearance.


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and it is evident in terms of press reaction, that the Soviet reply finally telling of Wallenberg's death has led to a decided worsening of Swedish-Soviet relations. The present sharp note deprecating the accuracy of the Soviet Memorandum of February 6 is still another indication that Swedish-Soviet relations are at a low ebb.

For the Ambassador:

Enclosure: 

Translation of note


Joseph Sweeney
First Secretary of Embassy

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Page 1 of

Encl. No. 1

Desp. No. 989

From Stockholm

"Inofficial (sic) translation" released by Foreign Office

Foreign Office Press Release Wednesday, February 20th, 1957
Concerning Swedish Note to Soviet Union

A note of the following content was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry by the Swedish Ambassador Rolf Sohlman on February 19th, 1957:

"In a Memorandum of February 6th, 1957, the Soviet Government declared that from their investigations regarding the Swedish Secretary of Legation Raoul Wallenberg the conclusion ought to be drawn, that Wallenberg died in a prison in Moscow during the night July 16th-17th, 1947. The responsibility for detaining the Swedish diplomat in prison and for the incorrect information which has been given the Swedish Government for many years since August 18th, 1947, is laid on the Soviet Security Agencies. The Soviet Government has expressed their sincere regret at what has happened. They have further stated, that the person among the top officials of the Security Service who was primarily responsible for the aggression against Wallenberg, was sentenced to death and executed on account of severe crimes. -

"Swedish public opinion is justly shocked by what has occurred in this matter. If the Soviet Security Service was able to act in such an autocratic way as to make a diplomat of a neutral country a prisoner and keep him in prison for 2 1/2 years without reporting the case to the Soviet Government or to the Foreign Ministry, this fact is not in itself a circumstance, for which the Soviet Government can disclaim responsibility. By expressing their regret, the Soviet Government has also admitted their responsibility. To this is added the fact that, while Wallenberg was confined in a Moscow prison, the Soviet Government cannot, considering the numerous Swedish appeals, have been unable to obtain reliable information in the matter, if they had really undertaken the thorough investigations they have repeatedly assured the Swedish Government that they had made.

"In this connection it should be recalled, that as late as the day before the one reported as the date of Wallenberg's death, Ambassador Sohlman reminded of Wallenberg in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Before that occasion Moscow had been reminded of this matter some twenty times after January 16th, 1945, when the Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanosov informed the Swedish Legation in Moscow, that Wallenberg had been found and taken in Soviet Russian custody.

The Swedish Government find it difficult to believe that all

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Encl. No. 1

Desp. No. 989

From Stockholm

further documentation concerning Wallenberg's stay in Soviet prisons, with exception of the report mentioned in the Soviet Government Memorandum, should have been completely obliterated. They expect, therefore, that if any further material is found in the Soviet Union, destined to clarify what happened to Wallenberg, it will be communicated to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Swedish Government, on their side, reserve their right to communicate further material concerning Wallenberg that the Swedish Government consider of importance for continued investigations in the Soviet Union."

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AIR POUCH

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(Security Classification)

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

989

DESP. NO.

March 5, 1957

DATE

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF : Embassy Despatch No. 964, Feb. 25, 1957;

Joint Weeka No. 8, Feb. 21, 1957.

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	IN
	EUR. 5	RM/R-2 OLI-8 P-1 L-2 U/O-1 U/O P-1
	3/11	OTHER
		0 CIA-15 OCB-1 USIA-10 Army-4 Navy-3 Air-3 OSD-4

SUBJECT: Sharp Swedish Note to Soviet Union Regarding Russian Memorandum of February 6, 1957, on Wallenberg Case.

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

The Swedish Government sent a sharply worded note to the Soviet Union on February 19, 1957, in answer to the Russian memorandum of February 6th which contained the information that Wallenberg had died in a Soviet prison. In unusually strong critical language the Swedish Government implied that it did not consider the Soviet Union's answer satisfactory. To make sure that there could be no misunderstanding of its position, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs released the full text of the Swedish note to the Soviet Union to the press on February 20, 1957, a copy of the translation of this note distributed by the press section of the Foreign Office is attached as Enclosure No. 1.

The Swedish note of February 19 laid full responsibility for detaining Raoul Wallenberg in a Soviet prison and for giving incorrect information to the Swedish Government about Wallenberg on the Soviet Government. It pointedly denied that the Soviet Government could shift responsibility for these actions onto any now deceased Soviet Security Agency officials. Furthermore, the note made a specific point of the fact that "Swedish public opinion is justly shocked by what has occurred in this matter". Expressing doubt that all traces of Wallenberg in Soviet imprisonment had been obliterated, as the Soviets claimed, the Swedish Government's note requested that any further details obtained be communicated to it, and it reserved the right to send additional material concerning Wallenberg to the Soviet Government.

The entire Swedish press, including the Communist Ny Dag, on February 21st headlined the story of the Swedish note, (although delivered in Moscow on February 19th by Ambassador Sohlman, publicity did not result until the evening of February 20). The overwhelming majority of the press commended the Government for the sharp tone of its note and ran editorials again deploring the Soviet treatment of Wallenberg.

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(Classification)

Page 2 of
Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. 989
From Stockholm

BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL

The Assistant Director of the Political Section of the Foreign Office, R. Hichens BERGSTRÖM observed that this was one of the strongest notes that Sweden has ever sent to the Soviet Union. He explained that it could be freely translated from its diplomatic language as saying on Sweden's part to the Soviet Union: "We think you are lying!"

If the Foreign Office had not put out a strong note and given publicity to it, there is little question but that there would have occurred a public disagreement between the Wallenberg Committee (made up of distinguished Swedish citizens) and the Foreign Office which would in turn have placed a political strain on the Government. As it turned out, the Government has had the support of a remarkably united public opinion in insisting that the last word has not been said on the Wallenberg case and that further and more energetic Soviet investigations are required to shed full and accurate light on Wallenberg's disappearance.

A concomittant of this press reaction, otherwise so decidedly in the Government's favor, has been a revived campaign by the Opposition press against Foreign Minister Undén for his alleged passiveness and lack of interest at an earlier stage of the search for Wallenberg. Testimonies by members of the Wallenberg Committee, released in Veckojournalen and similar weeklies told how Undén in 1947 reportedly took the Soviet assurances of that time as evidence that Wallenberg was not to be found on Russian territory. Several Opposition papers contained attacks on Foreign Minister Undén for his cynical attitude at that time. However, these attacks are all based on an alleged attitude that took place some ten years ago and must contend with the fact that Foreign Minister Undén is now responsible for this sharp note to the Soviet Union. On balance, therefore, it does not appear that these Opposition attacks have materially damaged Undén's unique political position in Sweden.

Foreign Office officials at the Bureau Chief level have made the point, and it is evident in terms of press reaction, that the Soviet reply finally telling of Wallenberg's death has led to a decided worsening of Swedish-Soviet relations. The present sharp note deprecating the accuracy of the Soviet Memorandum of February 6 is still another indication that Swedish-Soviet relations are at a low ebb.

For the Ambassador:

Joseph Sweeney

Joseph Sweeney
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure: *Att*

Translation of note

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(Classification)

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Page 1 of 1
Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 989
From Stockholm

"Inofficial (sic) translation" released by Foreign Office

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"Swedish public opinion is justly shocked by what has occurred in this matter. If the Soviet Security Service was able to act in such an autocratic way as to make a diplomat of a neutral country a prisoner and keep him in prison for 2 1/2 years without reporting the case to the Soviet Government or to the Foreign Ministry, this fact is not in itself a circumstance, for which the Soviet Government can disclaim responsibility. By expressing their regret, the Soviet Government has also admitted their responsibility. To this is added the fact that, while Wallenberg was confined in a Moscow prison, the Soviet Government cannot, considering the numerous Swedish appeals, have been unable to obtain reliable information in the matter, if they had really undertaken the thorough investigations they have repeatedly assured the Swedish Government that they had made.

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Encl. No. 1

Desp. No. 989

From Stockholm

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

1017
DESP. NO.

March 12, 1957

18

REF : Embassy Despatch 989, March 5, 1957;

Embassy Despatch 964, February 25, 1957.

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.	IN F O	OTHER
	REC'D			
	EUR-5			
	3-19			

RM/R-2 OLI-8 R-1 L-2 1/6/57
CIA-15 USA-10 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 MAR-3

SUBJECT: Swedish Government Issues White Book on Raoul Wallenberg

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED. The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a White Book on the Raoul Wallenberg case on March 11, 1957. This booklet issued by the Foreign Office contains the documentation made available to the Soviet Union on Wallenberg's imprisonment. In addition to a brief summary there is also reproduced the radio speech given by Arne LUNDBERG, former Secretary General of the Foreign Office, on February 7 upon the receipt of the Soviet note of February 7 claiming that Wallenberg died in a Soviet prison in 1947. The Lundberg radio statement is generally considered the best available public resumé of the Wallenberg case from the Swedish viewpoint. Six copies of this booklet are attached as Enclosure No. 1. END UNCLASSIFIED.

BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL.

The contents of this White Book are virtually identical with the material issued to the press on February 7 by the Swedish Foreign Office which is summarized in Embassy Despatch 964, February 25, 1957.

For the Ambassador:

Enclosure:

6 copies of White Book

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

1017

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

March 12, 1957

DATE

REF : Embassy Despatch 989, March 5, 1957;

Embassy Despatch 964, February 25, 1957.

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.	I N F O	OTHER
	REC'D			
	EUR-5	RM/R-2		
	3-19	CIA-15		

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BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL.

The contents of this White Book are virtually identical with the material issued to the press on February 7 by the Swedish Foreign Office which is summarized in Embassy Despatch 964, February 25, 1957. According to the Chief of the Press Section of the Foreign Office the delay in the long-heralded publication of this White Book was simply a printing delay and had no relation to any current international development. He made a point of emphasizing that press representatives had attempted with him to read into the publication of this document a connection, in a retaliatory sense, with recent Russian accusations of Swedish espionage in Russia; such a suggestion, he stated categorically, was false.

For the Ambassador:

Joseph Sweeney
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

6 copies of White Book

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AmEmbassy, STOCKHOLM

1042

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

April 28, 1959

DATE

REF :

17 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	I N F OTHER
	5-6	Rmk-2 IRC-8 L-2 Sy-2 s/s-3 s/p-1 C-1 H-1 Cia-10 Moscow-1 Helsinki-1

SUBJECT: Wallenberg Case may be Raised During KHRUSHCHEV Visit to Stockholm Oslo-1

Attached as an enclosure to this despatch is a report of a recent conversation between an Embassy officer and an officer of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding the case of Raoul WALLENBERG, a member of a prominent Swedish family who was reported by the Soviet Union in 1957 to have died in a Moscow prison in 1947 after he had disappeared in the closing period of World War II from his post in the Swedish Legation in Budapest. The Foreign Ministry official's comments indicated that the Swedish Government intends to raise the matter again with Khrushchev when he visits Sweden in Aug. that it is still not entirely convinced that Wallenberg is dead, and that Swedish feeling remains very deep on the subject. The officer also did not entirely rule out the possibility that Khrushchev might at some point produce Wallenberg and permit him to return to Sweden, which would be a major sensation with significance for Swedish--Soviet relations.

It is not possible to attest to the credibility of all of the Swedish official's comments from his viewpoint at the working level, particularly since it was not always clear whether he was outlining current Foreign Ministry thinking or his own conclusions. Nevertheless, taking into account the Embassy's qualifications as stated at the end of the memorandum, it seems safe to assume at least that serious consideration is being given by the Swedes to raising the Wallenberg case in some way or another during Khrushchev's visit.

James C. H. Bonbright

James C. H. Bonbright

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation.

Dept. please pass:

Amembassies Moscow, Helsinki, Oslo,
Copenhagen
Amlegation Budapest

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Page 1 of

Encl. No. 1

Desp. No. 1042

From Stockholm

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Wallenberg Case in Relation to Khrushchev Visit

PARTICIPANTS: Gunnar LORENTZON, Second Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
(Member of International Economic Organizations Section of Commercial
Affairs Bureau)

William M. OWEN, Second Secretary, American Embassy

DATE OF CONVERSATION: April 22, 1959

In a long after-dinner conversation, Lorentzon, in a voluble and reminiscent mood (he is shortly to be transferred to the Swedish Embassy in London) volunteered the following comments on the celebrated Wallenberg case. (Raoul Wallenberg, then 44 years of age, a member of the distinguished and influential family of Swedish bankers, was assigned to the Swedish Legation in Budapest in 1944 in a special capacity to assist Jews escaping from the Nazis. He disappeared after the Red Army entered the city. The Swedish authorities repeatedly pressed the Soviet authorities for information as to his fate, but without result. Prime Minister ERLANDER raised the matter with Khrushchev during his visit to Moscow in 1956. Ten months later the Soviet Foreign Ministry gave the Swedish Embassy in Moscow a note stating that after an intensive investigation the conclusion should be drawn that Wallenberg had died of a heart condition in a Moscow prison on July 14, 1947. In its reply the Swedish government made it clear that it was not satisfied with this explanation and reserved the right to press the case further. The Embassy's despatches No. 964 of February 25, 1957, and No. 989 of March 5, 1957, give details.)

1. The Foreign Ministry intends to raise the Wallenberg case as one of the major subjects during Khrushchev's forthcoming visit to Sweden, now planned for August 15-20. If the Swedes raise the subject only after Khrushchev's arrival in Stockholm, Khrushchev may be able to reply that he will see that the matter is looked into again and that he will let Prime Minister Erlander hear further on the subject when he next sees him. It may therefore be preferable for the Swedes to put Khrushchev on notice in advance of the visit that they intend to raise the subject and do not intend to be put off with temporizations.

2. Despite the two year interval since the last public Swedish -- Soviet exchange on the subject, the Foreign Ministry is still "working hard" on the case. In addition to the report in the press in November 1958 (Weeka No. 48 of November 28, 1958) that a Swiss subject had been in communication with Wallenberg in a Soviet prison as late as the fall of 1954 there are also other reports of a significant nature from other individuals. The Swedish Government's documentation on the case is so extensive that it would take the new man who had been assigned to it one year to sift through it in the light of subsequent evidence. (It was not made clear when the new man had commenced work but it was indicated that it was some months or more ago).

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3. Foreign Minister UNDEN himself is still much interested in the case. He asked Lorentzon (apparently fairly recently) whether in his judgment Wallenberg was still alive, to which he replied that he thought there was perhaps a 75-25 or 65-35 chance that he was. Mr. Uden himself wrote the Swedish reply of February 19, 1957, to the Soviet note, and it was in very strong language, in effect telling the Soviets that they were liars. (A senior Foreign Ministry official commented to the Embassy in 1957 that the note was one of the strongest ever sent by Sweden to the Soviet Union).

4. Lorentzon was a member of the Prime Minister's party which visited the Soviet Union in March 1956. The Wallenberg case was brought up by the Prime Minister in a small meeting in which the participants were Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov, Rodionov (the then Soviet Ambassador to Sweden) and the Swedish Prime Minister, Sohlman (Swedish Ambassador to the USSR), Palme (the Prime Minister's personal assistant), and Lorentzon himself, with possibly one or two others on each side. Mr. Erlander in blunt terms made clear the depth of feeling in the whole of Sweden in the case and that it transcended political party lines. Khrushchev looked with astonishment (apparently not feigned) at Rodionov and indicated that such reports as the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm had made on the matter had given him the impression that it was a Swedish internal political football and could be expected to blow over. Rodionov was said to be completely rebuked and repudiated by Khrushchev in the presence of the Swedes. From that point on Khrushchev realized that the Swedes meant business and in the hope of finally disposing of the matter, decided to prepare the best possible Soviet explanation, which resulted in the note of February 6, 1957.

5. In their earlier explorations of the case with the Soviet authorities the Swedes had made a tactical mistake. They had informed the Russians that under Swedish domestic law as it existed at that time evidence of witnesses was accepted as fully valid only if two witnesses testified independently that a certain event had happened at a specific time. While the Swedes had received many reports from individuals to the effect that they had seen Wallenberg, the Swedes admitted to the Russians that up to that time they had not had two reports giving the same time and place to the extent that these could be identified with certainty. This overly legalistic Swedish approach, basing their investigation on concepts of Swedish domestic law, may have given the Soviets the impression that the Swedes would give up after a while if they felt they could not obtain conclusive evidence.

6. The Soviet note of February 6, 1957, was of significance from two aspects in case the Soviet leadership should later wish to change its position on the matter: 1) it was not a categorical statement that incontrovertible evidence had established that Wallenberg was dead; it simply carefully stated that "the conclusion should be drawn" that Wallenberg died of a heart condition in Lubianka prison. 2) despite numerous earlier Swedish démarches to the Soviet authorities on the case, orally and in writing, the name of Wallenberg had been misspelled in the Soviet note. If Wallenberg were alive and should Khrushchev ever decide to announce it and permit Wallenberg to return to Sweden, he would be able to say that his discredited former colleagues (notably Bulganin, Molotov and possibly Malenkov)

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Page 3 of
Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 1042
From Stockholm

had given him wrong information and that he, Khrushchev, had always been sincerely devoted to uncovering the facts of the case and establishing whether Wallenberg were alive or dead.

7. When Lorentzon was asked whether he would rule out the possibility that Khrushchev might produce Wallenberg alive at some future time, he replied that he thought it possible, and that in such an event would be a major sensation in Sweden, with Khrushchev's reputation here probably rising on balance. However, Lorentzon added, the Russians at least in 1956 did not seem to realize the extreme importance the Swedes placed on Wallenberg's return, no matter what his physical or mental condition. For example, Bulganin made an abrupt comment to the effect that since his own son had disappeared during World War II and he soon became reconciled to it without making exhaustive inquiries, he wondered what all the fuss was about.

(Embassy Comment: So far as the Embassy is aware, Lorentzon's recent work on economic matters in the Foreign Ministry has been full time, although if the Ministry is intensively reviewing the Wallenberg case in light of recent developments it is possible that all officers who have worked on it may have been consulted. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministry is relatively small and its officers in one section usually appear well informed as to what is going on generally in other areas of the Ministry. Lorentzon is believed by the Embassy to have good contacts in other sections than his own).

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

MAY 22 1959

661-5864/5-2059
(20)

FROM AmLegation Budapest

643
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

May 20, 1959

DATE

REF : Embassy Stockholm's Despatch No. 1042 dated April 28, 1959

EUR INDEX

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	5/28	CIA-11

SUBJECT: Wallenberg Case

The Swedish Charge d'Affaires a.i. in Budapest came to see me a few weeks ago to ask whether anyone on the Legation staff had heard of a broadcast reportedly made about two or three months ago by Budapest radio regarding the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. The Swedish Foreign Office had received reports that Budapest radio in one of its international broadcasts had made the statement that Wallenberg had been killed by the Nazis during the German occupation of Hungary. The statement was apparently made in reply to a letter from some Swedish national outside Hungary asking why a Wallenberg street existed in Budapest.

After making inquiry among the staff, I found that no-one had heard any such broadcast. I therefore suggested to the Swedish Charge that his Embassy in Washington might be instructed to make inquiries at the Department in the thought that the broadcast, if it had actually occurred, might have been monitored by one of our stations.

Neither this Legation nor the Swedish Legation has seen any press reports in Hungary to the effect that Wallenberg may have been executed by the Nazis.

Garret G. Ackerson, Jr.
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Copy to AmEmbassy Stockholm

GGAckersonJr:lw
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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

601.5864/6-259

(21)

FROM : Amembassy, STOCKHOLM

1138

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

June 2, 1959

DATE

REF :

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	6/5	15 OCK-1 USIT 10 210-6 Army - 4 Navy

SUBJECT: Notes Exchanged Between Swedish and Soviet Governments Concerning Raoul Wallenberg. *Moscow - 1 Helsinki - 1 Stockholm - 1*

On May 28, 1959, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement that there had been a new exchange of notes between the Swedish and Soviet Governments concerning Raoul WALLENBERG.

The most recent of the earlier Swedish notes on this subject was dated February 17, 1957, and delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on February 19, 1957. The text of this note, as well as an extensive review of the circumstances surrounding the mysterious disappearance of Mr. Wallenberg in Budapest in 1944, after the Red Army entered the city, were reported in Embassy despatches No. 964, February 25, 1957, and No. 989, March 5, 1957. A recent conversation on this subject between an Embassy officer and an officer in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was reported in despatch No. 1042, April 28, 1959.

The press release from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (English translation enclosed) stated that on February 9, 1959, the Swedish Government requested that the Soviets investigate whether Wallenberg had been held in the Vladimir prison, which is located some 200 kilometers east of Moscow. The Soviet Government's reply of March 6, 1959, stated that the investigation had been made as requested by the Swedish Government, but that nothing had been revealed and that the information of the Swedish Government concerning Wallenberg's presence in Vladimir had not been confirmed.

The Swedish press release did not indicate how long after 1947--the date the Soviet Government reported that Mr. Wallenberg had died--Wallenberg is believed to have been alive. The press reported that one of the persons who reported knowing of Mr. Wallenberg after 1947 was a Swiss, Emil BRUGGER, who stated that he had been in contact with Wallenberg in the Vladimir prison on August 4, 1954. Brugger stated that, by means of knocking on the wall, Wallenberg had given him this message: "Wallenberg--First Secretary in the Swedish Mission in Budapest, taken in 1945." Brugger stated that he replied, giving his name and stating that he had been taken from Vienna in 1948. Brugger reported that Wallenberg asked him to contact Swedish authorities if he (Brugger) was released, since Wallenberg was not permitted to have any correspondence. Another returning prisoner, unidentified, except as a German was reported to have stated that he had been in the Vladimir prison from spring to fall of 1956, during which time he had been in contact with a Soviet citizen who had been in the Vladimir prison since 1945. The Soviet citizen reported that Wallenberg had been in the Vladimir prison after 1947, the date that Wallenberg had been reported dead by the Soviet authorities.

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A spokesman of the Raoul Wallenberg Committee, made up of friends and relatives of Mr. Wallenberg, has informed the press that there are a number of witnesses who have given testimony proving that Wallenberg was interned in various Russian prisons several years after his alleged death in 1947, and that the committee is confident that, with the help of the Swedish Government, Wallenberg will soon be back in Sweden.

In addition to the press release issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister UNDÉN made the following statement to the press: "It is difficult to judge the value of statements made by former Soviet prisoners. However, we will continue to take cognizance of any clues that may present themselves. It is an open question whether the matter will be taken up with the Soviet Chief of Government during his visit here. There is nothing to prevent this from being done. We have systematically sought to question people who have returned from imprisonment in Russia, regardless of their nationality, about Wallenberg. Some of them have made certain statements to the effect that Wallenberg was in a prison in Vladimir at a later time than that which the Russians have given as the day of his death, namely July 17, 1947. These statements caused us to turn to the Soviet Government with the request for an investigation whether Wallenberg could have been in the prison mentioned at any time after 1947. However, no new information resulted from the Russian investigation."

The Swedish press had been unaware of the renewed efforts on the part of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to learn about Wallenberg's fate and whereabouts and commended the Government for not having been satisfied with the many negative replies which it had received from Moscow. Conservative "Svenska Dagbladet" considered the latest Soviet denial to be less categorical than previously, and stated that the Swedish Government was justified in continuing to press the case. The paper suggested that Khrushchev's forthcoming visit to Stockholm in August will present "a ready opportunity once again to impress upon the Soviet rulers the burden created for Swedish-Russian relations by the unsolved Wallenberg affair." The statement on this subject by Foreign Minister Undén given above is somewhat less categorical but it is probable that the whereabouts and fate of Wallenberg will be one of the questions raised by the Swedish Government during Khrushchev's forthcoming visit.

For the Charge d'Affaires, a.i.:

G. Alonzo Stanford
G. Alonzo Stanford
Second Secretary

Enclosure: *at*

Press Release.

Department please pass:

Amembassies Moscow, Helsinki, Oslo, Copenhagen.
Amlegation, Budapest.

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(Classification)

Page 1 of

Encl. No. 1

Desp. No. 1138

From Stockholm

Ministry for Foreign Affairs Press Release, May 28, 1959.

In its note of February 17, 1957, to the Soviet Government the Swedish Government stated that it reserved the right to present further material concerning Raoul Wallenberg, which was considered to be of importance for continued investigations in the Soviet Union.

The Swedish authorities have continued to examine carefully all traces concerning Wallenberg's stay in the Soviet Union. In this connection there have been brought to their knowledge several accounts from persons, who have returned from Soviet imprisonment, implying that after 1947 Wallenberg had been in a prison at Vladimir, some 200 kilometers east of Moscow.

Because of this information the Swedish Government requested in a note, which was handed over to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs on February 9, 1959, that an investigation be made to establish whether Wallenberg had been in the Vladimir prison.

The reply of the Soviet Government, dated March 6, 1959, stated that the investigations which had been requested in the Swedish note had been carried out, but had not revealed anything new in the matter and that the information of the Swedish Government concerning Wallenberg's stay in Vladimir had not been confirmed.

Translator: MLHaijlen-Rylander.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

658.61/10-956

*R 601.5861
261.5811

FROM : AmEmbassy STOCKHOLM

386

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

October 9, 1956

REF :

EUR INDEX
FCFile
for

22

OCT 11 1956

13 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION EUR-5	DEPT. IN RM/12 CL-1-6 L-2 P-1 U/P-1
	REC'D 10-16	F OTHER O CIA-15 USIA-10 OCB-1

SUBJECT: NEW SWEDISH REPRESENTATION TO MOSCOW ON WALLENBERG CASE

The Swedish Foreign Office announced on September 28, 1956 that a "new serious reminder" had been made in Moscow the day before on the Raoul WALLENBERG case.

In an unusually sharp memorandum, by Swedish standards, the Foreign Office stated, according to a communique which it issued to the press:

"In a Memorandum handed by the Swedish Charge d'Affaires to Vice Foreign Minister ZACHAROV it was first recalled that the Soviet Government in connection with Prime Minister ERIANDER'S and Interior Minister HEDLUND'S visit to Moscow end March-early April 1956 had undertaken to study carefully the exhaustive material at that time submitted by Sweden and to advise the Swedish Government of the results of this study. The Memorandum then stated that it is consequently now almost half a year since the Soviet Government promised to start its new investigations. The Swedish Government establishes that during this time, when repeated reminders have been made to the Soviet authorities, it has not received any information on the result of the investigations. Because of this, it wishes to underscore anew the enormous importance it attaches to this affair. It has been a source of great disappointment both for the Swedish Government and the Swedish public that the Soviet Government has not even seen fit to supply any information on what has thus far transpired through the investigations."

With the sole exception of the Communist organs, the entire Swedish press welcomed this new reminder. In an unusual departure from its normal practice with the press the Foreign Office confirmed that this was an especially sharply worded representation. The unanimous gist of the press reaction to the reminder was to lay emphasis on the strong public demand that Moscow stop irritating Swedish patience and at last clarify the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg. It was recalled that after the Moscow visit of Prime Minister Erlander and Interior Minister Hedlund this spring and their subsequent presentation of material in Swedish possession to the

JSweeney/mk

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Soviet authorities documenting Wallenberg's whereabouts on various occasions in different Russian prisons and concentration camps, the following had happened:

- (1) During the Stockholm visit last May of a delegation from the Supreme Soviet the Russians requested, and later received, "supplementary information on the testimony concerning Wallenberg in Swedish hands.
- (2) In June, 1956 the Swedish Foreign Office informed the press that the Government was still waiting for a Soviet reply.
- (3) In July, 1956 Soviet Ambassador RODIONOV called on the Foreign Office and advised that the results of the investigation into the Wallenberg case made by the Soviet authorities would be forthcoming "shortly".
- (4) During August the Raoul Wallenberg Committee (made up of 25 prominent private citizens) appealed to the Government to summon the Foreign Relations Council for consultations on what steps to take next.

An editorial in semi-official Social Democratic Morgon Tidningen on September 29, which has been widely quoted and endorsed by other papers, stated that there should be no doubt among the Soviet leaders that the Swedish people looked upon the lack of Soviet information on the Wallenberg case as a highly serious matter:

"Yet, the reply is still missing. Why? This is a question which the Swedish nation asks itself. If there is any seriousness at all behind the East's talk about a desire to bring about friendly relations, it should be a natural thing that what has become a whole nation's concern not be ignored but, instead, an open and honest account be given of the measures taken and of the results achieved. The renewed Swedish reminder is well motivated. The serious tone corresponds to the sentiments among the Swedish people in this matter. Why is the Soviet Union silent on Wallenberg?"

Liberal Dagens Nyheter September 29, noting that it is now more than eleven years since Raoul Wallenberg disappeared, found that it was "about time" for the Swedish Foreign Office to employ strong words in the latest note to Moscow. This paper continued:

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Page 3 of

Encl. No.

Desp. No. 386

From Stockholm

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"It is known that on Sweden's part the most detailed information has been submitted to Moscow concerning Raoul Wallenberg's imprisonment in Russia. It is out of the question for the Soviet authorities not to have been able to trace him. In the Wallenberg case the Soviet Union's brazen nonchalance vis-a-vis elementary Swedish demands has crystallized. If even after the latest Swedish note the Russian reply should not come forward, all that remains for the Swedish Government is to place the cards on the table and give an exhaustive account of all the facts in the case of Wallenberg."

Conservative Sydsvenska Dagbladet wrote October 2:

"The Swedish Government's note in the Wallenberg affair was certainly warranted. It should have come months ago. The nonchalance shown by the Soviet authorities in this matter is unbelievable. Six months have past since the Soviet leaders promised to supply information on Wallenberg's fate. Since then Moscow has been silent. We have been given one more proof of how little Moscow cares about the most well-founded and legitimate Swedish demands."

The Foreign Office is very much concerned about the Raoul Wallenberg case and has done a tremendous amount of work to obtain information about this missing Swede who at the time of his disappearance possessed diplomatic status. Of necessity a large portion of this work has been done without publicity and under classified circumstance. However, public opinion in the past, as expressed in several of the leading papers, has implied that the Foreign Office has not done all that it might to secure the release of Wallenberg. The Foreign Office has been somewhat frustrated in not being able to answer this criticism without jeopardizing the work it was actually doing. Considerable pressure has been exerted on the Foreign Office to publish all of the material in its possession concerning Wallenberg. So far the Foreign Office has been hesitant to do this because much of the material has been obtained from foreign sources and, furthermore, it does not want to establish any sort of precedent. Feeling is so high in official Swedish circles over this case, however, that if some sort of satisfactory reply is not received soon from the USSR the Foreign Office will approve the publication of a report which will illustrate the intransigence of the Soviet Government in following up leads supplied by the Swedish Government.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:

Joseph Sweeney

Joseph Sweeney
First Secretary of Embassy

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PRIORITY

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

REF : Despatch 386, October 9, 1956

October 9, 1956

DATE

23

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	EUR. 5	RM/R. 2 CLI-G P-1 L-2 C/OP-1
	10-19	CIA-12 OCB-1

SUBJECT: Additional Information on Swedish Representation to Moscow on Wallenberg Case.

The acting head of the Political Section, Bureau Chief Bergström, volunteered the following additional information on the recent Swedish reminder to Moscow on the Wallenberg case:

(1) The Swedish reminder that the Soviet Union had made no recent response on the Wallenberg case was deliberately delivered in Moscow rather than in Stockholm. The reason for this action stems from the Moscow visit of Prime Minister Erlander and his party. When these high ranking Swedish officials discussed the Wallenberg case with their Soviet counterparts, they had the feeling that the Soviet leaders had not previously realized the importance Sweden attached to this case. The possibility was put forward by the Foreign Office that Ambassador Rodionov had not accurately reported Swedish reaction on Wallenberg. Therefore, Foreign Minister Undén decided that this reminder to the Soviet Union should be delivered in Moscow.

(2) The language of this reminder is unusually strong for a diplomatic communication between the Swedish Government and the Government of the Soviet Union. A milder but strong draft had initially been prepared in the Foreign Office and approved by everyone except by the Foreign Minister. When Foreign Minister Undén went over the draft with the Prime Minister, he deliberately strengthened several of the expressions. In fact, the Foreign Office believed the language so strong that they decided to publish only a gist rather than the full text.

(3) Because pressure is mounting in Swedish official circles for the publication of some sort of background study on the Wallenberg case, the Foreign Office wanted to assure the Embassy that if any publication should result, it would not compromise materials concerning Wallenberg given by any other government to Sweden. Bureau Chief Bergström emphasized that the Foreign Office had been grateful for American and other help in obtaining information about Wallenberg, and it had no intention of compromising these sources. The present thinking in the Foreign Office regarding publication of material on Wallenberg is that there should be two publications. The first should be a mimeographed press release which would contain only the official communications exchanged between the Swedish

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Page 2 of

Encl. No.

Desp. No. 425

From Stockholm

and Soviet Governments. These communications, the Foreign Office feels, would speak for themselves and constitute an indictment of the Soviet Union. The second contemplated publication would be a more elaborate glossy paper interpretation of the Wallenberg story. This in effect would mean a presentation of the Swedish case.

(4) The Foreign Office has no recent information on whether or not Wallenberg is alive, but feels that it must proceed on the basis that he is. There is no line of speculation in the Foreign Office as to whether or not Wallenberg will be returned in the immediate future.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:

Joseph Sweeney

Joseph Sweeney
First Secretary of Embassy

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Rec'd: February 7, 1957
11:56 a.m.

24

FROM: Stockholm
TO: Secretary of State

NO: 843, February 7, 3 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 843; REPEATED INFORMATION MOSCOW 23.

Am informed that Swedish Government will announce this evening Russian reply to Swedish representations re Wallenberg case. Reply states that following exhaustive investigations report doctor of Lubianka wrote Minister of Security in July 1947 has been discovered stating Wallenberg had died. Doctor was instructed to have his body cremated. Reply states doctor dead points out many wrongful acts of minister for which he since executed and deeply regrets affair.

Foreign Office has no clear evidence Wallenberg alive after 1947 and is inclined to believe Russian story since Russians did not know Swedes lacked clear evidence of Wallenberg's whereabouts after 1947. They point out how extraordinary it was for Russians to admit having held Wallenberg after so many details.

CABOT

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FEB 27 1957

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Department of State

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25

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53-51
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ECR FROM: MOSCOW

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1914, FEBRUARY 7, 7 PM

Control: 4465
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 7, 1958
4:44 PM

DEPT OF STATE

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29-5

SENT DEPARTMENT 1914, REPEATED INFORMATION STOCKHOLM 20
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

SWEDISH AMBASSADOR TOLD ME TODAY THAT YESTERDAY HE WAS HANDED AIDE-MEMOIRE FROM GROMYKO ON WALLENBERG CASE WHICH STATED THAT ALTHOUGH NO RECORD OF WALLENBERG COULD BE FOUND IN REGULAR FILES SOVIET GOVERNMENT, A SPECIAL SEARCH SUPPLEMENTARY RECORDS PRISON HAD REVEALED A HANDWRITTEN NOTE FROM DOCTOR AT LUBIANKA PRISON TO ABAKUMOV INFORMING HIM OF DEATH FROM HEART ATTACK OF WALLENBERG ON JULY 17, 1947 AND A NOTE, LIKEWISE HANDWRITTEN, FROM ABAKUMOV IN REPLY ORDERING BODY TO BE CREMATED WITHOUT AUTOPSY. AIDE-MEMOIRE CONTINUED THAT ABAKUMOV, WHO WAS SUBSEQUENTLY EXECUTED FOR ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITIES, HAD BEEN OBVIOUSLY MISLEAD MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON WALLENBERG CASE WHICH WAS WHY THEY HAD HAD NO PREVIOUS INFORMATION. PRISON DOCTOR HAD DIED IN 1953 AND THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ANY FURTHER DETAILS THIS MATTER. AIDE-MEMOIRE CONCLUDED WITH EXPRESSION "SINCERE REGRETS TO SWEDISH GOVERNMENT AND THROUGH GOVERNMENT TO FAMILY"

SINCE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE SOME FORM ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS, AMBASSADOR ASKED THIS TO BE HELD IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL THAT TIME.

AMBASSADOR BELIEVES THIS IS PART SOVIET ATTEMPT RE-ESTABLISH BETTER RELATIONS WITH SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES (IMPAIRED BY HUNGARIAN EVENTS) WHICH HE HAD SENSED AT TIME VISIT FINNISH PRIME MINISTER. HE BELIEVES UNUSUAL ADMISSION OF ERROR AND EXPRESSION OF REGRET IS DUE SOVIET DESIRE CLOSE OFF WALLENBERG CASE WHICH HAS BEEN CONTINUOUS SOURCE FRICTION SOVIET/SWEDISH RELATIONS.

BOHLEN

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Date 2-15-57
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

A-10

UNCLASSIFIED

NO.

TO Department of State WASHINGTON

INFO: MOSCOW, OSLO, HELSINKI, COPENHAGEN, REYKJAVIK

PM 4

FROM Amembassy STOCKHOLM

DATE: July 7, 1964

SUBJECT Communist Ny Dag joins in Criticism of Soviet Refusal to Shed Light on Wallenberg Case

REF 1964

True to its new "nationalist" facade -- and with an obvious side-glance at the forthcoming election -- even Communist Ny Dag joined the press chorus after Nikita Khrushchev's visit to Sweden deploring the stubborn Soviet refusal to supply any further information on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. At the same time, Ny Dag sought to minimize the impact of the Wallenberg affair by discrediting publicity on the matter as being inspired by elements hostile to the Soviet Union and to the Social Democrats.

on

Ny Dag wrote/June 30, in part:

"On street posters and front pages a very large section of the Swedish press based its evaluation of the joint communique from the Soviet Government visit on the negative response in the Raoul Wallenberg affair. This question obviously was found to be more essential than, for example, the strong positive appreciation of the Swedish policy of neutrality as voiced by the Soviets in the communique.

"Considerations of different kinds may have prompted this headline accent and the subsequent commentaries. It is felt in many quarters that the question about the fate of the Swedish diplomat has come to be such a morally binding issue as to give it very high priority. Other quarters simply believe that Raoul Wallenberg is the best weapon for a two-fold purpose: to seek to deteriorate relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union, as well as to seek to defeat the Social Democrats in the fall election. No one need doubt that Expressen belongs to the latter category. ...

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

POL:NMoller:bm

 Contents and Classification Approved by:
 Charge d'Affaires a.i.: AleS Jenkins

Clearances:

"It is regrettable that Expressen and other newspapers having the same objective are supplied with material for their campaign. It would have been desirable if the Soviet Union had shown better understanding of the fact that it is not only people using Expressen as their mouthpiece who in this country feel that more ought to be said about the investigations concerning the fate of Raoul Wallenberg.

"The decisive thing here, of course, is not regard for the propaganda conducted by anti-Soviet quarters but the purely humanitarian aspect -- regard for family and friends. Even if the Soviet Government holds to its earlier stand and has nothing to add over and beyond the notation in a prison register concerning Wallenberg's death in 1947, a more exhaustive explanation -- like what was now done in the "Bengt Sture" case -- would be fitting. The continued investigations should also be accounted for. The more material made public the more convincing will be the stand taken.

"No party seriously interested in a further improvement in Swedish-Soviet relations is served by the campaign now in progress in the Raoul Wallenberg affair being allowed to continue on the basis of intimations and unconfirmed allegations."

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:



George R. Andrews
Second Secretary of Embassy

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

POL 17 SWE. HUNG

RR TEL 9.2 SWE

RR POL SWE-455R

VR CR 16-3

87-81 CONTROL: 10050 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Action RECD: JANUARY 14, 1965, 12:49 PM

P FROM: STOCKHOLM

Info ACTION: SECSTATE 532

SS INFO: MOSCOW 34

G DATE: JANUARY 14, 6 PM

L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SAL FOR HISTORICAL OFFICE

EUR
USIA RADIO SWEDEN PREPARING TV DOCUMENTARY ON DISAPPEARANCE SWEDISH
NSC DIPLOMAT RAOUL WALLENBERG 1945. HANS VILLIUS, DIRECTOR
INR HISTORICAL RESEARCH RADIO SWEDEN, HAS ASKED EMBASSY S HELP
SY IN OBTAINING ACTUAL TELEGRAMS OR COPIES OF ACTUAL TELEGRAMS
RM DEALING WITH US REPRESENTATIONS ON CASE. OBJECT TO SHOW VISUAL
EVIDENCE US EFFORTS AND SOVIET REFUSAL AID IN SEARCH. VILLIUS
HAS COPIES OF MESSAGES AND CLAIMS HAVE SEEN ORIGINALS. FOLLOWING
RMR TELEGRAMS DESIRED:

1. LEGATION STOCKHOLM TO SECSTATE. TEL. 1251, APR 4, 1945
(701.5864/4-445).

2. SECSTATE TO EMBASSY MOSCOW, TEL 824, APR 9, 1945
(701.5864/4-445).

3. SECSTATE TO WAR REFUGEE BOARD, MAY 8, 1945 (701.5864/4
1245).

4. EMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE TEL 1139, APR 12, 1945
(701.5864/4-1245).

COMMENT: EMBASSY HAS NO FIRM KNOWLEDGE POLICY OR SECURITY
CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN THIS RELEASE. HOWEVER, WALLENBERG
CASE IS CONTINUING IRRITANT IN SWEDISH-USSR RELATIONS. AT END
KHRUSHCHEV VISIT HERE LAST YEAR, PRIME MINISTER PUBLICLY
DEPRECATED SOV ATTITUDE TOWARD HIS OWN REPRESENTATIONS ON
THIS. (INR-28, AUGUST 11, 1964). GIVEN THIS, EMBASSY WOULD
RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT CONSIDER AIR MAILING DIRECTLY TO EMBASSY
PHOTOGENIC COPIES OF THE ACTUAL TELEGRAMS.

EMBASSY LOCAL HAS ONLY TOLD VILLIUS WE WOULD CHECK OUR
FILES, ADDING THAT IF TELEGRAMS REPRODUCED IN FOREIGN RELATIONS
HE WOULD BE WELCOME TO PORTRAY OPEN BOOK ON TV PROGRAM.

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STOCKHOLM 532

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-2- 532, January 14, 6 p.m., from Stockholm

PLEASE ADVISE AS VILLIUS HAS JANUARY 21 DEADLINE.

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RECD FEBRUARY 8, 11:57 AM

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FROM STOCKHOLM

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SP

ACTION SECSTATE ~~562~~ 602

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DATE FEBRUARY 8, 5 PM

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DEPARTMENT'S A-115

RMR

IN CONFORMITY REFERENCE INSTRUCTION, 1945 (SIC) MESSAGES WALLENBERG CASE RELEASED TO VILLIUS, DIRECTOR HISTORICAL RESEARCH SWEDISH RADIO, AND USED ON HIS PROGRAM. SUBSEQUENT INFORMAL QUERY FROM BERGSTROM OF FONMINISTRY REVEALED VILLIUS PROGRAM WAS SURPRISE TO MINISTRY WHICH HAD GIVEN HIM SOME DOCUMENTARY BUT NO OTHER HELP EARLIER ON BECAUSE OF SOVIER SENSITIVITY. SOVIETS APPROACHED SWEDISH EMBASSY MOSCOW SOON AFTER PROGRAM ANNOUNCED SOME DAYS PRIOR BROADCAST. MY RESPONSE TO BERGSTROM'S INQUIRY APPEARED SATISFY BERGSTROM AND ACTING FONMIN PALME, WHO TOOK ADVANTAGE MY CALL TODAY ON VIET NAM DEVELOPMENTS TO MENTION, SUBJECT

PALME READ ME PRESS RELEASE BEING ISSUED TODAY. PRINCIPAL POINT WAS THAT WHEREAS US EMBASSY TELEGRAMS SAID SWEDISH MINISTER SODERBLOM TURNED DOWN US OFFER TO HELP, SWEDISH ARCHIVES SHOW SODERBLOM REPORTED SIX DAYS LATER THAT US EMBASSY DOUBTED IT COULD DO ANYTHING TO HELP. RELEASE IS BLANDLY PHRASED AND NO IMPLICATION WHATSOEVER THAT GOS EMBARRASSED BY VILLIUS BROADCAST. RELEASE NECESSITATED BY SUSTAINED PUBLIC INTEREST WALLENBERG CASE AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL EFFORTS EXPLOIT EVEN THOUGH COALITION GOVERNMENT, NOT SOCIAL DEMOCRATS ALONE, THEN IN POWER.

SUBSEQUENT PALME TALK, BERGSTROM AT LUNCH TODAY SAID PALME FORGOT TO MENTION AMBASSADOR DE BESCHE HAS BEEN REQUESTED ASK DEPARTMENT SEARCH ARCHIVES FOR ANY FURTHER TELEGRAMS BEARING ON WALLENBERG CASE. FYI. BERGSTROM SAID SODERBLOM FAILED REPORT AMERICAN OFFER TO HELP SWEDES BEFORE TURNING IT DOWN. AS SODERBLOM LATER SUFFERED PERMANENT MENTAL BREAKDOWN, GOS ANXIOUS PROBE FOR FACTS THROUGH ANY CONTEMPORARY SOURCES AVAILABLE. END FYI. GIVEN FOREGOING AND SWEDISH ACCEPTANCE MY EXPLANATION

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STOCKHOLM 602

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-2- 562, FEBRUARY 8, 5 PM, FROM STOCKHOLM

OUR DEVELOPMENT IN VILLIUS PROGRAM, I HOPE EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE SEARCH FILES FOR ANYTHING WHICH CAN BE GIVEN DE BESCHE EITHER WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS OR IN CONFIDENCE. BERGSTROM ALSO MENTIONED IN PASSING THAT WHILE GOS PRESS RELEASE LIKELY GIVE RISE TO QUESTIONS, GOS ALSO WANTED LEAVE EMBASSY AND USG OUT OF MATTER IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.

AIRGRAM FOLLOWS WITH MEMCONS AND TEXT GOS RELEASE.

CEN 115 1945

PARSONS

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86

CORRECTION

Action

Control:

6581

EUR

Rec'd:

February 8, 1965
11:57 a.m.

Info

FROM: Stockholm

SS

ACTION: Secstate 602

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SP

DATE: February 8, 5 p.m.

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M.

The serial number of this incoming LIMITED OFFICIAL USE message should be corrected to read 602, vice 562.

NAR/2/9/65

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AIRGRAM

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A-511

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CR 16-3

TO : Department of State WASHINGTON

INFO: MOSCOW

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

DATE: February 12, 1965.

SUBJECT: Reaction to Swedish TV Program on Disappearance of Raoul WALLENBERG

REF : Embtel 532; Department's A-115; Embtel 562 602

The Ambassador's full and frank explanation of the background of the release of the U.S. official telegrams in question has apparently satisfied the concern of the Swedish Government in the matter.

Apart from the Swedish Government's reaction to the release and publication of the U.S. official messages and the Embassy's role therein, is the question of the effect the TV program has had on Swedish public opinion. Because of criticism directed against the Swedish Legation's action in refusing American help, the Swedish Government has felt impelled to issue a press release through the Foreign Office, a translation of which is attached as enclosure number 3. (Two copies of the original Swedish version of the Foreign Office press release are also attached.)

It will be seen that the Foreign Office press release blandly ignores the criticisms levelled against the Legation's action. At the same time, the confused and turgid quotation attributed to the Swedish Minister, Söderblom, in the third paragraph of the press release implies that it was the U.S. Embassy in Moscow that did not wish to pursue the matter. The Foreign Office apparently went even further, because Dagens Nyheter on February 9 stated

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Draited by:

POL:GRAndrews:bm 2/10/1965

Contents and Classification Approved by:

AMB:JGParsons

Clearance:

DCM:AlaSJenkins

USIS:Mr. Moe

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
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"the Foreign Office tells Dagens Nyheter that it is still unclear just how the Swedish rejection of the American offer of assistance was made -- 'and whether the rejection did at all come from Swedish quarters'", (the inner quote apparently refers to the Foreign Office official's exact words).

4 The fact that the Foreign Office press release used a partial and confusing quote of Minister Söderblom's without publication of the full text of the message (while publishing the text of the American official documents) has aroused the suspicions of the Swedish press. Thus, Liberal Göteborg's Handels Tidningen wrote that "unfortunately one has reason to suspect that the Swedish version was doctored" (not doctored by the Foreign Office, but by Söderblom at the time). Liberal Stockholm Dagens Nyheter was sarcastic as to why the Foreign Office did not produce the full text of the Söderblom message, hinting it was because Wallenberg was an American agent. Social Democratic Stockholms-Tidningen, however, ignoring the careful avoidance of the question by the Foreign Office press release, wrote: "The American offer in April 1945 of diplomatic support in the search for Raoul Wallenberg was judged as non-desirable by the Swedish Moscow Minister, and the Foreign Office was of the same opinion." The principal press reactions to date are enclosed as enclosure no. 4.

For the Ambassador:


George R. Andrews
Second Secretary of Embassy

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Page 2 of Enclosure E-71
A-511 from Stockholm

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Page 1 of Enclosure 3

TRANSLATION OF FOREIGN OFFICE PRESS RELEASE, FEBRUARY 8, 1965.

In the course of the TV program on February 2, 1965, concerning Raoul Wallenberg the content was shown and recapitulated of an exchange of telegrams in April 1945 between the State Department in Washington and the American Embassies in Stockholm and Moscow regarding the possibility of American diplomatic support in the search for Wallenberg. The texts of the three messages which formed part of the exchange of telegrams and which have now been placed at the disposal of the Foreign Office are enclosed in translation.

By telegram of April 4, 1945, to the State Department the then American Ambassador in Stockholm, Herschel Johnson, requested that the American Embassy in Moscow support the Swedish Legation in Moscow in its efforts through the Soviet authorities to ascertain what had happened to Wallenberg. By telegram of April 9, 1945, the State Department instructed its Embassy in Moscow to render all necessary support to the Swedish Legation. The then American Ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman, reported by telegram of April 12, 1945, that the Swedish Legation had declared that it had no reason to believe that the Soviet authorities were not doing what they could in respect of this search, and that the Legation did not feel that an American approach to the Soviet Foreign Ministry would be desirable.

The telegrams reflect contacts which during the final stage of the war occurred between the Foreign Office and the American Embassy in Stockholm as well as between the Swedish and the American missions in Moscow concerning the search for Wallenberg then in progress. The Swedish Legation reported afterwards to the Foreign Office about the contacts in Moscow. The Legation stated in its report that the American Embassy in Moscow was believed to have replied to Herschel Johnson "that it presumed that the American representation in Hungary had been approached through the State Department. The Embassy otherwise is hardly likely to feel that anything was to be done for America's part".

As is seen from the Foreign Office White Paper on Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish demarche on the matter was made on April 25, 1945, to the Soviet authorities.

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Press Reaction to TV Program on Wallenberg CaseI Dagens Nyheter (Liberal) February 9 (news report):

"The Foreign Office tells Dagens Nyheter that it is still unclear just how the Swedish rejection of the American offer of assistance was made -- 'and whether the rejection did at all come from Swedish quarters'.

"The Foreign Office Press Bureau said Monday evening that it may be that Minister Staffan Söderblom (then Swedish Minister in Moscow) did not judge American assistance in the Wallenberg case as being profitable. The Minister himself had previously made several representations to the Soviet authorities without result. But on the other hand, it may have been the American Embassy in Moscow which felt that possible American assistance would not serve much of a purpose."

II Dagens Nyheter February 9 (editorial): -

"The American Minister in Stockholm during World War II, Herschel Johnson, appears more and more as having been a driving force behind the efforts to clarify the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. This is seen from the three American telegrams which were published in full by the Foreign Office on Monday. A communique' from the Foreign Office also quotes a passage from a telegram from the Swedish Legation in Moscow; one must ask why that telegram was not quoted in full. The customary secretiveness?

"As the material is now presented it is partly contradictory. The telegram from Harriman to Washington says that Swedish quarters (apparently then Moscow Minister Söderblom) did not feel that an American approach in favor of Wallenberg would be desirable because the Russians surely nevertheless 'are doing what they can'. The telegram from the Swedish Legation to Stockholm says that the American Embassy in Moscow 'is hardly likely to feel that anything is to be done for America's part' concerning Raoul Wallenberg. But could this not be a question of cause and effect? The negative Swedish attitude caused the American interest to decline.

"The fact is that a Swedish demarche was made shortly afterwards in Moscow concerning Raoul Wallenberg. But how much greater weight would not an energetic American action had carried at that time. With some interest shown by Sweden it would without doubt have been brought about. It is difficult not to be disturbed by the Swedish passiveness -- then."

III Göteborgs Handelstidning (Liberal), February 9

"After several days, the Foreign Office has produced some sort of commentary to the American offer of assistance in the

Wallenberg affair which was recently referred to in a Swedish TV program. The Foreign Office publishes the American exchange of telegrams, but not the Swedish Moscow Legation's report on the subject. One quotation from this report appears in the Foreign Office communique, however. It is seen from the material available, that Washington instructed Ambassador Harriman in Moscow to assist the Swedes but that nothing was done. Harriman reported home that the Swedes in Moscow did not want any help, while the Swedish Legation in turn asserted that it was the American Embassy which saw no reason to intervene. A typical example of how unsatisfactory diplomatic reports can be. Unfortunately, one has reason to suspect that the Swedish version was doctored. The Americans were eager, but it is doubtful whether the same could be said about the Swedish Legation."

IV Svenska Dagbladet (Conservative), February 9

"The American material now published by the Foreign Office confirms in full measure the great and positive interest which Washington showed to shed light on the disappearance of the Swedish diplomat. ...

"It is an only too well known and a tragic fact that Swedish optimism and faith in the Russian intentions lacked any foundation. Nor is it surprising that many quarters have criticized the Swedish Government for its negative attitude toward the American offer. Here the leading Western Power promised to put its weight and authority behind an inquiry, but this possibility, the critics maintain, was not seized upon. The matter has also another side, however. At the time in question, the cold war which was to follow upon the Second World War was already under full development. The Russians' almost pathological suspiciousness against everything Western found expression in practically the entire territory where their troops had marched in, and everything was being done to wipe out the traces of Western Power activities and influence. Is it not likely in these circumstances that an open American engagement in favor of a Swedish diplomat would have increased the suspiciousness against him and further impaired his situation in front of criminally unscrupulous interrogators?"

V Stockholms-Tidningen (Social Democratic), February 10

"The American offer in April 1945 of diplomatic support in the search for Raoul Wallenberg was judged as non-desirable by the Swedish Moscow Minister, and the Foreign Office was of the same opinion. This is documented by an exchange of telegrams now made public."

ST then goes on to quote, first Dagens Nyheter's criticism of the Swedish passiveness at the time, and then Svenska Dagbladet's understanding attitude toward the Swedish rejection of the U.S. offer, adding:

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Page 3 of Enclosure 4

"This is how diametrically different judgments can be twenty years afterwards. It sheds light on the difficulty in establishing whether the Coalition Government, which was still in office in April 1945, and Foreign Minister Günther committed a misjudgment. Otherwise, it must be said to be of highly peripheral interest for a clarification of the Wallenberg case. It provides no new clue in the search."

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Pressmeddelande måndagen den 8 februari 1965

Under TV-programmet den 2 februari 1965 om Raoul Wallenberg visades och återgavs innehållet av en telegramväxling april 1945 mellan State Department i Washington och de amerikanska ambassaderna i Stockholm och Moskva angående möjligheten av amerikanskt diplomatiskt stöd vid efterforskningarna av Wallenberg. Texterna till tre meddelanden, som ingick i telegramväxlingen och vilka numera ställts till det svenska utrikesdepartementets förfogande, bifogas i översättning.

I ett telegram av den 4 april 1945 till State Department hemställde den dåvarande amerikanske ambassadören i Stockholm, Herschel Johnson, att amerikanska ambassaden i Moskva måtte stödja den svenska legationen i Moskva i dess strävande att genom de sovjetiska myndigheterna fastställa Wallenbergs öde. I ett telegram av den 9 april 1945 instruerade State Department sin ambassad i Moskva att ge allt erforderligt stöd åt den svenska legationen. Den dåvarande amerikanske ambassadören i Moskva, Averell Harriman, rapporterade i ett telegram av den 12 april 1945, att svenska legationen förklarade sig ej ha anledning att tro, att sovjetiska vederbörande icke gjorde vad de kunde i fråga om dessa efterforskningar, och att legationen icke ansåg att en amerikansk framställning till sovjetiska utrikesministeriet skulle vara önskvärd.

Telegrammen avspeglar kontakter som under krigets slutskede förekom mellan utrikesdepartementet och amerikanska ambassaden i Stockholm samt mellan de svenska och amerikanska beskickningarna i Moskva angående de pågående efterforskningarna av Wallenberg. Svenska legationen rapporterade i

efterhand till utrikesdepartementet om kontakterna i Moskva. Legationen framhöll i sin rapport att den amerikanska ambassaden i Moskva torde ha svarat Herschel Johnson, "att den utgår ifrån att man genom State Department vänt sig till Amerikas representation i Ungern. Ambassaden torde i övrigt svårligen anse något vara att göra från amerikansk sida".

Såsom framgår av utrikesdepartementets vitbok om Raoul Wallenberg, gjordes den 25 april 1945 en svensk démarche hos de sovjetiska myndigheterna i ärendet.

Rubens

Secretary of State, Washington

1251, 4 april kl. 5 e.m.

Stockholm den 4 april 1945.

Svenska utrikesdepartementet är mycket bekymrat över att attachén vid legationen i Budapest, Raoul Wallenberg, försvunnit. Enligt obekräftade radiomeddelanden har han mördats. Svenska legationen i Moskva har instruerats att begära ryska regeringens bistånd att fastställa Wallenbergs öde.

I mitt 14 den 4 april kl. 5 e.m. sändes detta till Moskva.

Vi hade särskilt intresse av Wallenbergs verksamhet i Ungern och skulle mycket uppskatta varje stöd som vår ambassad i Moskva kan lämna den svenska legationen i Moskva i denna sak.

Johnson

Embassy, Moskva

Washington den 9 april 1945.

Följande till Harriman från departementet och krigsflyktingstyrelsen (War Refugee Board).

Vi hänvisar till Stockholms nr 14 den 4 april till Er, sänt till departementet som nr 1251 den 4 april.

Departementet och styrelsen skulle uppskatta om Ni gäve allt möjligt stöd åt svenska legationen i Moskva vid dess hemställan till ryska regeringen om bistånd att fastställa attachéns vid svenska legationen i Budapest, Raoul Wallenbergs, öde.

Krigsflyktingstyrelsen hade särskilt intresse av Wallenbergs verksamhet i Unger på grund av hans utomordentliga arbete för att skydda judar och andra offer för fiendens förtryck under fiendens ockupation av Ungern.

Stettinius

Secretary of State, Washington

Moskva den 12 april 1945.

1137, 12 april kl. 10.

Svenska legationen i Moskva informerades sent i december av sovjetiska utrikesministeriet att Wallenberg (Edert 824 9 april kl. 7 e.m.) vore i säkerhet i Budapest. Legationen mottog senare en rapport från den svenska representationen i Bukarest att Wallenberg hade lämnat Budapest ensam med bil med okänt färdmål och att han försvunnit. Legationen i Moskva ombad därpå sovjetiska myndigheterna att söka spåra honom, vilket de lovade att göra. Svenskarna säger, att de icke ha någon anledning tro att ryssarna inte gör vad de kan, och att de inte anse att en framställning till sovjetiska utrikesministeriet från vår sida skulle vara önskvärd. (Sänt till departementet som nr 1137; sänt till Stockholm som nr 16).

Medlemmarna av den svenska representationen i Budapest förväntas anlända till Moskva inom några få dagar på väg till Stockholm och de kan möjligen ha ytterligare upplysningar om Wallenberg.

AIRGRAM

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HANDLING INDICATOR

(29)

TO : Department of State WASHINGTON

INFO: MOSCOW

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

DATE: February 12, 1965.

SUBJECT: Reaction to Swedish TV Program on Disappearance of Raoul WALLENBERG

REF : Embtel 532; Department's A-115; Embtel 562 602

As stated in Embtel 562, the Swedish Government was both surprised and taken aback by the publicizing on Swedish television on February 2 of a telegram from the American Embassy in Moscow to the Department of State on April 12, 1945 stating that the Swedish Legation in Moscow had turned down American assistance in the Wallenberg case. The Ambassador's full and frank explanation of the background of the release of the U.S. official telegrams in question has apparently satisfied the concern of the Swedish Government in the matter. However, for the record there are attached, as enclosures 1 and 2, two conversations which the Ambassador had on the subject with Foreign Office Political Director Hichens-Bergström.

Apart from the Swedish Government's reaction to the release and publication of the U.S. official messages and the Embassy's role therein, is the question of the effect the TV program has had on Swedish public opinion. Because of criticism directed against the Swedish Legation's action in refusing American help, the Swedish Government has felt impelled to issue a press release through the Foreign Office, a translation of which is attached as enclosure number 3. (Two copies of the original Swedish version of the Foreign Office press release are also attached.)

It will be seen that the Foreign Office press release blandly ignores the criticisms levelled against the Legation's action. At the same time, the confused and turgid quotation attributed to the Swedish Minister, Söderblom, in the third paragraph of the press release implies that it was the U.S. Embassy in Moscow that did not wish to pursue the matter. The Foreign Office apparently went even further, because Dagens Nyheter on February 9 stated

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Drafted by:

POL:GRAndrews:bm 2/10/1965

Contents and Classification Approved by:
AMB:JGParsons

Clearances:

DCM:AleSJenkins

USIS:Mr. Moe

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
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"the Foreign Office tells Dagens Nyheter that it is still unclear just how the Swedish rejection of the American offer of assistance was made -- 'and whether the rejection did at all come from Swedish quarters'", (the inner quote apparently refers to the Foreign Office official's exact words).

The fact that the Foreign Office press release used a partial and confusing quote of Minister Söderblom's without publication of the full text of the message (while publishing the text of the American official documents) has aroused the suspicions of the Swedish press. Thus, Liberal Göteborg's Handels Tidningen wrote that "unfortunately one has reason to suspect that the Swedish version was doctored" (not doctored by the Foreign Office, but by Söderblom at the time). Liberal Stockholm Dagens Nyheter was sarcastic as to why the Foreign Office did not produce the full text of the Söderblom message, hinting it was because Wallenberg was an American agent. Social Democratic Stockholms-Tidningen, however, ignoring the careful avoidance of the question by the Foreign Office press release, wrote: "The American offer in April 1945 of diplomatic support in the search for Raoul Wallenberg was judged as non-desirable by the Swedish Moscow Minister, and the Foreign Office was of the same opinion." The principal press reactions to date are enclosed as enclosure no. 4.

If there should be further critical press reaction to the Foreign Office press release, it is entirely possible that the Government will feel called upon to take some further action. One interesting aspect of the matter which has not reached the public domain is the advance Soviet approach to the Swedish Embassy in Moscow (the program had been advertised for several days) saying that the Soviets saw no point in a public airing of the Wallenberg case on TV. The fact that the Russians would make such a bald approach and that the Swedish Government, either as a result of it or because of anticipated Soviet sensitivity, refused to go beyond giving documentary help to the TV producer, could provide considerable ammunition to the press and the opposition parties if it were to become known.

For the Ambassador:



George R. Andrews
Second Secretary of Embassy

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Conversation Between Ambassador Parsons and Foreign Office
Director for Political Affairs, Ambassador Hichens-Bergström
on February 4, 1965

At the Foreign Ministry luncheon for Dr. Scoville, Ambassador Bergström made an immediate point of telling me that the Government was somewhat concerned by the program carried over the radio a few days ago on the Raoul Wallenberg affair. It seemed that we had authorized the correspondent who organized this program to use official documents indicating that the Swedish Government had turned down an official American offer in Washington to help. Given the criticism which the Government had been under for its handling of the Wallenberg affair, the matter had caused the Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister Olof Palme some concern. In fact, only yesterday, they had asked Ambassador Bergström (currently senior officer present in the Foreign Ministry) if it would not be well to take some formal notice of the American release of these documents to the correspondent without prior notification to the Swedish Government. Ambassador Bergström had replied that there might be factors thus far unknown and in any event he would be seeing me soon and could speak to me informally. Messrs. Erlander and Palme had agree to this.

I expressed surprise and asked if the matter had not died out in the press today. Ambassador Bergström said it was still alive. I then said it was my recollection that we had had an inquiry as to whether these documents, which were known to the inquirer, were classified. We had asked Washington and the answer came back that they were no longer classified. Beyond that, I would have to ask my colleagues for further facts.

Ambassador Bergström then said that there had been some sort of report (he was vague at this point) that we had taken the position that the release of these documents was to be made known to the Swedish Government only after they were released to the interested correspondent, and I said that I could not believe this. Ambassador Bergström then revealed that the Embassy in Washington had already inquired into the circumstances of release of these papers and that the Department had answered simply that the American Embassy in Stockholm had asked a question as to their status and had been told they could be released. If the Department had said more to the Swedish Embassy, Bergström did not reveal what it might have been.

I expressed my regret at any embarrassment that the Government here might have felt and said that, of course, neither Bergström nor I would be able to think of any reason why we should wish to embarrass the Swedish Government. Bergström agreed. I added that I would, as promised, check further at the Embassy and then be in touch with him.

Before changing the subject, Ambassador Bergström, who was friendly throughout albeit a bit pointed in his remarks, said that I might be interested to know that two days before the broadcast, the Soviet Government had approached the Swedish Embassy in Moscow and said that it saw no point in a public airing of this matter.

Swedish discomfiture is quite obviously intensified by the circumstance that, according to Bergström, the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow who received the American offer of assistance turned it down without reference to Stockholm. The Government here has searched its archives in vain for any indication that it was ever informed about the offer and its rejection without authority from home.

Delivered

Conversation Between Ambassador Parsons and Foreign Office
Director for Political Affairs, Ambassador Hichens-Bergström
on February 6, 1965

Having studied the file and received Mr. Moe's memorandum of February 5, I telephoned to Ambassador Bergström and said I knew more now about the Embassy's connection with the use of certain 1945 telegrams on Docent Villius' radio program on the Wallenberg Case. I said that Villius, Director for Historical Research for Sveriges Radio, had first telephoned a Swedish employee of USIS and referred by number to these telegrams which he had copies of and asked if he could have the originals or photo-copies to use on his program. The employee suggested that he make this request to us in writing; which he did. We thereupon telegraphed Washington to ascertain if the messages had been declassified and if we could comply with the request. When we received an affirmative answer, we went back to Villius and said that our cooperation was based on his willingness to leave this Embassy and the U.S. Government out of the picture so that our agreement to use of the documents would not be a factor in any reactions they might cause. I said that we, of course, assumed that Sveriges Radio had been in touch with the Foreign Ministry, given the interest in the Wallenberg affair.

Ambassador Bergström asked if the Embassy had assumed that Villius had copies of the telegrams in his possession. I replied that he apparently said so and he quoted correctly the numbers, dates, and file numbers in his letter to us. He then asked if he himself could assume that we had not imposed the condition that Villius should not inform the Foreign Ministry before using the documents on his program. I said that naturally no such stipulation had even occurred to us because we assumed that in this important matter the Foreign Ministry would know all about the proposed program. Ambassador Bergström remarked, as he had in our earlier conversation, that a thorough search in Swedish archives had been made and no reference had been found to the involvement of our Embassy in Moscow in the question of possible assistance to Sweden in the Wallenberg investigation. Thus, the Swedish Government had been surprised. I replied that I was sorry but naturally we supposed that the correspondence was known to the Swedish Government because it had been a matter of official record through our Embassy in Moscow and, being important to Sweden, we naturally thought it was a matter of record from the Swedish viewpoint also.

Comment: The foregoing exchanges reflect the main points of our telephone conversation but not the atmosphere, which was very friendly. Ambassador Bergström was effusive in his thanks for my clarification of the American role and said that it served to clear up the matter so far as we were concerned. He at no time intimated that our action in turning the papers over to Villius without prior notice to the Foreign Ministry was considered improper. Inasmuch as the Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister Palme bear the brunt of whatever political impact press and party

reactions have had, they may be less happy than Bergström. However, it was a coalition government, not a Social Democratic Government at that time and I took care to slip that into my remarks to Bergström. In any event, I do not consider that there can be any question of the propriety of our action and I am assured that Mr. Moe faithfully carried out the instructions contained in the Department's A-115.

W. Moe

TRANSLATION OF FOREIGN OFFICE PRESS RELEASE, FEBRUARY 8, 1965.

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Page 1 of Enclosure 4

Press Reaction to TV Program on Wallenberg Case

I Dagens Nyheter (Liberal) February 9 (news report):

"The Foreign Office tells Dagens Nyheter that it is still unclear just how the Swedish rejection of the American offer of assistance was made -- 'and whether the rejection did at all come from Swedish quarters'.

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"As the material is now presented it is partly contradictory. The telegram from Harriman to Washington says that Swedish quarters (apparently then Moscow Minister Söderblom) did not feel that an American approach in favor of Wallenberg would be desirable because the Russians surely nevertheless 'are doing what they can'. The telegram from the Swedish Legation to Stockholm says that the American Embassy in Moscow 'is hardly likely to feel that anything is to be done for America's part' concerning Raoul Wallenberg. But could this not be a question of cause and effect? The negative Swedish attitude caused the American interest to decline.

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Pressmeddelande måndagen den 8 februari 1965

Under TV-programmet den 2 februari 1965 om Raoul Wallenberg visades och återgavs innehållet av en telegramväxling i april 1945 mellan State Department i Washington och de amerikanska ambassaderna i Stockholm och Moskva angående möjligheten av amerikanskt diplomatiskt stöd vid efterforskningarna av Wallenberg. Texterna till tre meddelanden, som ingick i telegramväxlingen och vilka numera ställts till det svenska utrikesdepartementets förfogande, bifogas i över-sättning.

I ett telegram av den 4 april 1945 till State Department hemställde den dåvarande amerikanske ambassadören i Stockholm, Herschel Johnson, att amerikanska ambassaden i Moskva måtte stödja den svenska legationen i Moskva i dess strävanden att genom de sovjetiska myndigheterna fastställa Wallenbergs öde. I ett telegram av den 9 april 1945 instruerade State Department sin ambassad i Moskva att ge allt erforderligt stöd åt den svenska legationen. Den dåvarande amerikanske ambassadören i Moskva, Averell Harriman, rapporterade i ett telegram av den 12 april 1945, att svenska legationen förklarat sig ej ha anledning att tro, att sovjetiska vederbörande icke gjorde vad de kunde i fråga om dessa efterforskningar, och att legationen icke ansåg att en amerikansk framställning till sovjetiska utrikesministeriet skulle vara önskvärd.

Telegrammen avspeglar kontakter som under krigets slutskede förekom mellan utrikesdepartementet och amerikanska ambassaden i Stockholm samt mellan de svenska och amerikanska beskickningarna i Moskva angående de pågående efterforskningarna av Wallenberg. Svenska legationen rapporterade i

efterhand till utrikesdepartementet om kontakterna i Moskva. Legationen framhöll i sin rapport att den amerikanska ambassaden i Moskva torde ha svarat Herschel Johnson, "att den utgår ifrån att man genom State Department vänt sig till Amerikas representation i Ungern. Ambassaden torde i övrigt svårligen anse något vara att göra från amerikansk sida".

Såsom framgår av utrikesdepartementets vitbok om Raoul Wallenberg, gjordes den 25 april 1945 en svensk démarche hos de sovjetiska myndigheterna i ärendet.

Secretary of State, Washington

Stockholm den 4 april 1945.

1251, 4 april kl. 5 e.m.

Svenska utrikesdepartementet är mycket bekymrat över att attachén vid legationen i Budapest, Raoul Wallenberg, försvunnit. Enligt obekräftade radiomeddelanden har han mördats. Svenska legationen i Moskva har instruerats att begära ryska regeringens bistånd att fastställa Wallenbergs öde.

I mitt 14 den 4 april kl. 5 e.m. sändes detta till Moskva.

Vi hade särskilt intresse av Wallenbergs verksamhet i Ungern och skulle mycket uppskatta varje stöd som vår ambassad i Moskva kan lämna den svenska legationen i Moskva i denna sak.

Johnson

Embassy, Moskva

Washington den 9 april 1945.

Följande till Harriman från departementet och krigsflyktingstyrelsen (War Refugee Board).

Vi hänvisar till Stockholms nr 14 den 4 april till Er, sänt till departementet som nr 1251 den 4 april.

Departementet och styrelsen skulle uppskatta om Ni gäve allt möjligt stöd åt svenska legationen i Moskva vid dess hemställan till ryska regeringen om bistånd att fastställa attachéns vid svenska legationen i Budapest, Raoul Wallenbergs, öde.

Krigsflyktingstyrelsen hade särskilt intresse av Wallenbergs verksamhet i Ungern på grund av hans utomordentliga arbete för att skydda judar och andra offer för fiendens förtryck under fiendens ockupation av Ungern.

Stettinius

Secretary of State, Washington

Moskva den 12 april 1945.

1137, 12 april kl. 10.

Svenska legationen i Moskva informerades sent i december av sovjetiska utrikesministeriet att Wallenberg (Edert 824.9 april kl. 7 e.m.) vore i säkerhet i Budapest. Legationen mottog senare en rapport från den svenska representationen i Bukarest att Wallenberg hade lämnat Budapest ensam med bil med okänt färdmål och att han försvunnit. Legationen i Moskva ombad därpå sovjetiska myndigheterna att söka spåra honom, vilket de lovade att göra. Svenskarna säger, att de icke ha någon anledning tro att svenskarna inte gör vad de kan, och att de inte anse att en framställning till sovjetiska utrikesministeriet från vår sida skulle vara önskvärd. (Sänt till departementet som nr 1137; sänt till Stockholm som nr 16).

Medlemmarna av den svenska representationen i Budapest förväntas anlända till Moskva inom några få dagar på väg till Stockholm och de kan möjligen ha ytterligare upplysningar om Wallenberg.

Harriman

AIRGRAM

Entered in full
POLITSWE-HUNG

30

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A-526

NO.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TO : Department of State WASHINGTON

INFO: MOSCOW

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

SUBJECT : Reaction to Swedish TV Program on Disappearance of Raoul WALLENBERG

REF : A-511, February 12, 1965.

DATE: February 17, 1965.

HANDLING INDICATOR

1965 FEB 20 AM

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

Attached is a memorandum of conversation with the Deputy Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Information Service, shedding further light on the Soviet protest on the February 2 showing of a film on Swedish TV on the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg. As will be seen, the Swedish reaction was distinctly negative.

For the Ambassador:

George R. Andrews

George R. Andrews
Second Secretary of Embassy

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decontrol

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:	CRA POL:GRAndrews:bm 2/15/65	Contents and Classification Approved by:
Clearances:	POL:JKHOLDWAY, Jr.	AMB:JGParsons
	DCM:AlS Jenkins	

1965 FEB 17 AM 9 04

COPYFLO-PBR

ADG-2

JFS

VT

American Embassy,
Stockholm, Sweden,
February 15, 1965.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leif Leifland, Deputy Chief of Information Service, Foreign
Office
George R. Andrews, Second Secretary of Embassy

DATE: February 11, 1965

SUBJECT: Russian Protest on February 2 TV Program on Raoul WALLENBERG

During the course of a conversation on the February 2 TV program on the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg, Mr. Leifland confirmed that Ambassador Jarring had been called into the Soviet Foreign Ministry on the TV program. The Russians had not lost any time being delicate about the matter, but had simply asked Jarring in point blank terms to have the program cancelled. I asked Leifland whether the crassness of the Soviet approach had taken the Foreign Ministry aback. He replied in the negative, saying this was the normal way for the Soviets to deal with "their small Swedish neighbor."

Leifland said that the Foreign Ministry had kept this information on a limit distribution basis in order that no word or rumor of the Soviet approach could reach Sveriges Radio and the producers of the program, who might conceivably have cancelled the program if they had heard of the Soviet demarche. Leifland also implied at one point that the Foreign Ministry had declined to provide more assistance to the producers of the program because of Russian sensitivity. However, the Foreign Ministry's attitude taken as a whole, judging from Leifland's remarks, was certainly an encouraging one.

Leifland added that word of the Russian protest was more widely known now within the Foreign Ministry and that there was some fear that there might be a news break on it. He asked me to treat his comments on a very confidential basis.

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decontrol

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AIRGRAM

POL 17 SWE-HUNG

XR CR 16-1(31)
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A-43

Copy No. 1 Series A

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : AmEmbassy STOCKHOLM

This document consists of 4
pages. No. 1 of 4
copies. See 10-17-AM '65

FROM : Department of State

DATE: September 15, 1965

SUBJECT: Documents on Case of Raoul Wallenberg.

REF :

There are transmitted herewith copies of the
Department's 1945-1957 documents on the Wallenberg case.

In view of the interest of the Swedish Government
in these documents the Embassy is authorized to show them,
in confidence, to the Swedish Foreign Office. It is
possible that the Foreign Office may wish some of them
included in the White Paper to be published by the
Government of Sweden. If so the Embassy is requested to
identify the message or messages to the Department. The
Embassy should also submit its own recommendation and
a resumé of the Foreign Office's reasons for desiring
publication. It should be noted that the Department
would be reluctant to grant permission for publication
but would consider a request on its merits and in the
light of all the circumstances involved.

RUSK

Group 1
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downgrading and declassification

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FORM DS-323

Drafted by: EUR:BNA:RDGeppent, ah 9/15/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: EUR/BNA:J. Harold Shullaw

Clearances: SOV - Mr. Woods (subs)

SY - Mr. Gilmore (subs)

P/HO - Dr. Parks (subs)

EUR/P - Mr. Courtney (subs)

COP 1 FLO-RBR 2

Enclosure No. 1

Page 1

AmEmbassy STOCKHOLM

- (1) Foreign Service Despatch No. 643 to the Dept from AmLegation Budapest, dated May 20, 1959.
- (2) Foreign Service Despatch No. 1042 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated April 28, 1959.
- (3) Foreign Service Despatch No. 1017 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated March 12, 1957.
- (4) Foreign Service Despatch No. 989 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated March 5, 1957.
- (5) Foreign Service Despatch No. 964 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated February 25, 1957.
- (6) Telegram No. 413 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated October 27, 1955.
- (7) Note No. 65 from the Dept to AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated July 14, 1949.
- (8) Note No. 031125 to the Secretary of State from Guy von Dardel, dated February 14, 1949.
- (9) Airgram No. 313 to the Dept from AmLegation Budapest, dated April 17, 1949.
- (10) Airgram No. 968 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated December 9, 1948.
- (11) Airgram No. 882 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated October 28, 1948.
- (12) Airgram No. 42 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated January 14, 1948.
- (13) Airgram No. 674 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated November 3, 1947.
- (14) Airgram No. 650 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated October 23, 1947.
- (15) Note No. 785 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated August 26, 1947.
- (16) Note No. 779 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated August 22, 1947.
- (17) Note No. 729 to the Department from AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated July 28, 1947.
- (18) Letter to Mr. von Dardel from the Dept (George L. Warren), dated April 11, 1947.

(")

Enclosure No. 1

Page 2

AmEmbassy Stockholm

- (19) Airgram No. 380 from the Dept to AmLegation Stockholm, dated April 11, 1947.
- (20) Letter to the Secretary of State from Senator Vandenberg, dated April 4, 1947; Letter to Senator Vandenberg from Guy von Dardel, dated March 31, 1947; Letter to Senator Vandenberg from the Dept, dated April 23, 1947.
- (21) Letter to President Truman from Guy von Dardel, dated March 27, 1947.
- (22) Note No. 7637 to the Dept from AmLegation Stockholm, dated December 11, 1946.
- (23) Letter to Mrs. Roosevelt from May von Dardel, dated November 30th, 1946; Letter to Mrs. Roosevelt from the Dept (George L. Warren), dated February 21, 1947.
- (24) Telegram No. 902 to the Dept from AmLegation Budapest, dated November 13, 1945; Telegram No. 902 to the Dept from AmLegation Budapest, dated November 13, 1945; Telegram No. 902 to the Dept from AmLegation Budapest, dated November 13, 1945.
- (25) Telegram No. 3321 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated October 27, 1945.
- (26) Telegram No. 3367 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Stockholm, dated September 25, 1945.
- (27) Telegram No. 2042 from the Dept to Moscow, dated September 20, 1945.
- (28) Note No. 5797 to the Department from AmLegation Stockholm, dated July 9, 1945.
- (29) Telegram No. 2063 to the Department from AmLegation Stockholm, dated June 7, 1945.
- (30) Telegram No. 1052 from the Dept to AmLegation Stockholm, dated June 5, 1945.
- (31) Letter to General O'Dwyer from the Dept (George L. Warren), dated May 8, 1945.
- (32) Telegram No. 1264 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Moscow, dated April 19, 1945.
- (33) Letter to the Secretary from William O'Dwyer, dated April 12, 1945.

Enclosure No. 1

Page 3

AmEmbassy Stockholm


- (34) Telegram No. 1137 to the Dept from AmEmbassy Moscow, dated April 12, 1945.
- (35) Telegram No. 824 from the Dept to Moscow, dated April 9, 1945.
- (36) Telegram No. 1251 to the Department from AmLegation Stockholm, dated April 4, 1945.
- (37) Telegram No. 231 to the Department from Bucharest, dated March 29, 1945.

Date: April 11, 1966.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Reference: Department's A-43 to Stockholm, dated September 13, 1965.

According to Official-Informal letter to Richard Geppert from Jerome K. Holloway dated March 9, 1966, the Embassy decided not to show these to the Swedes.


EUR:BNA:RDGeppert:ah
4/11/66.

AIRGRAM

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A-210

NO.

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11

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

1965 SEP 28 AM 9 57

INFO : GOTEBOG, REYKJAVIK, OSLO, HELSINKI, COPENHAGEN, MOSCOW.

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

(32)

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

EUR-

DATE: September 24, 1965.

SUBJECT: Statement by Prime Minister on WALLENBERG Affair

REF :

SUMMARY

The recently released Swedish White Paper on the case of Raoul WALLENBERG is a surprisingly strong effort to put pressure on the Soviets to be more cooperative in the matter. The White Paper also needs to be seen in the domestic political context as an attempt by the Government to reply to opposition criticism that it has not been active enough in pursuing the question with the USSR. While the Wallenberg affair will continue to be a definite irritant in Swedish-Soviet relations, it will not affect the operation of Swedish neutrality policy.

There is enclosed an Embassy translation of a statement made by Prime Minister Tage-ERLANDER on September 16 on the occasion of the release of the Swedish Government's White Paper on the case of Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who disappeared in Hungary in 1944 during the Soviet advance into that country. The White Paper released to the press comprises three sections: the Prime Minister's statement enclosed with this airgram, a chronological recitation of the history of the Wallenberg affair, and a series of documents bearing upon the subject, such as letters from Erlander to KHRUSHCHEV and KOSYGIN. The chronological account, together with the documentation (both of which are rather long), will be submitted separately as soon as the Embassy has been able to complete the translations.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

POL:GRAndrews: CIRA

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

Charge T. Chameton, Jr.

POL: J. K. [Signature], Jr.

1965 SEP 28 PM 4 39

COPYFLO-PBR

The Wallenberg case has been the most persistent issue of contention between Sweden and the USSR since the war. In addition, it has been a domestic political issue in Sweden. The bourgeois opposition has criticized the Social Democratic Government for not doing enough to clear up the mystery, and has urged the Government to make public the evidence available to it showing that Wallenberg was alive after August 1947, the date on which he is alleged by the Soviets to have died in Ljubljanka prison. The Government resisted these pressures on the grounds that to release the information would antagonize the Soviets and thereby reduce the chances of obtaining Wallenberg's release if he were actually still alive.

After the visit of KHRUSHCHEV to Sweden in June 1964, and during the campaign before the elections in September of that year, there was continued agitation by the bourgeois opposition for the Government to issue a White Paper which would put public pressure on the Soviets to be more cooperative and forthcoming in their investigations in the Wallenberg case.

Subsequently, (which has only just been revealed through the publication of the White Paper), Prime Minister Erlander wrote to Premier Kosygin on the subject on February 11, 1965 (receiving a negative reply from the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm). During Erlander's visit to the Soviet Union in June of this year, he again took up the Wallenberg case with Kosygin but without any result. It was at the conclusion of this trip apparently that Erlander decided to accede to the proposal of a White Paper, and rumors to this effect appeared in the press in July.

When the Government actually did issue its White Paper, three months later, the leaders of the opposition were not given an opportunity to study it ahead of time, but were presented with copies of it in a meeting of the Foreign Relations Council just a couple of hours before its release to the press. By releasing the White Paper in this fashion without prior consultation with the opposition, Erlander presumably intended to forestall any future opposition claim that the Government had acted upon the advice of the opposition,

as well as to stress to the Soviet Union that the White Paper represents a considered step by the Government, acting upon its own initiative. The opposition leaders on the Council protested this mode of operation and refused to give their assent to the White Paper (on the theory that there might be additional documentation which should have been included in it), and requested that the Government make available to them the entire file on Wallenberg. Prime Minister Erlander has replied that the opposition is welcome to examine the Government's voluminous dossier on the case. There is another meeting of the Foreign Relations Council scheduled for October 1, at which time the opposition will probably express its satisfaction with the White Paper. In fact, the opposition press has been practically unanimous in commending Erlander for having pursued the case with such tenacity through the years, despite Soviet denials. However, the opposition will presumably insist that the Wallenberg affair not be shelved and that Sweden continue to make strenuous efforts to clarify the matter.

The White Paper contained one sensational new piece of evidence in the form of a statement by a respected and internationally known Swedish doctor, Professor Nanna SVARTZ, who said that while on a visit to Moscow in January 1961 she had learned from a Soviet professor that Wallenberg was then still alive but confined to a mental institution. This information was immediately communicated by Professor Svartz to Prime Minister Erlander and it has formed the basis for a series of Swedish representations to the Soviets ever since, although the information was subsequently retracted by Professor Svartz's informant under what appeared to be pressure from Soviet officials.

As for Erlander's statement itself, it is a surprisingly strong condemnation of Soviet behaviour, as can be seen from the following excerpts:


"The fate of Raoul Wallenberg has deeply engaged Swedish opinion...We have sought to convince the Soviet leadership of the extraordinary seriousness with which Swedish quarters look upon this question. An essential part of our negotiations with the Soviet leaders during this time has come to concern the Wallenberg case. Unfortunately, the result has been negative. The Soviet leaders firmly assert that Raoul Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union -- either in prison, in hospital, or somewhere else....We have not achieved the result we have sought. Today, we make public our account....In a democratic country, the individual citizen should be able to rest assured that the community will spare no

efforts for his protection. As long as there is a possibility, this effort must continue and be pursued. In its effort to find a solution to the Wallenberg case, the Government has felt the support of a unanimous Swedish opinion."

Conclusion:

The Government's White Paper, including Erlander's statement, represents an effort to put public pressure on the Soviets, while at the same time seeking to avoid giving undue offense. However, it is in effect also an admission of despair on the part of the Government that there can be a successful resolution of the Wallenberg case. In a sense, it is more of a gesture towards Swedish public opinion. However, Erlander specifically stated that "as long as there is a possibility, this effort must continue and be pursued", so the case is not considered to be publicly closed, and will continue to be an irritant between Sweden and the USSR. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that whatever the frictions in Swedish-Soviet relations engendered by the Wallenberg affair, the Social Democratic Government is highly unlikely to let them affect its concept of Sweden's neutral and non-aligned role in the East-West conflict.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim



George R. Andrews
Second Secretary of Embassy

PRIME MINISTER ERLANDER'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 16, 1965.

(In connection with release of the Government's White Paper)

The fate of Raoul WALLENBERG has deeply engaged Swedish opinion. He was arrested and carried away by a foreign Power while in diplomatic service for Sweden. His heroic achievements to save Hungarian Jews from brutal persecutions by German and Hungarian Nazis have aroused deep admiration and affection. We have had proof that he was in prison in the Soviet Union. This is the background for the intensive Swedish efforts to find out his whereabouts and have him sent home.

In 1957, the Foreign Ministry made public an exhaustive collection of documents concerning Raoul Wallenberg, together with commentaries concerning his captivity in the Soviet Union. Allow me to make a short recapitulation.

In March 1944, after the German troops had marched into Hungary, a Swedish relief action was started for the Hungarian Jews. Raoul Wallenberg was assigned to the Legation in Budapest in July 1944 to lead the relief action under the direct supervision of the Chief of Mission, Minister DANIELSSON. He carried a Swedish diplomatic passport and enjoyed diplomatic immunity. He worked untiringly, with his own life at stake, to save Jews from Nazi persecution. He saved human lives by the thousands.

By the middle of January 1945, that part of Budapest where the Jews protected through the Swedish relief action were living fell in the hands of the Soviet troops. On January 16, the Soviet Foreign Ministry advised that Wallenberg was under the protection of the Russian troops.

The earlier White Paper [1957] contains detailed material on all the Swedish démarches which were made at that time and during the years to follow, to clarify Wallenberg's whereabouts and to have him transferred to Sweden. They were all fruitless. I wish to recall in particular that the Soviet Government in August 1947 informed us that as a result of a careful investigation it had been established that Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union and that he was unknown to the Soviet authorities.

Between 1947 and 1951 no essentially new facts in the

the texts of the notes exchanged with the Soviet Union since 1957. It accounts for the various conversations which we have had with members of the Soviet Government during this period, particularly my talks with Khrushchev in the summer of 1964 and with KOSYGIN in June of this year. Furthermore, the White Paper contains material about the testimonies on which we have founded our representations in recent years. These testimonies refer to two different periods of time.

First, it concerns the reports that Wallenberg during the 1950's had been in prison in Vladimir. We have sought to make contact with the prisoners of war returning from the Soviet Union who could be expected to have been in Vladimir during this period. All of the information obtained from them which could be placed in direct or indirect connection with Raoul Wallenberg has been the subject of testing. A collective judgment of the weight of this information was made in 1959 by Justices of the Supreme Court GYLLENSWARD and SANTESSON. Their pronouncement, which is included in the material now presented, is to the effect that in their opinion, and under Swedish law, the investigation at hand, although not containing full evidence in this respect, must be held as making likely that Wallenberg was alive at least during the early 1950's and that he was then in prison in Vladimir.

Second, the White Paper contains new testimony which appeared in January 1961. Professor Nana SVARTZ on a visit to Moscow had a conversation about Raoul Wallenberg with a prominent Soviet scientist. According to her testimony, the latter on her direct question then made a statement to the effect that Wallenberg was still alive. Professor Svartz has written a separate account, which forms part of the White Paper, about this statement and about her subsequent contacts with the Soviet scientist.

These testimonies have formed the basis for our recurring representations to the Soviet Government. We have concentrated our efforts to the opportunities when there have been possibilities for contact on the highest level. For an initiative from the highest quarters in the Soviet Union has seemed to be the absolute prerequisite for achieving clarity about the fate of Wallenberg and for having him returned to Sweden. During these contacts we have accounted for our material and for our views. We have sought to convince the Soviet leadership of the extraordinary seriousness with which Swedish quarters look upon this question.

An essential part of our negotiations with the Soviet leaders during this time has come to concern the Wallenberg case.

Unfortunately, the result has been negative. The Soviet leaders firmly assert that Raoul Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union -- either in prison, in hospital, or somewhere else. They persist that no material whatsoever exists concerning Wallenberg over and beyond the brief notation about his death in 1947 which we were told about in the Soviet reply of 1957. Repeated new investigations are said to have been made because of our representations, but no new material whatsoever has been uncovered. It is being stated that Wallenberg was never in Vladimir and that the statements by the Soviet scientist to Professor Svartz have been misinterpreted. It is being held forth that there is no reason whatsoever why the Soviet Union should detain Wallenberg, in whatever condition he may be, and reference is being made in this connection to all of the prisoners of war and others who have been allowed to return from the Soviet Union in recent years. The Russians express their regret about Raoul Wallenberg's fate, and call to mind in this connection all of the tragedies which followed in the wake of the war.

We have not achieved the result we have sought. Today, we make public our account.

All of the efforts made by Sweden in this case have naturally been motivated by Raoul Wallenberg's contribution to relieve suffering people and by consideration for his family. But this engagement and these efforts also have a wider aspect. In a democratic country, the individual citizen should be able to rest assured that the community will spare no efforts for his protection. As long as there is a possibility, this effort must continue and be pursued. In its effort to find a solution to the Wallenberg case, the Government has felt the support of a unanimous Swedish opinion.

Translation: Nils Moller.

ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-210

NO.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

11

XR

HANDLING INDICATOR

32

TO : Department of State

1965 SEP 23 AM 9 57

INFO : GOTEBOG, REYKJAVIK, OSLO, HELSINKI, COPENHAGEN, MOSCOW.

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

DATE: September 24, 1965.

SUBJECT: Statement by Prime Minister on WALLENBERG Affair

REF :

SUMMARY

The recently released Swedish White Paper on the case of Raoul WALLENBERG is a surprisingly strong effort to put pressure on the Soviets to be more cooperative in the matter. The White Paper also needs to be seen in the domestic political context as an attempt by the Government to reply to opposition criticism that it has not been active enough in pursuing the question with the USSR. While the Wallenberg affair will continue to be a definite irritant in Swedish-Soviet relations, it will not affect the operation of Swedish neutrality policy.

There is enclosed an Embassy translation of a statement made by Prime Minister Tage ERLANDER on September 16 on the occasion of the release of the Swedish Government's White Paper on the case of Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who disappeared in Hungary in 1944 during the Soviet advance into that country. The White Paper released to the press comprises three sections: the Prime Minister's statement enclosed with this airgram, a chronological recitation of the history of the Wallenberg affair, and a series of documents bearing upon the subject, such as letters from Erlander to KHRUSHCHEV and KOSYGIN. The chronological account, together with the documentation (both of which are rather long), will be submitted separately as soon as the Embassy has been able to complete the translations.

FORM 4-62 DS-323
Encl. att. M.M.

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Drafted by:

POL: GR Andrews: CWA

Contents and Classification Approved By:

Charge T. Cameron, Jr.

Clearances:

POL: J. K. [Signature], Jr.

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The Wallenberg case has been the most persistent issue of contention between Sweden and the USSR since the war. In addition, it has been a domestic political issue in Sweden. The bourgeois opposition has criticized the Social Democratic Government for not doing enough to clear up the mystery, and has urged the Government to make public the evidence available to it showing that Wallenberg was alive after August 1947, the date on which he is alleged by the Soviets to have died in Ljubljanka prison. The Government resisted these pressures on the grounds that to release the information would antagonize the Soviets and thereby reduce the chances of obtaining Wallenberg's release if he were actually still alive.

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After the visit of KHRUSHCHEV to Sweden in June 1964, and during the campaign before the elections in September of that year, there was continued agitation by the bourgeois opposition for the Government to issue a White Paper which would put public pressure on the Soviets to be more cooperative and forthcoming in their investigations in the Wallenberg case. [The Embassy was informed confidentially at the time that Khrushchev in his talks with Erlander last June was extremely unreasonable and obdurate, and was very annoyed at Erlander's persistence in the matter. However, the Government still refused to agree to opposition demands for the release of its confidential documents, feeling that the time was not yet ripe, and that further efforts should be made with the Soviets behind the scenes.] Subsequently, (which has only just been revealed through the publication of the White Paper), Prime Minister Erlander wrote to Premier Kosygin on the subject on February 11, 1965 (receiving a negative reply from the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm). During Erlander's visit to the Soviet Union in June of this year, he again took up the Wallenberg case with Kosygin but without any result. It was at the conclusion of this trip apparently that Erlander decided to accede to the proposal of a White Paper, and rumors to this effect appeared in the press in July.

When the Government actually did issue its White Paper, three months later, the leaders of the opposition were not given an opportunity to study it ahead of time, but were presented with copies of it in a meeting of the Foreign Relations Council just a couple of hours before its release to the press. By releasing the White Paper in this fashion without prior consultation with the opposition, Erlander presumably intended to forestall any future opposition claim that the Government had acted upon the advice of the opposition,

as well as to stress to the Soviet Union that the White Paper represents a considered step by the Government, acting upon its own initiative. The opposition leaders on the Council protested this mode of operation and refused to give their assent to the White Paper (on the theory that there might be additional documentation which should have been included in it), and requested that the Government make available to them the entire file on Wallenberg. Prime Minister Erlander has replied that the opposition is welcome to examine the Government's voluminous dossier on the case. There is another meeting of the Foreign Relations Council scheduled for October 1, at which time the opposition will probably express its satisfaction with the White Paper. In fact, the opposition press has been practically unanimous in commending Erlander for having pursued the case with such tenacity through the years, despite Soviet denials. However, the opposition will presumably insist that the Wallenberg affair not be shelved and that Sweden continue to make strenuous efforts to clarify the matter.

The White Paper contained one sensational new piece of evidence in the form of a statement by a respected and internationally known Swedish doctor, Professor Nanna SVARTZ, who said that while on a visit to Moscow in January 1961 she had learned from a Soviet professor that Wallenberg was then still alive but confined to a mental institution. This information was immediately communicated by Professor Svartz to Prime Minister Erlander and it has formed the basis for a series of Swedish representations to the Soviets ever since, although the information was subsequently retracted by Professor Svartz's informant under what appeared to be pressure from Soviet officials.

As for Erlander's statement itself, it is a surprisingly strong condemnation of Soviet behaviour, as can be seen from the following excerpts:


"The fate of Raoul Wallenberg has deeply engaged Swedish opinion...We have sought to convince the Soviet leadership of the extraordinary seriousness with which Swedish quarters look upon this question. An essential part of our negotiations with the Soviet leaders during this time has come to concern the Wallenberg case. Unfortunately, the result has been negative. The Soviet leaders firmly assert that Raoul Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union -- either in prison, in hospital, or somewhere else....We have not achieved the result we have sought. Today, we make public our account....In a democratic country, the individual citizen should be able to rest assured that the community will spare no

efforts for his protection. As long as there is a possibility, this effort must continue and be pursued. In its effort to find a solution to the Wallenberg case, the Government has felt the support of a unanimous Swedish opinion."

Conclusion:

The Government's White Paper, including Erlander's statement, represents an effort to put public pressure on the Soviets, while at the same time seeking to avoid giving undue offense. However, it is in effect also an admission of despair on the part of the Government that there can be a successful resolution of the Wallenberg case. In a sense, it is more of a gesture towards Swedish public opinion. However, Erlander specifically stated that "as long as there is a possibility, this effort must continue and be pursued", so the case is not considered to be publicly closed, and will continue to be an irritant between Sweden and the USSR. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that whatever the frictions in Swedish-Soviet relations engendered by the Wallenberg affair, the Social Democratic Government is highly unlikely to let them affect its concept of Sweden's neutral and non-aligned role in the East-West conflict.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim



George R. Andrews
Second Secretary of Embassy

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from Stockholm 9/24/65

PRIME MINISTER ERLANDER'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 16, 1965.

(In connection with release of the Government's White Paper)

The fate of Raoul WALLENBERG has deeply engaged Swedish opinion. He was arrested and carried away by a foreign Power while in diplomatic service for Sweden. His heroic achievements to save Hungarian Jews from brutal persecutions by German and Hungarian Nazis have aroused deep admiration and affection. We have had proof that he was in prison in the Soviet Union. This is the background for the intensive Swedish efforts to find out his whereabouts and have him sent home.

In 1957, the Foreign Ministry made public an exhaustive collection of documents concerning Raoul Wallenberg, together with commentaries concerning his captivity in the Soviet Union. Allow me to make a short recapitulation.

In March 1944, after the German troops had marched into Hungary, a Swedish relief action was started for the Hungarian Jews. Raoul Wallenberg was assigned to the Legation in Budapest in July 1944 to lead the relief action under the direct supervision of the Chief of Mission, Minister DANIELSSON. He carried a Swedish diplomatic passport and enjoyed diplomatic immunity. He worked untiringly, with his own life at stake, to save Jews from Nazi persecution. He saved human lives by the thousands.

By the middle of January 1945, that part of Budapest where the Jews protected through the Swedish relief action were living fell in the hands of the Soviet troops. On January 16, the Soviet Foreign Ministry advised that Wallenberg was under the protection of the Russian troops.

The earlier White Paper [1957] contains detailed material on all the Swedish démarches which were made at that time and during the years to follow, to clarify Wallenberg's whereabouts and to have him transferred to Sweden. They were all fruitless. I wish to recall in particular that the Soviet Government in August 1947 informed us that as a result of a careful investigation it had been established that Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union and that he was unknown to the Soviet authorities.

Between 1947 and 1951 no essentially new facts in the

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Wallenberg affair reached the Swedish Foreign Ministry. But in so far as foreign prisoners began to be sent home from the Soviet Union there appeared definite reports about Wallenberg being held in prison in Moscow. This prompted a new long series of Swedish démarches, similarly without result. In April 1956, Minister of the Interior Gunnar HEDLUND and I visited the Soviet Union. We had then the opportunity to present directly to the Soviet Union's Government an exhaustive account of the Swedish views. As a matter of fact, the talks primarily centered on the Wallenberg case. At the end of our talks, the representatives of the Soviet Government -- including BULGANIN, KHRUSHCHEV and MOLOTOV -- promised that a new extensive investigation concerning Wallenberg's fate would be made because of the evidence which had been collected and presented by Sweden.

On February 6, 1957, came the Russian reply. Its implication was as follows: in the course of the extensive Soviet investigations a document had been found according to which Raoul Wallenberg had died in the Ljubljanskaja Prison in Moscow on July 17, 1947. This had been told by the head of the health service in the prison, SMOLTSOV, to the chief of the Soviet security service, ABAKUMOV. The latter, it was stated in the Russian reply, had previously supplied the Soviet Foreign Ministry with false information. Abakumov was executed in connection with the purge within the Security Police following STALIN's death.

The Swedish Government's reaction to this reply was that it seemed difficult to believe that all documentation concerning Wallenberg's stay in Soviet prisons other than the document mentioned would be extinct. The Swedish Government reserved the right to submit any further material concerning Wallenberg that could be of importance for a continued investigation in the Soviet Union.

During the years which have followed since then, we have pursued our search and our efforts. We have left no trace unexplored, however vague it may have seemed. We have seized upon every opportunity to bring up the question, through diplomatic channels or by personal contacts. Intensive checking of all material and thorough internal considerations have taken place all the time.

The collection of documents now being published aims at providing a comprehensive picture of what has happened since the earlier White Paper was published. Thus, it contains

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the texts of the notes exchanged with the Soviet Union since 1957. It accounts for the various conversations which we have had with members of the Soviet Government during this period, particularly my talks with Khrushchev in the summer of 1964 and with KOSYGIN in June of this year. Furthermore, the White Paper contains material about the testimonies on which we have founded our representations in recent years. These testimonies refer to two different periods of time.

First, it concerns the reports that Wallenberg during the 1950's had been in prison in Vladimir. We have sought to make contact with the prisoners of war returning from the Soviet Union who could be expected to have been in Vladimir during this period. All of the information obtained from them which could be placed in direct or indirect connection with Raoul Wallenberg has been the subject of testing. A collective judgment of the weight of this information was made in 1959 by Justices of the Supreme Court GYLLENSWARD and SANTESSON. Their pronouncement, which is included in the material now presented, is to the effect that in their opinion, and under Swedish law, the investigation at hand, although not containing full evidence in this respect, must be held as making likely that Wallenberg was alive at least during the early 1950's and that he was then in prison in Vladimir.

Second, the White Paper contains [new] testimony which appeared in January 1961. Professor Nana SVARTZ on a visit to Moscow had a conversation about Raoul Wallenberg with a prominent Soviet scientist. According to her testimony, the latter on her direct question then made a statement to the effect that Wallenberg was still alive. Professor Svartz has written a separate account, which forms part of the White Paper, about this statement and about her subsequent contacts with the Soviet scientist.

These testimonies have formed the basis for our recurring representations to the Soviet Government. We have concentrated our efforts to the opportunities when there have been possibilities for contact on the highest level. For an initiative from the highest quarters in the Soviet Union has seemed to be the absolute prerequisite for achieving clarity about the fate of Wallenberg and for having him returned to Sweden. During these contacts we have accounted for our material and for our views. We have sought to convince the Soviet leadership of the extraordinary seriousness with which Swedish quarters look upon this question.

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An essential part of our negotiations with the Soviet leaders during this time has come to concern the Wallenberg case.

Unfortunately, the result has been negative. The Soviet leaders firmly assert that Raoul Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union -- either in prison, in hospital, or somewhere else. They persist that no material whatsoever exists concerning Wallenberg over and beyond the brief notation about his death in 1947 which we were told about in the Soviet reply of 1957. Repeated new investigations are said to have been made because of our representations, but no new material whatsoever has been uncovered. It is being stated that Wallenberg was never in Vladimir and that the statements by the Soviet scientist to Professor Svartz have been misinterpreted. It is being held forth that there is no reason whatsoever why the Soviet Union should detain Wallenberg, in whatever condition he may be, and reference is being made in this connection to all of the prisoners of war and others who have been allowed to return from the Soviet Union in recent years. The Russians express their regret about Raoul Wallenberg's fate, and call to mind in this connection all of the tragedies which followed in the wake of the war.

We have not achieved the result we have sought. Today, we make public our account.

All of the efforts made by Sweden in this case have naturally been motivated by Raoul Wallenberg's contribution to relieve suffering people and by consideration for his family. But this engagement and these efforts also have a wider aspect. In a democratic country, the individual citizen should be able to rest assured that the community will spare no efforts for his protection. As long as there is a possibility, this effort must continue and be pursued. In its effort to find a solution to the Wallenberg case, the Government has felt the support of a unanimous Swedish opinion.

Translation: Nils Moller.

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AIRGRAM

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RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

DATE: October 4, 1965.

SUBJECT: Government White Paper on Wallenberg Affair

REF : Embassy's A-210 dated September 24, 1965.
G.M.

The airgram under reference enclosed the statement made on September 16 by Prime Minister ERLANDER on the occasion of the release of the Swedish Government's White Paper on the WALLENBERG affair (the statement forms an integral part of the White Paper). This airgram submits Embassy translations of the other portions of the White Paper as follows:

- (1) a chronological account of the Wallenberg case since 1957 (enclosure 1);
- (2) appendices to the chronological account, consisting of the texts of hitherto confidential correspondence between Erlander and Soviet leaders, public statements by the Swedish Government, etc. (enclosure 2);
- (3) a memorandum by Professor Nanna SVARTZ concerning the information she received in the Soviet Union in January 1961 that Wallenberg was then still alive (enclosure 3).

The following appendices in enclosure 2 are of particular interest:

- a) Ambassador RODIONOV of the Soviet Foreign Ministry informed Swedish Ambassador SOHLMAN on January 27, 1959 that because of Swedish newspaper stories alleging that Wallenberg was still in the Soviet Union, "I find it necessary to inform you...that

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POL:GRANDrews: CRA

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Charge TCCameron, Jr.

Clearances:

POL:JKHolloway, Jr.

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Wallenberg died in 1947 - the pieces of information to which Swedish papers refer are all made up". Rodionov added that "on the part of the Soviet Union the hope is expressed that Sweden...may assume an attitude that makes it impossible for certain elements in the future to use this question for the purpose of poisoning Soviet-Swedish relations." (page 4, enclosure 2).


- b) A Swedish memorandum dated July 18, 1959 replied to Rodionov's statements cited above in the following terms: "Reference was made [by Rodionov] to certain pieces of information published in the Swedish press...which are declared to be simply made up....In order to avoid misunderstandings as to the material on which the Swedish inquiry was based, the Ministry finds it necessary to give the following more detailed information..." The Swedish memorandum then went on to cite by name Swiss, Austrian, and German citizens who had been in Russia as prisoners who had all reported separately and individually to Swedish authorities that they had either seen or heard that Wallenberg was interned in the hospital of Vladimir Prison in the early 1950's (several years after the Soviets say he died in 1947). The Swedish note went on to say that the only Swedish motive was to solve the fate of Raoul Wallenberg and that "if this happens this will remove a serious irritative factor in Swedish-Soviet relations". (page 5, enclosure 2).
- c) A letter from Erlander to KHRUSHCHEV on February 9, 1961 in which Erlander said that Professor Nanna SVARTZ had been informed by a prominent Soviet doctor that Wallenberg was then alive in a mental hospital, which concluded as follows (without asking for verification of the information): "Foreign Minister UNDEN and I have discussed the most suitable way of transferring Wallenberg to Sweden. We have found that the best way would be if a Swedish physician were permitted to come to Moscow and discuss with his Soviet colleagues arrangements for transportation, medical care, etc. Yours very respectfully." Despite sharp requests by Erlander to the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm, as well as by the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, Khrushchev never replied to this letter. (page 9, enclosure 2)

Comment:

The implications of the release of the Government's White Paper have already been analyzed in the airgram under reference. The above brief selections from its appendices serve to reveal the extent of irritation in Swedish-Soviet

relations caused by the Wallenberg affair and highlight the persistence and determination shown by the Swedes, as well as the obdurate, and even scornful, attitude of the Soviets toward the repeated Swedish requests for information. The chronology and appendices make clear that there were several points at which Erlander could have dropped the matter or the Soviets could have sought to allay Swedish suspicions by providing specific information or by appearing more solicitous of Swedish feelings, but neither did so.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim



George R. Andrews
Second Secretary of Embassy

Chronological Account of Wallenberg Case since 1957

1. In 1957, the Foreign Ministry published a collection of documents along with commentaries concerning Raoul Wallenberg's captivity in the Soviet Union. The material was made public after the reply in the matter had been received which had been promised by the Soviet Government during Prime Minister Erlander's and Interior Minister Hedlund's visit to Moscow in March/April 1956. The reply, which was received in the form of a memorandum on February 6, 1957, implied in the main that the Soviet Government, because of the discovery of a document from the Ljubljanskaya Prison in Moscow, was of the opinion, first, that there was reason for looking upon this document as referring to Wallenberg, and, second, that the conclusion ought to be drawn from the content of the document that Wallenberg died in the Ljubljanskaya Prison in July 1947.
2. On account of the Soviet Government's memorandum of February 6, 1957, a Swedish note of reply was transmitted on February 19, 1957, in which it was stated, inter alia, that Swedish public opinion was rightly disturbed by what had occurred in the matter. The Swedish Government found it difficult to believe that all documentation concerning Wallenberg's confinement to Soviet prisons other than the report referred to in the Soviet Government's memorandum would be wholly extinct. The Government therefore expected that if additional material should come to light in the Soviet Union which could clarify what had happened to Wallenberg, this would be communicated to the Swedish Foreign Ministry. The Swedish Government for its part reserved the right to make available any additional material concerning Wallenberg which the Swedish Government judged to be of importance for continued investigations in the Soviet Union.
3. The Swedish note of February 19, 1957 was replied to by the Soviet Government through a note of April 17, 1957, which was handed to the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires ad interim by Deputy Foreign Minister Zacharov. It was stated in the note of reply that the Soviet memorandum of February 6, 1957, had given all the information which had been obtained as the result of a careful and comprehensive investigation concerning Wallenberg carried out by the competent Soviet authorities. It was also pointed out that the Soviet Government unfortunately was not in possession of any further information whatsoever. The content of the Soviet note was made public through a press release of April 23, 1957.
4. It was clear to the Swedish Government that also henceforth all existing or new clues would have to be tested. The continued search, which was conducted with the same exactitude and along the same principles as the earlier investigations concerning Wallenberg's stay in the Ljubljanskaya and Lefortovskaya prisons, indicated that Wallenberg some time after 1947 had been transferred to the prison in Vladimir, situated northeast of Moscow. At the beginning of 1959, the work on the collection of the new material of evidence had proceeded far enough to provide the

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from Stockholm

foundation for a new representation by the Swedish Government. This was given the form of a note which was submitted by Ambassador Sohlman to Deputy Foreign Minister Zacharov on February 9, 1959 (Appendix A). By way of introduction, it is recalled in the note that the Swedish Government in its note of February 19, 1957 had reserved the right to make additional material available to the Soviet Government. The Swedish authorities had continued to test all clues bearing upon Wallenberg's sojourn in the Soviet Union. There had then come to the knowledge of the Swedish authorities a number of testimonies by persons having returned from Soviet captivity of the implication that Wallenberg after 1947 had been transferred to the prison in Vladimir. These testimonies, independent of each other, had all been obtained from direct contact between the persons in question and Swedish official representatives. The note concluded with the request that the Soviet Government make a prompt investigation for the purpose of determining whether Wallenberg had been staying in the Vladimir prison.

5. The Soviet reply to this request was received on March 6, 1959 (Appendix B). It was stated in the reply that the Soviet Government's memorandum of February 6, 1957 had contained all the information which had been obtained as the result of a careful and comprehensive control, and led to the conclusion that Wallenberg died in July 1947. The reply concluded with the declaration that a renewed investigation, made in accordance with the Swedish Government's wish, had not brought to light any new facts in the matter. The information mentioned in the Swedish note about Wallenberg's stay in Vladimir had not been confirmed.

In response to press inquiries, the Foreign Ministry on May 28, 1959, published a communiqué concerning this exchange of notes (Appendix C).

6. During the spring and summer of 1959 preparations were in progress for the eventually cancelled return visit to Sweden by Minister President KHRUSHCHEV which had been scheduled for August 1959. The Swedish Government informed the Soviet Embassy on May 8 that the Wallenberg affair would be brought up during the negotiations in connection with the visit.

7. On June 27, 1959, the Soviet Foreign Ministry made an oral statement to Ambassador Sohlman in reply to a letter which Wallenberg's mother, Mrs. Maj von Dardel, had written to Minister President Khrushchev. It was requested in the statement that Mrs. von Dardel be referred to the Soviet Government's memorandum of February 6, 1957 (Appendix D).

8. Irrespective of the negative Soviet replies, the Swedish representation of February 9, 1959, was followed up through the delivery on July 17, 1959 of a summary of the main testimonies which formed part of the Swedish material concerning Wallenberg's stay in Vladimir (Appendix E).

9. As is also seen from the communications exchanged during June and July 1959, the Swedish press particularly during the month of May 1959 carried a large number of articles on the Wallenberg case. In this connection

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the Foreign Ministry as already stated issued a press communiqué on May 28, 1959, concerning the exchange of notes which had taken place earlier in the year. During the latter half of 1959 and in early 1960 there were also numerous articles in the press which caused inquiries to be made to the Ministry. On January 23, 1960, a new press release was issued (Appendix F), in which it was stated anew that the Swedish authorities were carefully testing all existing and newly incoming clues in the Wallenberg affair and that nothing new was to be added at that time over and beyond what had been accounted for in the press communiqué of May 28, 1959.

10. In the collection of documents of 1957 concerning the Wallenberg affair an account was given of the study of the then available material of evidence about Wallenberg's confinement to prison in the Soviet Union which had been made by former Justices of the Supreme Court Eklund and Lind. The work by the two Justices led to a written report which was submitted to the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm on March 10, 1956, as part of the material which at that time was made available by Sweden to the Soviet authorities. A corresponding study of the material which had transpired in support of the fact that Wallenberg had been in the Soviet Union after July 1947 and had then been confined to prison in Vladimir was made on the Ministry's orders by former Justices of the Supreme Court Gyllensvärd and Santesson. They stated in a report dated April 25, 1960, that in their opinion the investigation at hand, although not including full evidence in this respect, must under Swedish law be considered as making likely that Wallenberg had been alive at least in the early 1950's and had then been in prison in Vladimir (Appendix G).

11. Throughout this period, efforts were being made to elaborate the evidence as the basis for a renewed démarche to the Soviet Government. An important new testimony appeared in January 1961 in connection with a visit to Moscow by Professor Nanna Svartz. In a conversation with a prominent Soviet scientist she had, in response to a direct question, received the reply that the latter knew about Wallenberg, who was "in a very poor condition" and mentally ill. After Professor Svartz' informant had summoned a colleague, she had been given the advice by the latter to get in touch with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister SEMJONOV -- whom Professor Svartz had said she had known for a long time -- to seek permission for Wallenberg to be brought home -- "if he is still alive".

Professor Svartz in a memorandum has given an account of this conversation and of her subsequent contacts in Moscow.

12. Professor Svartz, who had tried in vain to see Deputy Foreign Minister Semjonov personally in Moscow, quickly informed the Swedish Government about what had happened. Following thorough considerations within the Cabinet, Prime Minister ERLANDER addressed a letter directly to Minister President Khrushchev containing a request that a Swedish physician be allowed immediately to travel to Moscow to decide in consultation with his Soviet colleagues the manner of transportation, medical care, etc.,

in connection with a repatriation of Wallenberg to Sweden (Appendix H). The letter, which was dated February 9, 1961, was delivered on February 25, 1961, by Ambassador Sohlman at a personal call on Minister President Khrushchev. The latter, who had been informed in advance that the conversation would concern the Wallenberg affair, immediately and categorically declared that he had nothing new to add to the information given previously.

13. Professor Svartz for her part made various efforts to renew contact with her colleagues in Moscow. During a visit to Moscow in March 1961, at which she again met with her informant, she reverted to the question about Wallenberg. The informant then maintained that Professor Svartz had misunderstood him. He declared that prior to their conversation in January he had known nothing about Wallenberg.

After some time had past without any written reply to Prime Minister Erlander's letter having been received, Ambassador Sohlman was instructed to express to the Soviet Foreign Ministry an earnest expectation that such a reply would soon be delivered. This oral reminder was made on July 10, 1961. The Foreign Ministry then asserted that a reply to the letter had already been made, to which Ambassador Sohlman rejoined that Prime Minister Erlander after a written representation of this nature felt he had the right to expect a written reply.

14. During the months following this reminder, which neither led to any reply from the Soviet Government, the possibility was considered of seeking to find response from the highest Soviet quarters to the Swedish representations via Professor Svartz' Soviet contacts. In May 1962, Professor Svartz was invited to attend a medical congress in Moscow and then met anew with her original informant. The latter, however, rejected any conversation about Wallenberg and referred her to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

15. In connection with Soviet Ambassador GUSEV's transfer from Stockholm he was summoned to call on Prime Minister Erlander on August 17, 1962, and was asked upon his return to Moscow to forward to the Soviet Government and to Minister President Khrushchev personally a message containing an urgent appeal for a positive treatment of the Swedish representations concerning Wallenberg (Appendix I). Not even this new representation caused any reply from the Soviet Union.

16. After Foreign Minister Nilsson had been invited by Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO to pay a visit to Moscow in May 1963, the Foreign Ministry on April 17 informed the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm that the Swedish Foreign Minister had no concrete questions that he wished to bring up during his visit, with one exception, namely, the question about Wallenberg's fate.

At his first talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko on May 8, 1963, Foreign Minister NILSSON reminded him of Prime Minister Erlander's representations and declared that he wished to take up the question with

Minister President Khrushchev. Foreign Minister Gromyko firmly advised against such a step which in his opinion must be entirely fruitless since there was nothing new to say in the matter. After Foreign Minister Nilsson on May 16 had been informed that time for a meeting with the Minister President had been set for the following day, he immediately confirmed to Foreign Minister Gromyko his previously declared intention to take up the Wallenberg question with the Minister President. This was also done at the meeting which took place on May 17, 1963. Foreign Minister Nilsson then referred to, among other things, Professor Svartz' testimony, and addressed an urgent appeal to the Minister President for assistance in clarifying Wallenberg's fate. The Minister President declared that if Wallenberg had existed he would have been returned to Sweden. He regretted that he had nothing to add over and beyond what had previously been told by the Soviet Government.

17. During Foreign Minister Gromyko's return visit to Sweden at the middle of March 1964 there was a conversation between him and Prime Minister Erlander which was devoted almost exclusively to the Wallenberg affair. The Prime Minister pointed to the great importance of the affair to Swedish-Soviet relations and requested that the Soviet Government make a further attempt to trace Wallenberg's fate, under the guidance of available information. He also proposed that a meeting be arranged between Professor Svartz and her informant, to gain further clarity about that testimony. Foreign Minister Gromyko replied that Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union, that no further trace had been found after him, and that nothing was to be added. Professor Svartz' testimony must depend on some misunderstanding. The Soviet scientist in question had categorically denied that he had spoken the way it had been alleged. Perhaps he would be prepared himself to make a declaration to Professor Svartz to this effect.

Some time after this conversation, Professor Svartz received a letter from her informant, dated April 29, 1964. In his letter he stated that at the conversation in January 1961 he had said that he knew nothing about Wallenberg, had never heard his name, and had not the slightest idea whether or not he was alive. The content of this letter as well as Professor Svartz' reply by letter of May 28, 1964, are accounted for in Professor Svartz' memorandum.

18. In an interpellation on March 3, 1964, Mr. OHLIN asked Foreign Minister Nilsson whether he would provide the Riksdag with an account of the development of the Wallenberg affair since the publication of the Foreign Ministry's White Paper of 1957 -- in so far as certain information must not be kept secret for special reasons -- and also give information on what measures the Government planned to take to convince the Soviet Government of the necessity of a more effective search for Wallenberg and his whereabouts during different periods after the war.

The Foreign Minister's reply was given in the Riksdag on April 3, 1964 (Appendix J). It was stated in the reply, among other things, that the Government had sought to exploit every suitable possibility to underscore

to the Soviet authorities the importance of having clarity achieved concerning Wallenberg's fate. However, the material which in recent years had been presented to the Soviet authorities and the details of the representations which had been made were not of a character to make it possible to make them public in this connection. Yet, all representations had been met by the Soviet Government with the reply that there was nothing to add beyond what had previously been stated by the Soviet Government. In conclusion, Foreign Minister Nilsson confirmed that the Swedish Government did not look upon Wallenberg's cause as being finished but would continue its efforts to create clarity about his fate,

19. On account of Minister President Khrushchev's impending visit to Sweden, Ambassador JARRING had a conversation in Moscow on May 26, 1964, with the chief of the Scandinavian Division in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, KOVALJOV. During this conversation, the Swedish request was advanced anew that the Soviet Government make a new investigation in the Wallenberg affair. With reference to this conversation, Ambassador Jarring was summoned on June 11, 1964, to call on Deputy Foreign Minister ORLOV and then received an oral statement as follows:

The Soviet authorities had carried out the most minute investigation in the Wallenberg case because of the conversation with Kovaljov. The result of this investigation was the same as had been presented in the memorandum of February 8, 1957, in which the circumstances of Wallenberg's death had been stated. There were no further circumstances whatsoever that could bring about any news in this matter. The assertions by some persons that Wallenberg was supposed to have been alive after 1947 were either due to mistakes, or else they reflected the efforts of certain circles to complicate relations between the Soviet Union and Sweden. Wallenberg had not, after 1947, been in any hospital, any prison, or in any other place. For the part of the Soviet Union, there was no doubt whatsoever that Wallenberg died on July 17, 1947, in the Ljubljanskaya Prison. Since all possibilities for investigating Wallenberg's fate had consequently been completely exhausted, the Soviet Government saw no further reason for engaging itself any longer in this question. Any return to a discussion on this regrettable fact belonging to the past could only cause harm to Swedish-Soviet relations.

20. During Minister President Khrushchev's official visit to Sweden on June 22-27, 1964, the Wallenberg affair was brought up by the Swedish Government on several occasions. The main discussion took place during a private conversation between Prime Minister Erlander and Minister President Khrushchev, in the presence of Foreign Minister Nilsson and Minister PAIME; immediately after the governmental negotiations on June 23, 1964,

Prime Minister Erlander underscored the great importance which was attached on the Swedish side to the Wallenberg question, and pointed to the necessity of at last bringing about clarity on this outstanding question in order to create thereby better relations between the two countries.

The Prime Minister thereafter gave an account of Professor Svartz' testimony, and stressed the great confidence which he personally had in her. The Swedish Government was aware of the fact that the Soviet scientist had asserted that there had been a misunderstanding. Since there were thus two contradictory opinions on what had occurred, it would be necessary to arrange a meeting between the two scientists in order to gain clarity.

Minister President Khrushchev reacted with a declaration that he could not have imagined that the Wallenberg question would be brought up anew by the Swedish Government. He declared that Wallenberg was not to be found in the Soviet Union. This he had already sharply made clear to Ambassador Sohlman. The Swedish Government must realize that the Soviet Union naturally would extradite Wallenberg if he was alive, irrespective of his physical or mental status. The Soviet Union had extradited and repatriated all sorts of people. What interest would the Soviet Union have in keeping Wallenberg? Professor Svartz' statement was founded on sheer misunderstanding. Her Soviet informant had never heard Wallenberg mentioned, had never heard anything about the Wallenberg affair; he was not aware of the exchange of letters which had taken place between the two Governments. It must all be a misunderstanding because of poor knowledge of a foreign language. As far as the Soviet Government was concerned the matter was finished. If there was a desire to arrange a meeting between the two scientists through private channels, the Soviet Government would not make any objections. When the Prime Minister immediately seized upon this statement, the Minister President declared that the Soviet Government neither recommended nor advised against such a confrontation.

The Minister President added that many deeply tragic things had happened during the STALIN period. One could not expect of him to account for the Stalin period. He did not wish to expose himself to this interrogation, with a number of questions which had been replied to long ago. The Soviet Government had made extensive investigations and had given clear replies concerning Wallenberg, and yet the Swedish Government did not seem to rely on them.

Prime Minister Erlander emphasized that he had wished to take this opportunity to discuss, openly and in confidence, a question of considerable importance to the relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union. Swedish public opinion would certainly find it very difficult to understand why the Soviet Government objected to further investigations in order to seek clarity.

At private conversations with the Minister President later during his visit Prime Minister Erlander repeatedly reverted to the question and further developed the Swedish views. Nothing new in point of fact transpired then. The Minister President declared himself to be sincerely sorry that the Soviet Government did not have access to any material whereby this regrettable subject of contention between the Soviet Union and Sweden could be brought to an end.

important for the Swedish Government to be given access to the investigations which had been made in recent years and which had obviously led to this change.

b) Soviet views on and possibly counter-evidence against the testimonies which have been made by prisoners of war who have returned from the Soviet Union and according to which Wallenberg had been in prison in Vladimir after 1947. These testimonies had been studied by prominent Swedish jurists, who had come to the conclusion that, even if full evidence was^{not} at hand, it is likely that Wallenberg had been alive at least at the beginning of the 1950's and had then been in prison in Vladimir.

c) Professor Svartz' testimony concerning her conversation in Moscow with a Soviet scientist in early January 1961 had been stated by the latter as being due to misunderstanding. This question must be clarified.

The discussion at the two negotiations came to deal mainly with these Swedish demands. Minister President Kosygin stated that after receipt of the Prime Minister's letter he had ordered a new investigation. He had received documents giving the day of death and information that Wallenberg was cremated and was not alive. The Swedish Government had been informed of this. There existed no further material and no personal file on Wallenberg. Why it was not known. Nor were there any Soviet witnesses. If Wallenberg was alive he would be found very soon. It was known who were in prisons and in hospitals. A Chief of Government could soon find a living man but not a dead one. How could the Swedish Government seriously believe that the Soviet authorities were keeping Wallenberg in the Soviet Union? Why should they keep him? The Minister President said he realized that the matter was a difficult and complicated one for the Swedish Government and for Wallenberg's family. However, the Soviet Government had done everything and had no more to add.

The testimonies by the repatriated prisoners of war had no bearing. Professor Svartz' informant had declared that he had never heard of Wallenberg and that the misunderstanding must be due to language difficulties. The Prime Minister's request for a meeting between Professor Svartz and her informant, the Minister President said, he was prepared to comply with, even though he considered the measure meaningless.

In the course of the continued exchange of views, both sides reverted to the stands already cited. The Minister President dwelt at length on the conditions which prevailed during the war and the time immediately thereafter. The Prime Minister repeated with sharpness the demand that exhaustive material be made available to shed light on the question in its entirety. The purpose was to have a complete account on all the points where there was great obscurity at an impartial study. The Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction that the Minister President had endorsed a meeting for Professor Svartz, but regretted that the replies to his other requests had been negative.

26. In accordance with what had thus been agreed during Prime Minister Erlander's official visit, a conversation took place in Moscow on July 6,

In a special Swedish statement on the Wallenberg question which was made public at the Prime Minister's press conference on June 26, 1964, it was said that the Soviet Government had held to its earlier declaration that Wallenberg was not to be found in the Soviet Union. The Swedish Government felt deep disappointment that the Soviet Government had not felt itself capable of doing anything more in this matter. Despite the fact that the many representations made by the Government after the reply made by the Soviet Government in 1957 had been fruitless, the Swedish Government would not give up its efforts (Appendix K).

21. During the months immediately following upon Minister President Khrushchev's visit, various possibilities were considered for bringing about through private channels, for example through the agency of different scientists, a meeting between Professor Svartz and her Soviet informant. However, these efforts did not produce any result.

22. Minister President KOSYGIN took office in October 1964. In early 1965 a representation was addressed to him on the Wallenberg question. This was done in the form of a letter from Prime Minister Erlander dated February 11, 1965. Following a summary of the earlier treatment of the case, and with reference to, among other things, the testimonies according to which Wallenberg had been alive in the Soviet Union at a considerably later date than the stated year of death 1947, in prison in Vladimir as well as in a Soviet hospital, the letter concluded with an appeal to the Minister President that he personally bring about such a testing of all phases of the affair in question and of the information made available by the Swedish Government as to make it possible to gain clarity (Appendix L).

The letter was delivered by Ambassador Jarring at a call on Minister President Kosygin on March 22, 1965. The latter then declared that he had carefully read the Soviet file on Wallenberg. He could not arrive at any conclusion other than that shown by the investigations, namely, that Wallenberg was not alive but died in prison in Moscow under the circumstances and at the time as stated in the file. A reply to this effect would be made to the Prime Minister's representation.

With regard to Professor Svartz' testimony, the Minister President declared that the Soviet scientist had never made the statements attributed to him by Professor Svartz. He had no objection to Ambassador Jarring himself having this confirmed at a personal meeting with the scientist.

23. Such a meeting with the Soviet scientist was brought about on May 11, 1965. During this conversation, which took place in the presence of a representative of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the informant confirmed to Ambassador Jarring that Professor Svartz had had a long talk with him in January 1961 concerning their common scientific problems and interests. In conclusion, she had said she wished to take up with him privately a humanitarian case which concerned a Swedish citizen who was being held in

captivity in the Soviet Union, and she had asked for help to have the latter released. Professor Svartz had mentioned the name of the man, but the informant had at that time never heard this name and had no idea about whom it concerned. He had recommended Professor Svartz to address herself to high quarters in the Foreign Ministry. Ambassador Jarring recalled that Professor Svartz had said she had learnt from her informant that Wallenberg was alive but in poor condition and was in hospital. The informant denied the correctness of this information and declared that it was inconceivable to him how Professor Svartz could have misinterpreted him so completely. Perhaps it was due to the fact that his knowledge of the German language -- in which their conversation had been held -- was not so good. Because of this, Professor Svartz could have interpreted words like "if he is alive" or "if he is sick" not as conditional sentences but as statements of fact.

Ambassador Jarring replied that two testimonies stood against each other. He said he believed that it would be of great use if a meeting could be arranged between the informant, Professor Svartz and himself, where an opportunity was given jointly to discuss the matter. The informant declared that he failed to understand what purpose such a meeting would serve, but in the end, in reply to a direct question, he declared that he would be prepared to participate.

24. At a visit to Prime Minister Erlander on May 13, 1965, Soviet Ambassador BELOKHVOSTIKOV advised that on account of the Prime Minister's letter to Minister President Kosygin of February 11, 1965, he had been instructed to state that the Soviet Government in its note of February 6, 1957, had made it clear that Wallenberg died in 1947. The investigations which had now been made had confirmed that this was the case, Professor Svartz' testimony must be founded on a misunderstanding.

Prime Minister Erlander said he intended to take up the question during his impending visit to Moscow. He pointed out that the Soviet Government must realize that the Swedish Government attached extraordinary importance to the affair and that Swedish public opinion demanded an account of it.

25. During Prime Minister Erlander's official visit to the Soviet Union on June 10-17, 1965, the Wallenberg question was taken up at the governmental negotiations held on June 11 and June 17. By way of introduction, the Prime Minister said he wished to establish that bilateral Swedish-Soviet relations were favorable short of the fact that the Wallenberg question had not yet been solved. The Prime Minister then summarized in three points the further information and replies from the Soviet Government which he desired,

a) The Soviet reply of 1957 cited the existence of a notation concerning a person by the name of Wallenberg, dead in July 1947, which it was considered there was reason to look upon as referring to Raoul Wallenberg. It seemed to appear from later statements by the Soviet Government as if this assumption has now become a certainty. It was

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1965, between Professor Svartz and her informant. Present without taking part in the conversation were Ambassador Jarring and two officials from the Soviet Foreign Ministry, of whom the one served as interpreter. The exchange of views, which is accounted for in detail in Professor Svartz' memorandum, ended in that statement stood against statement.

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APPENDICES TO CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNTAPPENDIX A

Note delivered by Ambassador SOHLMAN in Moscow to Deputy Foreign Minister ZACHAROV on February 9, 1959.

In its Note to the Soviet Government of February 19, 1957 the Swedish Government reserved the right to put at the disposal of the Soviet Government any additional material concerning Secretary of Legation Raoul WALLENBERG, born August 4, 1912, that was considered by the Government to be of importance for further investigations in the Soviet Union.

The Swedish authorities have continued to examine carefully all clues having a bearing on the whereabouts of Wallenberg in the Soviet Union. In so doing, it has come to their notice that statements have been made by several persons returning from Soviet imprisonment that after 1947 Wallenberg was transferred to the prison in Vladimir where he was detained in the isolation ward of the sick (Corpus II). These quite independent statements have all been received in direct contact between the person in question and representatives of Swedish authorities.

The Swedish Government urges the Soviet Government to make a speedy investigation in order to determine whether Wallenberg has been detained in the Vladimir Prison.

APPENDIX BNote from the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union to the Swedish Embassy in Moscow, March 6, 1959.

The Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union assures the Swedish Embassy of its consideration and in response to the Embassy's Note of February 9 this year has the honor to provide the following information.

In the Embassy's Note it is stated that, according to information by persons who have left the Soviet Union, the Swedish citizen R. WALLENBERG after 1947 was detained in prison at Vladimir, and the Swedish Government's request is presented that an investigation be made for the purpose of verifying this information.

In this connection, the Ministry has the honor to state that its memorandum of February 6, 1957 contained all information concerning R. Wallenberg, which had been received as a result of a thorough and comprehensive check and which resulted in the conclusion that R. Wallenberg died in July 1947. A renewed investigation made in accordance with the Swedish Government's request has not brought to light any fresh information relative to the case and has shown that the information referred to in the Embassy's Note about R. Wallenberg's detention in the Vladimir Prison has not been confirmed.

APPENDIX C

Press Release from the Foreign Ministry, May 28, 1959.

In its note to the Soviet Government of February 19, 1957 the Swedish Government stated that it reserved the right to put at the disposal of the Soviet authorities any additional material concerning Raoul WALLENBERG that was regarded as being of importance for further investigations in the Soviet Union.

The Swedish authorities have continued to check carefully every fact that might have a bearing on the whereabouts of Wallenberg in the Soviet Union. In doing so, it has come to their attention that assertions have been made by several persons returning from imprisonment in the Soviet Union that after 1947 Wallenberg was detained in a prison at Vladimir, about 200 kilometers east of Moscow.

In view of these statements the Swedish Government, in a Note handed over to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on February 9, 1959, urged that an investigation be made to determine whether or not Wallenberg had been detained in the Vladimir prison.

The Soviet Government replied in a Note of March 6, 1959, that it had undertaken the investigations requested in the Swedish Note but that no fresh information relevant to the case had been brought to light, nor had the Swedish Government's information about Wallenberg's detention at Vladimir been confirmed.

APPENDIX D

Verbal information given by Ambassador RODIONOV of the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union to Ambassador SCHLMAN in Moscow, June 27, 1959.

The Foreign Minister has instructed me to give you the following information concerning Mr. Raoul WALLENBERG. At the end of May 1959 the Swedish press published articles stating that the Swedish citizen Raoul WALLENBERG was still in the Soviet Union. In these articles one referred to some so called witnesses, who reportedly should have seen Mr. Raoul Wallenberg in the Soviet Union after 1947. Because of these pieces of Swedish information I find it necessary to inform you of the following. In its aide-mémoire of February 6, 1957 the Foreign Ministry stated, as a result of a thorough and complete investigation made upon the request of the Swedish Government in 1957, that it had been established that Mr. Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947. The pieces of information to which Swedish papers refer are all made up.

The Foreign Ministry requests that what I have now said be reported to Mr. Raoul Wallenberg's mother, Mrs. VON DARDEL, who has turned to Chairman of the Council of Ministers KHRUSHCHEV with an inquiry about the fate of her son.

At the same time on the part of the Soviet Union the hope is expressed that Sweden on her part with respect to the Raoul Wallenberg matter may assume an attitude that makes it impossible for certain elements in the future to use this question for the purpose of poisoning Soviet-Swedish relations.

APPENDIX EMemorandum delivered to the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union on July 18, 1959.

The Swedish Foreign Ministry has received the Soviet Foreign Ministry's information concerning Raoul WALLENBERG which was given to Ambassador SOHLMAN on June 27. Reference was then made to certain pieces of information published in the Swedish press in May on Raoul Wallenberg's whereabouts in the Soviet Union, which are declared to be simply made up. For this reason the Foreign Ministry wants to stress that the Ministry on May 28 in reply to questions from the press made a short statement about the inquiry made by the Swedish Embassy on February 9 and the reply by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on March 6, 1959. The Ministry has no reason to comment on any additional information published by the Swedish press on this matter. In order to avoid misunderstandings as to the material on which the Swedish inquiry was based, however, the Ministry finds it necessary to give the following more detailed information concerning certain evidence included in this material.

1. The Swiss citizen E. BRUGGER, born January 22, 1903, who was detained in Soviet prisons during the years 1948-1958, has stated that he was in contact with Raoul Wallenberg through tapping in the Corpus II of the Vladimir prison at the turn of the month July/August 1954. Several other prisoners who have returned from the Soviet Union have confirmed that Brugger during the time of his imprisonment talked about this contact with Wallenberg.
2. An Austrian citizen, who spent the period 1945-55 in Soviet prisons, has declared that he had shared a cell with Wallenberg in Corpus II of the Vladimir prison. When the proper Soviet prison officer noticed the Austrian in Wallenberg's cell, the Austrian had immediately been removed from the cell and thereafter at several occasions been asked not to disclose anything about this meeting with the Swede.

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APPENDIX E (Cont'd.)

3. Two German citizens, H.T. MULLE and G. REHEKAMPFF, born June 11, 1917 and June 19, 1903, who were detained in Soviet prisons during 1950-1956 and 1945-1955, have each separately stated that they learned on different occasions through one and the same co-prisoner in the Vladimir Prison that Wallenberg was in Corpus II in Vladimir at the beginning of the 1950's. This Soviet co-prisoner has been characterized as a trustworthy and reliable person by a great number of former prisoners who have returned from Vladimir.

Naturally the Foreign Ministry must attach great importance to statements of such a detailed character which independently of each other tell that Wallenberg during certain years in the 1950's was detained in a certain section of a certain prison. The Foreign Ministry does not believe that there is reason to assume that these statements were made with the obvious intention of spreading untruthful information. Nor does it appear likely that all statements could be ascribed to confusion of names or slip of memory. This is the reason why the Foreign Ministry considered it necessary to try to throw light upon the question of the fate of Wallenberg through inquiry to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

With respect to the expressed wish in the message of the Soviet Foreign Ministry that the Swedish Government in the future assume an attitude towards the Wallenberg case that cannot be utilized for the purpose of disturbing Swedish-Soviet relations, the Foreign Ministry should like only to stress that the Swedish Government's only motive in this case has been and is to procure light as to the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. If this happens, this will remove a serious irritative factor in Swedish-Soviet relations. In this connection the Foreign Ministry wishes to call attention to the fact that the Soviet Foreign Ministry in its memorandum of February 6, 1957, did not express itself more precisely as to what had happened to Wallenberg in the Soviet Union than to state that on account of what had been reported in the memorandum referred to the conclusion ought to be drawn that Wallenberg died in July 1947.

Finally, the Foreign Ministry wishes to confirm that Raoul Wallenberg's mother, Mrs. von Dardel, has been informed of the content in the Ministry's memorandum of June 27, 1959.

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APPENDIX F

Press Release from the Foreign Ministry, January 23, 1960.

As pointed out several times the Swedish authorities check carefully all existing and new facts in the WALLENBERG case. That this still is the case is shown most recently in the press release of May 28, 1959. In that release, an account was given of a Swedish inquiry to the Soviet Government whether Wallenberg had been detained in the Vladimir prison and the reply to this question. In addition to what was reported in this press release there is at present nothing to be added.

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APPENDIX G

Statement by Supreme Court Justices GYLLENSWÄRD and
SANTESSON, April 25, 1960.

Raoul WALLENBERG, Secretary of Legation at the Royal Swedish mission in Budapest, was taken in Soviet custody in January 1945 and later taken as prisoner to the Soviet Union.

In a memorandum delivered on February 6, 1957 the Soviet Government, on grounds of certain investigations, stated that because of the investigation referred to the conclusion ought to be drawn that Wallenberg died in July 1947.

Reports have, however, been received indicating Wallenberg was alive even after the mentioned time and was detained in prison in Vladimir.

The undersigned have studied a great number of records in the Foreign Ministry of statements by persons who earlier lived in Soviet captivity, as well as other recorded statements and other documents.

The statements have been given by Finnish, French, Swiss, German and Austrian citizens and by stateless persons. Most statements have been given before officers of the Swedish Foreign Service or the Swedish national police.

The records are made with great care and do not give rise to the assumption that the statements were made after leading questions or other circumstances which might have influenced the content. The statements contain a great amount of information the correctness of which it was possible to check and they support each other.

According to our opinion the present investigation must according to Swedish law -- although it does not include full evidence in this respect -- be considered to make it likely that Wallenberg was alive at least in the beginning of the 1950's and then was detained in prison in Vladimir.

Stockholm, April 25, 1960.

Ragnar Gyllenswärd
former Supreme Court Justice and
President of the Supreme Court

Per Santesson
former Supreme Court Justice and
President of Section of the
Supreme Court

APPENDIX H

Letter from Prime Minister ERLANDER to Chairman of the Council of Ministers KHRUSHCHEV, February 9, 1961.

Dear Mr. Chairman of the Council of Ministers,

As you certainly recall, during my visit to Moscow in the spring 1956 we talked about the Swedish diplomat Raoul WALLENBERG who disappeared in Budapest at the end of the war. I stressed that the question concerning the fate of Wallenberg occupied Swedish public opinion to a high degree and that the Swedish Government wished to do everything in its power to throw light upon his fate. The Soviet Union on its part promised to make investigations and declared that Wallenberg would of course be permitted to return home if he was in the Soviet Union. In 1957 we were informed of the result so far of the investigations. Sweden on her part declared at a later occasion that the Swedish Government reserved the right to submit any additional material concerning Wallenberg which the Swedish Government considered to be of importance for continued investigations in the Soviet Union.

I now wish to inform you that I have been informed by a Swedish physician, Professor Nanna SVARTZ, who visited Moscow at the end of January 1961, invited to lecture there on her research results, that Wallenberg was alive at that time and that he was a patient in a mental hospital in Moscow. His health was not good. Mrs Svartz got the information from an internationally known, prominent representative of Soviet medical science.

Foreign Minister UNDEN and I have discussed the most suitable way of transferring Wallenberg to Sweden. We have found that the best would be if a Swedish physician was permitted to come to Moscow and discuss with his Soviet colleagues the way of transportation, medical care, etc.

Yours very respectfully,

Tage Erlander

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APPENDIX I

Verbal information given by Prime Minister ERLANDER to Soviet Ambassador GUSEV, August 17, 1962.

During a call on the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. KHRUSHCHEV, on February 25, 1961, Ambassador SOHLMAN handed over to him a letter from me, dated February 9. In this letter it was stated that I had received the information that WALLENBERG was alive at the end of January 1961 and that he was a patient in a mental hospital in Moscow. His health was not good. The letter ended with a proposal that a Swedish physician be immediately permitted to go to Moscow to discuss with his Soviet colleagues the method of transferring Wallenberg to Sweden.

When Mr. Khrushchev received the letter he said that information had already been given on the part of the Soviet Union and that there was nothing new with respect to the matter.

During a call on the acting chief of the Scandinavian section in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Ambassador KIRSANOV, on July 10, 1961, Ambassador Sohlman, under instructions, expressed his serious expectation that a reply would be soon delivered. We understand, he said, that investigations have been necessary but since several months have passed, we were of the opinion that it could be assumed that they had been completed by now. Mr. Kirsanov stated that a reply to the letter had already been given and to this Mr. Sohlman said that the Prime Minister considered that after a written request of this kind he had the right to expect a written reply.

As you may understand, Mr. Ambassador, this situation causes me serious concern and upon your return to Moscow I ask you to convey this to the Soviet Government and personally to its chief. When I speak about concern, I mean in the first place that the matter is of importance for Swedish-Soviet relations, in whose further development in a harmonious and friendly spirit I know you have a great interest. What is involved is the question of a Swedish diplomat who was captured by Soviet troops more than 17 years ago. You certainly agree with me that no Government in such a situation can refrain from demanding that the

APPENDIX I (Cont'd.)

requests it makes on the basis of information which it has received and found reliable, be given both thorough investigation and courteous treatment. I should also like to stress, as was pointed out by Ambassador Sohlman at his visit to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on July 10, 1961, that we have endeavored to treat the matter solely on a strictly factual basis.

But I have also the more human aspect in mind. It is a generally accepted principle that members of the same family who have been separated and mutually wish for contact shall be given all available information about each other and that they shall be given the opportunity to join each other, independent of place of residence, state of health etc. The principle is not only generally accepted in theory. It has also come to be more and more put into practice. I appeal urgently to your Government and to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, personally to also take this into consideration in dealing with this matter. I make this appeal with the strong hope of a positive reply.

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APPENDIX J

Reply by the Foreign Minister in the Lower House of the Riksdag to an interpellation by Mr. OHLIN, April 3, 1964.

(Excerpt)

Mr. Speaker,

In an interpellation dated March 3, 1964 Mr. OHLIN has asked me if I would tell this House what has happened in the Raoul WALLENBERG affair since the publication of the Foreign Ministry's White Book in 1957 -- with the exception of any particulars that must be kept secret for special reasons -- and also inform it about the steps the Government intends to take in order to convince the Soviet Government of the necessity of a more effective investigation into the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg and his whereabouts during different periods after war.

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First, in regard to the inquiries into the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg I should like to begin by recalling that the Foreign Ministry's White Book of 1957 was published after the receipt of information on the matter which had been promised by the Soviet Government during the visit to Moscow of the Prime Minister, Mr. Erlander, and the then Minister of the Interior, Mr. HEDLUND, in March - April 1956. In broad outline this reply, which was received on February 6, 1957, was to the effect that in view of the evidence of a document discovered in the Ljubljanskaja Prison in Moscow, the Soviet Government considered that there was reason to believe that this document referred to Wallenberg, and that from the contents of the document the conclusion could be drawn that Wallenberg died in the Ljubljanskaja Prison in July 1947.

In the light of the Soviet Government's reply of February 6, 1957 a Swedish note was delivered on February 19, 1957, which was similarly published in the White Book. In this Note it was declared, among other things, that Swedish public opinion was justifiably concerned about what had happened in regard to this affair. The Swedish Government found it hard to believe that all documents referring to Wallenberg's detention in Soviet prisons other

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APPENDIX J (Continued)

than the report mentioned by the Soviet Government had been entirely destroyed. The Government therefore expected that the Swedish Foreign Ministry would be informed should additional material emerge in the Soviet Union which could throw light on what might have happened to Wallenberg. The Swedish Government, for its part, reserved the right to make available any additional material concerning Wallenberg which could, in its opinion, be of importance in subsequent inquiries in the Soviet Union.

Thus the Swedish Government clearly realized that it must continue its examination of all existing or fresh clues. During the subsequent Swedish investigations, which were carried out with the same exactitude and along the same lines as the previous inquiries into Wallenberg's detention in the Ljubljanskaja and Lefortovskaja prisons, several statements were made by persons who had returned from Soviet imprisonment to the effect that Wallenberg after 1947 was detained in a prison at Vladimir, about 200 kilometers east of Moscow. In view of these statements the Government urged in a Note, which was sent to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on February 9, 1959, that an inquiry should be made to establish whether Wallenberg had been detained in the Vladimir prison.

In reply the Soviet Government announced on March 6, 1959 that it had made the inquiries requested in the Swedish Note, but that no fresh information on the matter had been brought to light and that the Swedish Government's assertions regarding Wallenberg's detention at Vladimir had not been substantiated.

Since then the Government has sought to make use of every appropriate opportunity to stress the importance to the Soviet authorities of obtaining definite knowledge of Wallenberg's fate. The additional material put before the Soviet authorities on these occasions and the details of the representations made are, however, not of a kind suitable to make public here.

I can however confirm that at the beginning of 1961 the Prime Minister sent a personal letter on this matter to the Soviet Premier, Mr. Khrushchev. Furthermore, I should like to mention that during my visit to Moscow in May last year I took up the matter both with the Foreign

APPENDIX J (Cont'd.)

Minister, Mr. GROMYKO, and with Mr. Khrushchev. Finally, as has been reported by the press, the Prime Minister took up the Wallenberg affair with Mr. Gromyko during his visit to Stockholm two weeks ago.

All representations have been met with the Soviet answer that nothing has been found to add to what has been previously -- i.e. in 1957 and 1959 -- communicated. It has also been repeatedly declared that if Wallenberg had been found, he would have been sent back to Sweden.

Nevertheless I should like to affirm to Mr. Ohlin that the Government does not regard Raoul Wallenberg's case as finally settled and that it will continue its efforts to obtain complete and definite knowledge of his fate.

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APPENDIX K

Statement by Prime Minister Erlander, June 26, 1964. (At Conclusion of Khrushchev's Visit to Sweden).

The Swedish Government, in the talks during the visit of the Soviet Premier, Mr. Khrushchev, has taken up the Wallenberg affair. We have informed the Premier of the importance we attach to this matter. It has been declared on the part of the Soviet Union that a fresh inquiry has been made on account of the repeated Swedish applications. The Soviet part maintains that no change has been made in its previous announcement that Raoul Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union.

We are deeply disappointed that the Soviet Union has not felt able to do more about this matter. Despite the fact that the many representations made by the Government since the Soviet reply in 1957 have yielded no result, we do not intend to give up our efforts in this matter.

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APPENDIX L

Letter from Prime Minister ERLANDER to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. KOSYGIN, February 11, 1965.

Dear Mr. Chairman of the Council of Ministers,

I should like to take up with you, Mr. Chairman of the Council of Ministers, a matter which ever since the end of the war has been the subject of long exchanges of views between the Swedish and Soviet governments, namely the disappearance in the Soviet Union of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg. As you certainly understand, I would not take up the matter again, if it had not been and were not now of such great importance for Sweden and Swedish public opinion, and if I had not been convinced that an elucidation of this matter would remove disturbing factors in Swedish-Soviet relations and thus in an extremely favorable way further the future harmonious development of these relations.

As you probably know, Raoul Wallenberg was taken in charge by the advancing Russian troops in Budapest in January 1945. This was confirmed in a message handed over by the then Deputy Foreign Minister DEKANOSOV to the Swedish Minister in Moscow on January 16, 1945, stating that the Soviet authorities had taken measures to protect Raoul Wallenberg and his property. During the following months and later during all subsequent years a great number of requests were directed on the part of Sweden to the Soviet authorities that Raoul Wallenberg be released or that information be developed as to his fate. In this connection I should like to call attention to the talks which took place in Moscow during my visit in April 1956 when the Soviet authorities promised to make an investigation into the matter based on the new material which was placed at Soviet disposal during the talks. As a result of this investigation the Soviet Government replied in a Note of February 6, 1957, that on the basis of a document that had been found the conclusion ought to be drawn that Raoul Wallenberg died in the Ljubljanskaja Prison in July 1947.

After the receipt of this Note the Swedish Government

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APPENDIX L (Cont'd)

has at different times provided further information to the Soviet Government, indicating that Raoul Wallenberg was alive in the Soviet Union at a considerably later time than 1947, at one time in prison in Vladimir and at another in a Soviet hospital in January 1961, according to a statement by to Professor Nanna SVARTZ at a meeting in Moscow in January 1961.

Most recently, I took the opportunities which were afforded in connection with Foreign Minister GROMYKO's visit to Stockholm in March 1964 and former Chairman of the Council of Ministers KHRUSHCHEV's visit to Sweden in June 1964 to stress what importance is attached to the matter on the part of Sweden. On these two occasions, just like at other times the Soviet Union for its part has referred to the above-mentioned Note of February 6, 1957 and added that Raoul Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union.

I have personally followed this case for many years in the hope of bringing the matter to a satisfactory solution. Through the kind message, which was handed over to me on October 16, 1964 by the Soviet Ambassador to Stockholm, I know that you agree with me on the importance of Swedish-Soviet relations being further developed and that in this respect we have a joint goal. In this spirit I take the liberty of addressing an appeal to you that you personally make arrangements for such an investigation into all aspects of the matter in question and into the pieces of information, which have been placed at your disposal by Sweden concerning Raoul Wallenberg, in order that definite knowledge can be attained.

I can assure you that a compliance with my request will be highly prized by the Swedish Government and the Swedish people.

Yours very respectfully,

Tage Erlander

Translations: M-LH-Rylander

MEMORANDUM BY PROFESSOR NANNA SVARTZ

During a visit to Moscow in January 1961 to lecture before a scientific congress I met with several prominent Soviet scientists. I had a talk with one of these on January 27 in his office. Our talk was held in the German language. After some discussion on congresses, research, etc., I asked him to pardon me if I brought up a question which was very close to my heart and to the heart of other Swedes. I gave him an account of the Raoul WALLENBERG case, and asked him whether he knew about this case, whereupon he nodded in the affirmative. I asked him then whether he could give me some advice on how I might go about to find out where Wallenberg may be. I told him that we in Sweden had information to the effect that Wallenberg was alive only two years ago and that his next of kin had received reports which indicated that he was still alive. My informant then suddenly said that he surely knew about the case and that the person I was asking about was in a very poor condition. Asked what I wanted I replied that the main thing was that Wallenberg could be brought home, no matter in what condition. My informant then said in a very low voice that the person inquired about was in a mental hospital. Then he added: "I shall call one of my colleagues to come here and consult with him". He left the room and returned after a while in company with his colleague, whereupon he himself again withdrew.

His colleague sat down facing me. I asked whether he had been briefed on what the matter was about, and he confirmed that this was so. He asked me carefully about where Wallenberg had been serving and asked me to write his name on a piece of paper. I then wrote: Attache Raoul Wallenberg. I told him that Wallenberg's mother was one of my patients. She would be served to have peace of mind and to be given full certainty. No matter how sick her son might be, it would be a blessing to her as it would be for all of Sweden if he could be given treatment in his home country. I asked him whether he could help us, and he replied that he would do everything within his power. I told him that the entire Swedish nation would be grateful to the Soviet Union if Wallenberg was permitted to be brought home, even if he were both physically and mentally seriously ill. This matter, I said, lies very close to the heart of our Government. I mentioned that I knew Deputy Foreign Minister SEMJONOV since his stay in Sweden, and was immediately given the advice to address myself directly to him.

I further asked the colleague whether he considered it possible for me as a doctor to take Wallenberg home. He believed -- "if he is still alive" -- that such a procedure would not be

impossible but that I ought to talk to Semjonov about this.

Upon returning to my hotel I was given through the Swedish Embassy the telephone number to Minister Semjonov's secretary. I dialled the number but was given the reply that Semjonov had gone abroad.

There was a banquet in the evening. After the dinner I suddenly spotted the colleague, who walked up to me and asked whether I had seen Semjonov. I replied that he had gone abroad, and asked whether I could write Semjonov. He replied in the affirmative. After some argument he promised me that I may say in the letter that I had been speaking with both of them -- i.e., with him and with my original informant -- and that they had given me the advice that I address myself to Semjonov. The colleague told me that after I had left them earlier in the day they had together discussed the question which had been the subject matter of our conversation. They were both of the opinion that a possible transportation to Sweden of the person in question -- "if he is still alive"-- naturally had to be organized through diplomatic channels, something which I said I could fully understand.

Upon my return to Stockholm I immediately called on Prime Minister ERLANDER and told him and Foreign Minister UNDEN about what had happened.

For the purpose of renewing the contact I wrote a personal letter to my informant and expressed the hope of seeing him again during an early return visit to Moscow. In accordance with the advice I had been given in Moscow I also wrote a letter to Semjonov in which I asked how far the investigations concerning Wallenberg had proceeded and about the possibilities for taking him home.

I received a reply from my informant in which he declared himself prepared to meet me again in Moscow. My journey took place at the end of March 1961. At a first talk with my informant -- in the presence of another Soviet scientist -- I put the question whether I might visit Wallenberg. He replied that this would have to be decided in higher quarters, and he added: "unless he is dead". To this I rejoined: "But then he must have died quite recently." During a private meeting with my informant later on he pointed out to me that I ought not to have told the Swedish Government about our original conversation. He did not deny the conversation but maintained that his poor German had led to a misunderstanding, and he declared now that he

had known nothing about the Wallenberg case. He told me that he had been summoned to Minister President KHRUSHCHEV, who had been informed about our conversation and had been angered because of it.

Since I did not succeed either during this Moscow visit to get an appointment with Semjonov -- despite the fact that I even sought to call him on his private telephone number, which I had been given by my informant -- I wrote a new letter to him upon my return to Stockholm asking for an appointment as soon as possible, wherewith I declared myself prepared to travel to Moscow immediately.

I never had a reply in any form to these letters of mine.

In May 1962 I was offered a new opportunity to attend a scientific congress in Moscow. It is true that I met my informant during this visit, but when I tried to lead our conversation into the Wallenberg question he merely declared that this question would have to be taken up through the diplomatic channels and that no private talks between the two of us on this subject ought to be held.

Attempts to reach my informant through other channels did not succeed.

In early May 1964, I received a letter from him, dated April 29, 1964. This letter read:

"I write you in connection with new statements appearing in Stockholm concerning Mr. Wallenberg's fate. I was cited in these statements -- in a way as to indicate that I should have given you some sort of information about him during your visit ... to Moscow in 1961.

"As you will surely recall, I told you then that I know nothing about Mr. Wallenberg, have never heard his name, and have not the slightest idea whether or not he is alive.

"I advised you to address yourself to our Foreign Ministry in this matter, through your Ambassador/in person. Upon your request that I inquire about the fate of this person with our Chief of Government N. S. Khrushchev, whose doctor I was according to your hypothesis, I replied to you that N.S. Khrushchev, as everyone knew full well, was in absolutely good health and that I was not his doctor.

"Owing to some misunderstanding inconceivable to me, this short talk with you (it was carried on in the German language which I may not fully master) has come to be erroneously interpreted in official Swedish quarters.

"I learnt later on that Mr. Wallenberg had died already in 1947 and that our Government at a later date had informed the Swedish Government and the deceased's family accordingly."

In an exhaustive reply of May 28, 1964, I recapitulated the main points of what in my opinion had happened during our conversation in January 1961 and which in essential respects deviated from the version given by my informant in his letter. Because of the allegation that there had been some misunderstanding owing to language difficulties, I reminded him that the two of us at a number of conversations during the 1950's, when we first met, had always understood both questions and answers very well, as had also been the case at our conversation in January 1961 as well as at the conversations which followed. In my letter I also expressed my urgent and warm hope that the Soviet authorities as soon as ever possible would take steps to permit Wallenberg to return home.

Throughout this period I have been in constant contact with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister in their efforts to solve the Wallenberg question with the support of, among other things, my own testimony.

Ever since 1962 I have in various ways tried to bring about a new personal meeting with my informant. I have also sought to obtain information on Wallenberg through other scientists, but nothing of importance has been unearthed. Following Minister President Khrushchev's visit to Sweden in June 1964, I intensified my efforts to have a personal meeting with my informant. However, these efforts produced no result.

In March 1965 I was informed that Ambassador JARRING in connection with submitting to Minister President KOSYGIN a new representation from Prime Minister Erlander in the Wallenberg case, had been given the opportunity himself to visit my informant to discuss my testimony. As my informant at this visit -- which took place in May -- repeated his categorical denials, Ambassador Jarring proposed that a new meeting be arranged for my account.

This meeting took place on July 6, 1965, in the presence of Ambassador Jarring and two representatives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, of whom the one served as interpreter. I began

the conversation -- which was conducted in Swedish and Russian, respectively, and lasted for almost three hours -- by giving a thorough account of the reason for my interest in Wallenberg. It dated back as early as from my visit to Moscow in March 1945. The foremost reason, however, was information which I had received from his mother and her present husband, with whom I had cooperated for many years at the Karolinska Hospital (in Stockholm). Wallenberg's mother, Mrs. von Dardel, had been my patient for a long time. Since she knew that I was closely acquainted with the former Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm, Madame KOLLONTAJ, and had many other Soviet friends, she asked me on repeated occasions to do something for her son. When in 1960 I received an invitation to attend a congress in Moscow in early 1961, I decided to read up on the case to be prepared for any contingencies. During my study of the "White Paper" published by the Foreign Office in 1957 I found certain circumstances to be particularly remarkable. In 1957 there had been an official Soviet announcement saying that judging from all accounts Wallenberg had died in the Ljubljanskaya Prison on July 17, 1947. It was then surprising that ten days later, on July 27, 1947, there had been interrogations concerning Wallenberg both in the Ljubljanskaya and the Lefortovskaya prisons with a number of other prisoners (who had not been in the same cell as Wallenberg, with the exception of one of them). It was remarkable to read that the prisoners had all told identically the same thing. Thus, they had said that Wallenberg was a Swedish diplomat and in that capacity had dealt with Jewish affairs and persecution of Jews in Budapest. They had also stated that they had learnt from tapping signals from Wallenberg or others that Wallenberg and his chauffeur LANGFELDER had been brought to the Ljubljanskaya Prison in 1945. So it had also been told that Wallenberg the same year had been transferred from Ljubljanskaya to the Lefortovskaya Prison. The prisoners who had told this had been prepared to swear to their statements. All this seemed strange when considering the fact that on August 18, 1947, a note had been dispatched to our Government from then Foreign Minister VYSHINSKY in which the latter declared that Wallenberg was unknown in the Soviet Union. Within the course of one month it would thus have happened, first, that Wallenberg had died. Ten days later there would have been interrogations on Wallenberg held with prisoners from different countries in two separate prisons. It had not been prison personnel who conducted the interrogations. Thus, he must have been well known. The prisoners interrogated had been placed in lone cells for several months. Then came the aforementioned announcement of August 1947 that he was unknown in the Soviet Union. *)

*) Later on, it will be recalled, it was said in the Soviet note of February 6, 1957, that Wallenberg died in July 1947.

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It was not least this lack of compatibility, I told my informant, which caused me to come to the conclusion at the time that I ought to inquire about Wallenberg. To this came later information in the press from three different persons who had been in the Vladimir prison that Wallenberg for a certainty had been confined to this prison in the 1950's. The von Dardel family had also received additional information that he was alive at a later date.

When I travelled to Moscow in January 1961 it had been my intention to try to contact Deputy Foreign Minister Semjonov, whom I knew since his stay in Stockholm. When I considered whom else I could talk to, my thoughts had come upon my informant. I had very much hesitated to mix him into these questions, but in a difficult and urgent matter one must sometimes seize the opportunity.

I pointed out to my informant that during our conversation in January 1961 I had not told of the reason for my interest as exhaustively as I had now done but that I had stated the essential points. I further reminded him that after my introductory account I had asked him whether he knew about the Wallenberg case and that he had then replied in the affirmative. I quoted the statement he had made about Wallenberg being in a poor condition and mentally ill. I also reminded him that he had summoned a colleague, with whom I had likewise spoken about the case and had given him a piece of paper with a notation giving Wallenberg's name.

At subsequent talks and by letter my informant had declared that I had misunderstood him because of his poor German, my presentation went on. I for my part had replied that I had always found it very easy to understand him. I added that it would be wrong of me not to say that I was certain about what I had heard.

Toward the end of my presentation I ventured the idea that perhaps Wallenberg in recent years had been in places unknown to the Soviet leadership, but that it ought to be possible through a very thorough investigation to extract information in order to achieve full clarity. This would be interpreted in Sweden -- and throughout the world -- as a truly great action by the Soviet Government.

My informant thereupon spoke up. He said he shared the moral aspects which had inspired me in my doings, but unfortunately he could not render any personal assistance in this affair. He

personally had not played any role in this connection. About the conversation which had led to a misunderstanding between the two of us he wished to state as follows. At the beginning of our conversation I had told about the case. He had then said that only through my story had he learnt about the case -- thus, prior to our conversation he had had no idea about this and had absolutely not known the name. Nor could he have known anything about it since he had had nothing to do with prisons or prison hospitals or with prisoners of war or with military on the whole. After the war he had become an ordinary civil citizen. Moreover, he had never been invited by any Soviet authorities to treat any foreign or other prisoners of war. Therefore he could not have seen or heard of Wallenberg. Therefore he could only add to what I had just said that I must have misunderstood him. During our conversation in 1961 he had said, in reply to my allegations: "If Wallenberg is alive perhaps he may be ill" -- and if it was assumed that Wallenberg was alive one could continue assuming that he could be ill in the one way or the other. In such turns lay perhaps the reason why I had interpreted his words not as assumptions but as statements of fact. He had been talking with me in quite a humane spirit and had not believed that I was on any official or semi-official errand. Had he believed so, he would naturally have summoned an interpreter who would have had to write down what was being said. I had misunderstood his poor German. He wished to assure me that he had no reason to say anything which he did not know anything about, that is, that which was attributed to him by me. Everyone in the Soviet Union knew well that he had had nothing to do with prisoners of war. During our conversation in 1961 I had asked him to talk about Wallenberg with Khrushchev, wherewith he had denied that he was the latter's doctor. He had recommended the Foreign Ministry. At the end of our conversation and against the background of all the information which I had presented, he had said to me that the person in question probably was dead.

During the continued discussion I denied that I had been on any official or semi-official errand but had talked to him as a private individual. I further repeated that at our first conversation on this subject in January 1961 he had said he was familiar with the case and knew that Wallenberg was seriously ill. I underscored that it was during our second talk in March 1961 that he had claimed that he had not previously known about the case. My informant answered me again with the declaration that he had never had anything to do with Wallenberg and had never heard anything about him prior to his conversation with me. He repeated that a misunderstanding must have arisen because of his poor German, to which I rejoined that I had been on the alert and had listened carefully and had always well understood his German. On both sides we reverted again and again in different forms to

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from Stockholm

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these stands. At the end of the discussion I pointed out anew that the account now given by my informant tallied with the conversation we had had in March 1961, two months after our first conversation. My informant said that this was correct, but judging from his statement he did not seem to feel that this was of any importance. In this connection I also referred to what had happened on the official level between the two conversations.

The discussion ended with a concluding declaration by my informant that he considered the question brought to an end between the two of us and that we had not come to the result that anyone of us had wanted. To this I declared that neither did I believe that we could come any farther and that testimony stood against testimony.

Translation: Nils Möller

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Disapproved by Kissinger
p/r Brian to jlh 10/15/73

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

O/FADRC/DR
FILES

August 21, 1973

Attention Mrs. Trombly
Keep this study together.

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Cable

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to Mr. Kissinger Concerning
Raoul Wallenberg

The attached letter and memorandum from Mrs. Fredrik von Dardel regarding her son, Raoul Wallenberg, were sent to our Embassy in Stockholm with the request that it be forwarded to you.

In her letter, Mrs. von Dardel asks you to make inquiries (presumably with the Soviet leadership) regarding the fate of her son, Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat assigned to Hungary who in 1945 was seized by Soviet authorities in Budapest. Although the Swedish Government over the years has made repeated efforts to determine the fate of Mr. Wallenberg, the Soviet Government has maintained that Wallenberg died in a Moscow prison in July 1947. Since 1965 the Swedish Government has been unwilling to make further official inquiries regarding Mr. Wallenberg, despite the unsatisfactory nature of the Soviet response.

As Mrs. von Dardel points out, her son had gone to Budapest in 1944 at the request of the then U.S. Minister to Sweden to lead an operation for the rescue of Hungarian Jews, and his efforts saved thousands of Jews from death. Since Mrs. von Dardel is now 80 years old and in ill health, it is probable that she wishes to make a final effort to determine the fate of her son before her death. In view of the compassionate nature of the case, and the fact that the U.S. Government supported Mr. Wallenberg's mission in Hungary, we believe we should reply to Mrs. von Dardel's request in a sympathetic manner, and offer to make inquiries ~~and the Soviet Foreign Ministry~~ without however, encouraging her hopes that this effort will be successful.

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Recommendation

That you approve the attached letter to Mrs. von Dardel, to be signed by an official at an appropriate level in the State Department.

Robert Blackwill for
Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Letter and Memorandum from Mrs. von Dardel
2. Suggested reply
3. Telegram to Moscow

CONFIDENTIAL

Drafter: EUR/NE:JP Owens:mlb
Ext. 29336, 7/19/73

Clearance:

EUR/NE:SGeorge
EUR/SCV:WNLuers
EUR:MC-STOESSE

Djursholm, May 4, 1973

132 62 DJURSHOLM /Sweden

Mrs. Maj von Dardel

Mr. Henry Kissinger

Dear Sir,

I have followed with great admiration your persistent and successful campaign for peace in the Far East. I am now approaching you regarding my son, Raoul Wallenberg, born in 1912. His father was a cousin of Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg, whom you might know.

In 1944, at the instance of the then U.S. Ambassador to Sweden, Mr. Hershel Johnson, my son undertook as a Secretary to the Swedish Legation in Budapest to lead an operation for the rescuing of the Hungarian Jews, who were persecuted by the Nazis. Thanks to his successful efforts many thousand Jews were saved from annihilation. When, in January 1945, Soviet troops arrived in Budapest, my son was taken prisoner by the Soviets, who - paradoxically - appear to have suspected him of espionage. He was brought to Moscow, where he was imprisoned.

Repeated inquiries by Swedish authorities concerning the fate of my son were left unanswered by the Soviets until August 18, 1947, when, by a memorandum, the Soviet Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vyshinskiy, declared that Raoul Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union and must be assumed to have been killed in the fights in Budapest or taken prisoner by the Nazis.

Later on a large number of repatriated prisoners affirmed that they had been in contact with my son in various prisons in Moscow during the years 1945 - 1947. Their testimonies were forwarded to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs for study. By a memorandum of February 6, 1957, Foreign Minister Gromyko then informed Swedish authorities that no trace of Raoul Wallenberg had come to light but a document found among the records of the Lyublyanka prison in Moscow, which might refer to him. The document, a hand-written report of July 17, 1947, by the chief of the prison hospital, Colonel Smoltsov, to the then Minister for Soviet State Security, Abakumov, informed the latter that the prisoner Wallenberg, who would be known to Abakumov, had died during the night, presumably from myocardium infarct. According to Gromyko's memorandum it must therefore be assumed that Wallenberg died in July 1947. Referring to this document Khrushchev as well as Kosygin answered Swedish inquiries concerning my son declaring that he is dead.

A number of returning prisoners affirmed, however, that Raoul Wallenberg still lived in Soviet prisons after 1947. In 1961 a Soviet scientist said that Raoul Wallenberg was in a Soviet mental

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hospital at that time. The Swedish Government, however, is presently not willing to request further inquiries by the Soviet authorities into the fate of my son.

In tragic uncertainty as to what really happened to my son after his imprisonment I beg of you, who by your outstanding efforts liberated thousands of prisoners, to inform me, whether you consider yourself able to undertake anything in order to shed light on the fate of my son and, should he still be alive, to restore him too to liberty.

Yours very faithfully,

Maj. M. L. Larsson Wallenberg

Memorandum on Raoul WALLENBERG

Wallenberg was born on August 4, 1912, as son of Lieutenant Raoul Oscar Wallenberg, who died in May that same year, and his wife, Maj, née Wising, who later on married Director General Fredrik von Dardel. Having matriculated in 1930 he studied architecture at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, U.S., graduating in 1935. Because of the depression in the construction field at that time in the United States as well as in Sweden he left the architectural career and after commercial studies in South Africa and Haifa he went in for business activities in Sweden, i.a. as Foreign Manager of the Central European Trading Company, that had extensive business connections with Hungary.

When in the spring of 1944 the Nazis extended their annihilation campaign against the Jews also to Hungary, the Swedish government was asked, i.a. from Jewish and U.S. quarters, to act in support of the Hungarian Jews. The Swedish Legation in Budapest, that was assailed by Jews asking for help, simultaneously asked for a reinforcement of its staff. At the end of June 1944 the Swedish government therefore appointed Wallenberg 1st Secretary to the Legation in Budapest with the special assignment to conduct a rescue action on behalf of the Jews in Hungary.

When Wallenberg arrived in Budapest on July 9, 1944, Adolf Eichmann and his staff had already transported the majority of the Jews, who lived in the Hungarian province, to Auschwitz and other annihilation camps. But in Budapest there were still around 200.000 Jews. With the help of his Jewish assistants, whom he stimulated to oppose the Nazis and the Pfeilkreuzlers, Wallenberg was able to rescue the majority of the Jews in Budapest. In the course of the Eichmann trial in 1961 the public prosecutor reported on the activities of Wallenberg in Budapest.

After the arrival of the Soviet troops in Budapest in the middle of January 1945, Wallenberg established contact with their commanders. He asked for permission to go to Debrecen in order there to discuss with Marshal Malinowski and the new Hungarian government formed by General Miklos a plan for the rehabilitation of the Hungarian Jews, that he had worked out. Instead of receiving the travel permit he asked for, he was arrested by Soviet authorities and brought to Moscow, where he was detained in the Lyublyanka prison and later on transferred to the Lefortovskaya prison.

Repeated inquiries and expostulations by Swedish authorities were answered by the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the one hand by a memorandum of August 18, 1947, signed by Vice Foreign Minister Wyshinskiy, according to which Wallenberg was unknown to the Ministry and presumably had been killed in Budapest, on the other by a memorandum of February 6, 1957, signed by Foreign Minister Gromyko, stating that Wallenberg presumably had died in the Lyublyanka prison on July 17, 1947.

According to testimonies, however, Wallenberg was alive and in the Soviet Union after the last mentioned date.

1. A Dane by the name of Mogens Carlson told that in February 1951 he had shared a cell in the Butyrka prison in Moscow with a Hungarian professor, Zoltan Rivo. Rivo had told Carlson that after New Year 1951 he had shared a cell for a week with a Swedish diplomat.

It has not been possible to establish contact with Rivo in order to get further information from him about his time together with the Swedish diplomat, who could not very well be anybody else but Wallenberg.

2. A German by the name of Karl Kraemer, domiciled at Monsheim, Kreis Worms, Hauptstrasse 43, has told the Search Service of the German Red Cross, that the man on a photo of Wallenberg distributed by the Search Service was known to him as a fellow prisoner at the Butyrka prison in the spring of 1949.
3. A German by the name of Horst Theodor Mülle, domiciled at Neuss/Rhein, Graf Landsbergstrasse 3, has told, that in 1956 he shared a cell at the Vladimir prison with a Georgian, Simon Gogiberidse, who had lived in the prison since 1945 and was very well informed on all prominent prisoners in that prison. According to Gogiberidse Wallenberg had been for quite a long time in that prison, as far as Mülle could recollect from 1948 to 1953. Gogiberidse had been treated in the prison hospital for some time and there Wallenberg had lived in a special section for prisoners, whom the prison authorities wanted to isolate.
4. A Swiss from Bern, Emil Brugger, has told that while in the Vladimir prison he was treated for some time in the prison hospital. During this time, at the beginning of August 1954, he had established contact by knocking with a prisoner in the adjacent cell. According to the latter he was "Wallenberg, 1st Secretary to the Swedish Legation in Budapest, removed in 1945". He had asked Brugger to report to a Swedish Consulate or Legation that he was not allowed to write and that he did not receive any letters. Brugger died a few years after his return from captivity.
5. Lucien Armand Gonazé, a French Major domiciled at 2, Avenue à la Porte Brancion, Paris, told in a letter of January 13, 1959, that he had shared a cell with Brugger in the Vladimir prison. Brugger had told him that during a stay in the prison hospital, according to Gonazé probably in the summer of 1954, he had got into contact with a prisoner, who had said that he was Wallenberg, a Swedish Ex-Consul in Budapest. In Gonazé's opinion there was no reason to doubt that Brugger had told him this in good faith. Brugger's testimony had also been confirmed by Gogiberidse's statement.
6. An Austrian, Otto Schöggel, domiciled at Hotel Wetterstein, Mittenwald, Bayern, has told that he was in the Vladimir prison from the autumn of 1953 till the spring of 1955. After an operation at the turn of the month January - February 1955 he was brought to a cell in the prison hospital. There he met a prisoner, who asked him, if he was released, to go to a Swedish Legation and tell them, that he had met Wallenberg. Should he not remember the name, he had just to say "a Swede from Budapest" and they would immediately know the name. The next morning a polit officer had entered the cell. He had got furious at finding the Austrian there and had given order that the latter should be brought to another cell immediately.
7. Professor Nanna Svartz, Brahegatan 27, Stockholm, has certified, that during a conference of scientists in Moscow in January 1961 she talked to a prominent Soviet colleague by the name of Myasnikov about Wallenberg. Myasnikov had told her that he knew about the case of Wallenberg and that Wallenberg presently was in a mental hospital.

Although the Soviet leaders have been informed of the statements cited above, they have stubbornly maintained that Wallenberg died in 1947.

1. In 1957, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs published a file of documents together with commentaries on Raoul WALLENBERG's imprisonment in the USSR. (Official Documents published by the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, new series II:9.) The publication of the documents was made after the receipt of the answer to the Swedish representations in this matter, that had been promised by the Soviets at the visit to Moscow, about April 1st 1956, of Prime Minister ERLANDER and Minister for the Interior, HEDLUND. The answer. that was received on the 6th of February 1967 in the form of a memorandum implied in the main that the Soviet Government on account of a document found in the Lyublyanska prison in Moscow considered that there was on one hand reason to consider this document as related to WALLENBERG, on the other that from the contents of the document the conclusion should be drawn that WALLENBERG died in the Lyublyanska prison in July 1947.

2. On account/ the memorandum of the Soviet Government of the 6th of February 1957 a Swedish reply note was delivered on 19th of February 1957, in which was among other things stated that Swedish public opinion was indignant, and rightly so, about what had happened in this case. The Swedish Government found it hard to believe that all the documents except the report mentioned in the memorandum of the Soviet Government concerning WALLENBERG's stay in Soviet prisons should have been completely obliterated. The Government therefore expected that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs should be informed in case additional documents should come to light that could throw light upon what had happened to WALLENBERG. The Swedish Government, on their part, reserved the right to hold at the disposal the additional material concerning WALLENBERG that the Swedish Government considered important to further investigations in the USSR.

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3. The Swedish note of the 19th of February 1957 was answered by the Soviets in the form of a note that was handed over, on the 17th of April 1957, by Deputy Foreign Minister ZACHAROV to the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Moscow, to the effect that the Soviets in their memorandum of the 6th of February 1957 had produced all the information that had been obtained as a result of a thorough and comprehensive investigation on WALLENBERG, carried out by the competent Soviet authorities. Furthermore the Soviet Government regretted to inform that it had no further information whatever at its disposal. The contents of the reply note was published in a press communiqué on the 23rd of April 1957.

4. The Swedish Government now realized that all existing or new traces must be studied and tested even henceforth. The subsequent investigations, that were carried out with the same carefulness and after the same principles as the previous investigations on WALLENBERG's stay in the Lyublyanska and the Lefortovska prisons indicated that WALLENBERG, some time after 1947, had been transported to the prison at Vladimir, situated northeast of Moscow. At the beginning of 1959, the work with collecting the new proofs had advanced so far that the basis for a new representation by the Swedish Government was at hand. This was made in the form of a note, that was handed over, on the 9th of February 1959, to Deputy Foreign Minister ZACHAROV by Ambassador SOHLMAN. By way of introduction is therein stated that the Swedish Government in its note of the 19th of February 1957 had reserved the right to place further documents at the disposal of the Soviet Government. The Swedish Government had continued to investigate and test all the traces related to WALLENBERG's stay in the Soviet Union. In that connection ^{there}/had come to the knowledge of the Swedish Government quite a number of statements made by persons, who had returned from captivity in the USSR, to the effect that WALLENBERG after 1947 had been transported to the prison at Vladimir. All these statements originated, independent of one another,

from direct contacts between the persons in question and representatives of Swedish authorities . The note ended in a request that the Soviet Government might make, without delay, an investigation with a view to establish whether WALLENBERG had been in the Vladimir prison or not.

5. The Soviet answer to this request was received on the 6th of March 1959. Therein was stated that in the memorandum delivered by the Soviet Government, on the 6th of February 1957, had been collected all information concerning WALLENBERG, that had been obtained as the result of a thorough and comprehensive control and had led to the conclusion that WALLENBERG had died in July 1947. The answer concluded with the statement that a renewed investigation, according to the wishes of the Swedish Government, had not brought to light further information in this matter. The Statements made in the Swedish note concerning WALLENBERG's stay in the Vladimir prison had not been confirmed.

On account of inquiries made by the press, the Ministry for Foreign affairs , on the 28th of May 1959, published a communiqué on the exchange of the notes.

6. During the spring and the summer of 1959, preparations were under way for Prime Minister CHRUSTCHEV's later on cancelled return visit to Sweden, which according to the plans was to take place in August 1959. On the 8th of May, the Swedes had informed the Soviet Embassy that the WALLENBERG case was to be brought up during the talks in connection with this visit.

7. On the 27th of June, the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs in reply to a letter, written by W:s mother Mrs Maj von DARDEL to Prime Minister CHRUSTHEV, verbally informed Ambassador SOHLMAN to the effect that the information, contained in the note delivered by the Soviet Government of February/1957 might be brought to the notice of Mrs von DARDEL.

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8. Irrespective of the negative Soviet answers, the Swedish representation of February 9th 1959 was followed out by the delivery, on the 17th of July 1959, of a summary of the main contents of the evidence included in the Swedish documents on WALLENBERG's stay in Vladimir.

9. As also appears from the exchanged notes in June and in July 1959, the Swedish press, especially during May 1959, published a large number of articles on the WALLENBERG case. In this connection the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as was already stated, on the 28th of May 1959 issued a press communiqué on the exchange of notes that had taken place at the beginning of the year. Also during the second half of the year and in the early part of the year 1960, many articles appeared in the press, which caused inquiries to be made in the Ministry.

On the 23rd of January 1960, a new press communiqué was issued, in which was once again called attention to the fact that the Swedish authorities carefully examined and tested all existing and new traces in the WALLENBERG case and that, for the time being, there was nothing new to be added to the facts reported in the press communiqué of May 28th 1959.

10. In the file of documents of 1957 concerning the WALLENBERG case is reported on the examination of the evidence then in existence of WALLENBERG's imprisonment in the Soviet Union, that had been carried out by the former Supreme Court Justices EKLUND and LIND. Their work resulted in a written report that was delivered on the 10th of March 1956 to the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm as part of the documentary material that at this time was placed at the disposal of the Soviet authorities. A corresponding examination of the documents, that had come to hand in support of the statements that WALLENBERG after the month of July 1947 had been in the Soviet Union and that he had then been imprisoned in Vladimir, was

carried out, by order of the Ministry, by GYLLENSWÄRD and SANTESSON, former Justices of the Supreme Court. In a statement, made on the 25th of April 1960, they declared that in their opinion and according to Swedish law the present investigation, though not containing full evidence in every respect, must give cause for considering it most likely that WALLENBERG was alive at least in the early fifties and that he was then imprisoned in Vladimir.

11. During all this time efforts were made to improve and elaborate the argumentation to form the basis of a new representation to the Soviet Government. An important new evidence was given in January 1961, on the occasion of Professor Nanna SVARTZ' visit to Moscow. In the course of her conversation with a prominent Soviet scientist, Professor SVARTZ had on her direct inquiry received the answer that he knew of WALLENBERG, who "was in a very bad condition" and mentally deranged. Professor SVARTZ' informant had then called a colleague, who had advised Professor SVARTZ to get into contact with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, SEMIONOV - whom Professor SVARTZ, according to her statement, had known for a long time - in order to try to bring about that WALLENBERG might be brought home again - "if he is still alive".

Professor SVARTZ has in a memorandum reported on this talk and on her later contacts in Moscow.

12. Professor SVARTZ who had tried in vain to see Deputy Foreign Minister SEMIONOV in person, had immediately informed the Swedish Government as to what had happened. After careful consideration together with the members of the Government, Prime Minister ERLANDER dispatched a direct letter to Prime Minister CHRUSCHEV, finishing with the request that a Swedish doctor should immediately be allowed to go to Moscow to decide together with his Soviet colleagues the mode of conveyance, medical care etc. in connection with a transfer of WALLENBERG to Sweden.

The letter, dated February 9th 1961, was delivered on the 25th of February 1961 by Ambassador SOHLMAN, received in audience by Prime Minister CHRUSCHEV in person. The latter who had been beforehand informed of the subject of the talk immediately and categorically declared that he had nothing new to add to the information given earlier.

13. Professor SVARTZ, on her part, made different efforts in order to renew the contacts with her colleagues in Moscow. When visiting Moscow in March 1961, on which occasion she again met her informant, she had once again brought the WALLENBERG case up for discussion. Her informant then maintained that Professor SVARTZ had misunderstood him. He stated that prior to their talks in January, he had not known of WALLENBERG.

After some time had passed without any written answer having arrived to Prime Minister ERLANDER's letter, Ambassador SOHLMAN was instructed to express to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs earnest expectations that an answer should be delivered very soon. This verbal reminder was made on the 10th of July 1961. On the part of the Soviet Foreign Ministry was in this connection maintained that the letter had been answered. To this Ambassador SOHLMAN retorted that Prime Minister ERLANDER, after a written approach of this kind, felt justified in expecting a written answer.

14. During the months after this reminder, that resulted in no answer either from the Soviets, the possibilities were taken into consideration to try to gain, through Professor SVARTZ' Soviet contacts, the hearing of the supreme Soviet leaders to the Swedish representations. In May 1962, Professor SVARTZ was invited to a medical congress in Moscow and she then once again met her informant from her first talks about WALLENBERG. He refused however definitely to talk about the WALLENBERG case and referred to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

15. In connection with his transfer from Stockholm, the Soviet Ambassador GUSEV, on the 17th of August 1962, was called to Prime Minister ERLANDER and was requested, after his return to Moscow, to forward to the Soviet Government and to Prime Minister CHRUSCHEV in person a message, containing an urgent appeal for a positive treatment of the Swedish approaches concerning WALLENBERG. Nor did this appeal result in any answer from the Soviets.

16. Foreign Minister NILSSON, having been invited by the Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO to visit Moscow in May 1963, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on the 17th of April, informed the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm that the Swedish Foreign Minister had no concret questions that he wished to discuss during his visit, with one exception, the question of WALLENBERG's fate.

In the course of his first talk with Foreign Minister GROMYKO, on the 8th of May 1963, Mr. NILSSON reminded of Prime Minister ERLANDER's representations and declared that he wished to discuss the matter with Prime Minister CHRUSCHEV. Mr. GROMYKO firmly advised him against such a step, that in his opinion had to be fruitless, as there was nothing new to report on the matter. Mr. NILSSON having been informed that the date of a meeting with the Prime Minister had been fixed for the following day, immediately called Mr. GROMYKO's attention to his previously stated intention to bring up the WALLENBERG question to discussion with the Prime Minister. That was also what happened at the meeting, that took place on the 17th of May 1963. Foreign Minister NILSSON among other things referred to Professor SVARTZ' statement and urgently appealed to the Prime Minister to help to throw light on WALLENBERG's fate. The Prime Minister maintained that WALLENBERG would have been sent back to Sweden, if he had been alive. He regretted to have nothing to add to the information previously delivered by the Soviet authorities.

17. During the return visit to Sweden of Foreign Minister GROMYKO, in the middle of March 1964, a talk took place between him and Prime Minister ERLANDER that was almost wholly devoted to the WALLENBERG question. The Prime Minister stressed the great importance of this question to the Swedish-Soviet relations and urged that the Soviet authorities with the aid of available information might make further efforts to trace WALLENBERG and his fate. He suggested moreover that a meeting should be arranged between Professor SVARTZ and her informant in order to find out more about this statement. Mr GROMYKO answered that WALLENBERG was not to be found in the Soviet Union, that no further traces of him had been found and that there was nothing to add. The statements made by Professor SVARTZ must be due to some misunderstanding. The Soviet scientist in question had categorically denied that he had expressed himself in the alleged way. He would perhaps be willing to make himself to Professor SVARTZ a declaration in this matter.

Some time after this talk, Professor SVARTZ received from her informant a letter dated April 29th 1964, to the effect that he in the course of the talk in January 1961 alledged to have said, he knew nothing of WALLENBERG, he had never heard his name and he had not the slightest idea as to whether WALLENBERG was alive or not. The contents of this letter and Professor SVARTZ' letter of reply, of May 28th 1964, in refutation of this statement, are presented in the report made by Professor SVARTZ.

18. In an interpellation, on the 3rd of March 1964, Mr. OHLIN put the question to Foreign Minister NILSSON, if he would give the House of the Riksdag both a report on the development of the WALLENBERG case after the publication in 1957 of the White Book of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs - to the extent that for special reasons certain information must not be kept secret - and inform the House of the measures the Government planned to take

to convince the Soviet Government of the necessity to institute a more efficient search for WALLENBERG and his dwellingplace during different periods after the war.

The answer of the Foreign Minister was delivered in the RIKSDAG on the 3rd of April 1964. Therein was stressed, among other things, that the Government had tried to benefit by every suitable opportunity to emphasize to the Soviet authorities the importance of shedding light upon WALLENBERG's fate. The documents that during the last years had been presented to the Soviet authorities and the details of the representations that had been made, were however not of the nature that they could be published in this connection. All the representations had however from the Soviet Government met with the answer, there was nothing to add in addition to the information previously given by the Soviets. Mr. NILSSON concluded by confirming that the Swedish Government did not consider the WALLENBERG case as being terminated, but intended to continue the efforts to shed light upon his fate.

19. On account of Prime Minister CHRUSCHEV's approaching visit to Sweden, Ambassador JARRING, on the 26th of May 1964, had a talk, in Moscow, with the head of the Scandinavian Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, KOVALIOV. On this occasion, the Swedish desire for renewed investigations in the WALLENBERG case was once again expressed to the Soviet Government. With reference to this talk, Ambassador JARRING, on the 11th of June 1964, was called to Deputy Foreign Minister, ORLOV, who verbally made a statement to the following effect.

On account of the talk with KOVALIOV the competent authorities had carried out the most thorough investigation in the WALLENBERG case. The result of this investigation was the same as had been put forward in the memorandum of February 6th 1957, in which the particulars and circumstances of WALLENBERG's death in 1947 were stated. There were no further circumstances whatsoever that could result in anything new in this question. Statements made

by certain persons importing that WALLENBERG was alive after 1947 were due either to some mistake, or they reflected the efforts of certain circles to complicate the relations between the Soviet Union and Sweden. WALLENBERG had not, after 1947, been in any health or medical institution, any prison or in any other place. On the part of the Soviet Authorities there was no doubt whatsoever that WALLENBERG died on the 17th of July 1947 in the Lyublyanska prison. All the possibilities of investigating WALLENBERG's fate thus being completely exhausted, the Soviets had on their part no further reason to go on occupying themselves with this question. To resume again the discussion of this deplorable fact in the past would only be detrimental to the Swedish-Soviet relations.

20. During Prime Minister CHRUSCHEV's official visit to Sweden, 22nd - 27th June 1964, the WALLENBERG question was on several occasions brought up for discussion by the Swedes. The main discussion took place in the course of a private meeting between the two Prime Ministers, ERLANDER and CHRUSCHEV, in the presence of Foreign Minister NILSSON and Cabinet Minister PALME, immediately after the Government negotiations, on the 23rd of June 1964.

Prime Minister ERLANDER called special attention to the great importance the Swedes attached to the WALLENBERG question and emphasized the necessity of throwing light on this unsolved question, therewith creating better relations between the two countries.

Mr. ERLANDER then gave an account of Professor SVARTZ' evidence, stressing the great confidence he personally had in her. The Swedish Government was conscious of the fact that the Soviet scientist had asserted that there had been some misunderstanding. As there were here two contradictory opinions of what had happened, it would be important to arrange a meeting between the two scientists to try to be clear about the matter.

that he could never have imagined that the Swedish Government once again should bring up the WALLENBERG question. He declared that WALLENBERG was not in the Soviet Union. He had emphatically declared this to Ambassador SOHLMAN. The Swedish Government had to understand that The Soviet Union naturally would have sent WALLENBERG back to Sweden, if he had been alive, independent of his physical or mental condition. The Soviet Union had delivered and sent back all sorts of persons. What interest would the Soviet Union take in keeping WALLENBERG? Professor SVARTZ' statement was based on mere misunderstanding. Her Soviet informant had never heard of WALLENBERG, or of the WALLENBERG case, and he knew nothing of the exchange of letters that had taken place between the governments. There must be some misunderstanding because of bad knowledge of language. On the part of the Soviet Government, the matter was finished. If a meeting between the two scientists could be arranged privately, the Soviet Government would do nothing to prevent that. When the Prime Minister immediately made a mental note of this statement, Mr. CHRUSCHEV declared that the Soviet Government neither recommended nor warned against such a confrontation.

Mr. CHRUSCHEV added that many deeply tragic things had happened during the STALIN period. It could not be expected that he should account for the STALIN time. He did not want to expose himself to this interrogation with a lot of questions that had been answered long ago. Thorough investigations had been made by the Soviet authorities and exact information had been given concerning WALLENBERG, but yet the Swedes did not seem to trust them.

Mr. ERLANDER stressed that he had wanted to seize the opportunity to discuss frankly and intimately a question of great importance to the relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union. Swedish opinion would certainly find it difficult to understand that the Soviet authorities opposed to further investigations aiming at shedding light upon the case.

In the course of private talks between Prime Minister ERLANDER and Mr. CHRUSCHEV, later on during the visit, Mr. ERLANDER repeatedly came back to the matter and developed further the Swedish views. Nothing new in substance was brought to light. The Prime Minister declared that he was sincerely grieved at the fact that the Soviet Government had no documents available, by the way of which this deplorable controversial question between the Soviet Union and Sweden could be put to an end.

In a special Swedish statement in the WALLENBERG question, published at the press conference of the Prime Minister, on the 26th June 1964, was declared that the Soviets had adhered to their previously given information that WALLENBERG was not in the Soviet Union. The Swedish Government felt deeply disappointed at the fact that the Soviets had considered not being able to do more in this question. In spite of the fact that the great number of representations, made by the Swedish Government after the information given by the Soviets in 1957, had been fruitless, the Swedish Government would not give up their efforts.

21. During the months following Prime Minister CHRUSCHEV's visit, different possibilities to arrange, privately, a meeting between Professor SVARTZ and her Soviet informant, among other things through the intermediary of different scientists, were studied and tried. These efforts were however fruitless.

22. Prime Minister KOSYGIN took office in October 1964. At the beginning of 1965, a representation in the WALLENBERG question was made to him in the form of a letter from Prime Minister ERLANDER, dated February 11th 1965. After a summary of the earlier handling of the matter and referring among other things to evidences according to which WALLENBERG was alive at a considerably later date than the alledged year of his death, 1947, imprisoned in Vladimir and also in a Soviet hospital, the letter ended

by an appeal to Mr. KOSYGIN that he might, in person, make arrangements for such a reconsideration of all the elements of the question and for such an examination of the information, submitted by the Swedes, that light would be thrown on the matter.

The letter was delivered by Ambassador JARRING, on March 22nd 1965, when he was received in audience by Prime Minister KOSYGIN. Mr. KOSYGIN stated that he had thoroughly studied the Soviet WALLENBERG file. He could come to no other conclusion than that, in which the investigations had resulted, that is to say that WALLENBERG was not alive but had died in prison in Moscow in the way and at the time that was stated in the file. An answer to the representation, made by the Prime Minister, was to be delivered along these lines.

As to the evidence, given by Professor SVARTZ, the Prime Minister declared that the Soviet scientist had never made the statements attributed to him by Professor SVARTZ. He had no objection to Ambassador JARRING making sure of this for himself, at a personal meeting with the scientist in question.

23. Such a meeting with the Soviet scientist came off on the 11th of May 1965. In the course of this talk, that took place in the presence of a representative of the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the informant confirmed that Professor SVARTZ, in January 1961, had quite a long talk with him about scientific problems and interests in common. In conclusion she had said she wanted to take up with him, privately, a humanitarian case that had to do with a Swede, imprisoned in the Soviet Union and she had asked him for help to bring about his release. Professor SVARTZ had mentioned the name of the prisoner, but at that time her informant had never heard this name and had had no idea of whom it concerned. He had directed Professor SVARTZ to apply, at a high level, to the Foreign Ministry. Mr. JARRING

reminded of the fact that, according to Professor SVARTZ, her informant had said that WALLENBERG was alive but in bad condition and in hospital. The informant denied the truth of this statement and said it was incomprehensible to him that Professor SVARTZ had misapprehended his statement so completely. It might have been due to the fact that his knowledge of German - the language used during the talk - was not so good. In this way Professor SVARTZ might have misunderstood statements of the kind "if he is alive" or "if he is ill" not as conditional clauses but as declarative sentences.

Mr. JARRING retorted that one statement contradicted the other. He said he believed it would be of great value, if a meeting could be arranged between the informant, Professor SVARTZ and himself, thus giving an opportunity to talk the matter over. The informant said he could not understand what was the use of such a meeting, but in answer to a direct question he at last declared himself prepared to assist.

24. When visiting Prime Minister ERLANDER, on the 13th of May 1965, the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, BELOHVOSTIKOV, announced that on account of Prime Minister ERLANDER's letter to Prime Minister KOSYGIN of February 11th 1965, he had been assigned the task to make the statement that the Soviet Government, in its note of February 6th 1957, had made clear that WALLENBERG had died in 1947. The investigations now carried out had confirmed that this was the case. The evidence given by Professor SVARTZ must be due to some misunderstanding.

Prime Minister ERLANDER declared that he had the intention to take up the matter at his coming visit to Moscow. He pointed out that the Soviet Government must realize that the Swedish Government attached great importance to this matter and that Swedish public opinion demanded a full and detailed account of it.

25. In the course of Prime Minister ERLANDER's official visit to the Soviet Union, from the 10th to the 17th of June 1965, the WALLENBERG question was taken up at government talks on the 11th and the 17th of June. By way of introduction Mr. ERLANDER declared he wished to state that the bilateral Swedish-Soviet relations were favourable, but for the fact that the WALLENBERG question had not yet been settled. After that Mr. ERLANDER summarized in the following three points the further information he still wished to receive from the Soviet authorities.

- a) In the Soviet answer of 1957 was mentioned the presence of a note concerning a person by the name of WALENBERG, deceased in July 1947. There were reasons to assume that this note had reference to Raoul WALLENBERG. From subsequent statements, made by the Soviet Government, it seemed to appear that this supposition had now grown into certainty. The Swedes were anxious to be informed of the investigations, carried out during the last years, that had obviously led to this change.
- b) The views taken by the Soviets of the evidences - and possible counterevidences - given by Soviet prisoners, that had returned from the Soviet Union and according to whom WALLENBERG was imprisoned in Vladimir after the year 1947. These evidences had been studied by prominent Swedish lawyers, who had come to the conclusion that even if full evidence was not introduced, it was most likely that WALLENBERG had been alive at least in the early fifties and that he had then been in the Vladimir prison.
- c) The evidence given by Professor SVARTZ concerning her talks, in Moscow, at the beginning of January 1961 with a Soviet scientist was, according to his statement, due to some misunderstanding. This matter must be made clear.

The subject of the two discussions was primarily these Swedish demands. Prime Minister KOSYGIN stated that

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after having received the letter from Prime Minister ERLANDER, he had ordered a new investigation. He had received documents containing the date of the day of WALLENBERG's death and the information that WALLENBERG had been cremated and that he was no longer living. The Swedish Government had been informed accordingly. There were no further documents and no personal file compiled for WALLENBERG. The reason for this was unknown. Nor did any Soviet witnesses exist. If WALLENBERG was alive, he would be found very soon. One knew who were in prisons and hospitals. The Head of a Government could quickly find a living man but not a dead. How could the Swedes in earnest believe that the Soviet authorities were keeping WALLENBERG in the Soviet Union? Why should they keep him? The Prime Minister said he understood that this was hard and complicated to the Swedish Government and to WALLENBERG's family. On the part of the Soviet authorities they had however done everything and had nothing to add.

The statements made by the prisoners of war returning home, had no convincing force. Professor SVARTZ' informant had declared that he had never heard of WALLENBERG and that the misunderstanding must be due to language difficulties. Mr. KOSYGIN declared himself willing to comply with the Prime Minister's request for a meeting between Professor SVARTZ and her informant, even if he considered such a step to be useless.

In the course of the subsequent discussions both parts reverted to the views reported earlier. Mr. KOSYGIN gave a detailed account of the situation prevailing during and immediately after the war. Mr. ERLANDER emphatically repeated that detailed documents should be provided in order to elucidate the question entirely, with a view to have a detailed account on all the points, where on closer impartial examination great obscurity could be found. Mr. ERLANDER expressed his satisfaction

with the fact that Mr. KOSYGIN was willing to support a meeting between Professor SVARTZ and her informant but regretted that the answers to the rest of his wishes were negative.

26. In accordance with the agreement made during Prime Minister ERLANDER's official visit, a talk took place in Moscow, on the 6th of July 1965, between Professor SVARTZ and her informant. Among those present were also Ambassador JARRING, who did not take part in the talks, and two officials from the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs, /of whom acted as an interpreter. The talk of which has been given a detailed account in the report of Professor SVARTZ, ended by one statement contradicting the other.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Mrs. Maj von Dardel
Auravagen 25
182 62 Djursholm, Sweden

Dear Mrs. von Dardel:

Dr. Henry Kissinger has asked me to reply to your letter and memorandum of May 4, 1973, in which you discuss your efforts to determine the fate of your son, Raoul Wallenberg, who has been missing since 1945.

First let me say that I sympathize deeply with your wish to find out definitely what has happened to your son. It is indeed tragic that so many years after the end of World War II your son's fate remains undetermined.

In view of the humanitarian nature of the case, and your son's efforts on behalf of the Hungarian Jews during World War II, the United States Government is prepared to make inquiries regarding your son's fate of the Soviet Government through the American Embassy in Moscow. At such time as an answer is received, we will communicate it to you promptly. However, in view of the many years that have passed since your son's disappearance, and the earlier unsuccessful efforts to obtain additional information on his fate, I must caution you against any optimism regarding the obtaining of more precise information on his case.

Please be assured that I appreciate the profound suffering you have undergone these many years.

Sincerely yours,

EUR/NE:JPOwens:mlb
7/26/73

CONFIDENTIAL

EUR/NE: JPOWENS:MLB
EXT. 29336

EUR : MR. WALTER J. STOESEL, JR.

EUR/NE: MR. GEORGE
EUR:MR. ARMITAGE
S/S -

EUR/SOV: JMATLOCK
WHITE HOUSE -

ROUTINE MOSCOW

ROUTINE STOCKHOLM

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:

SUBJECT: REQUEST BY SWEDISH CITIZEN TO USG TO MAKE
INQUIRIES OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT

1. DEPT HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY MRS. FREDRIK VON DARDEL OF SWEDEN TO MAKE INQUIRIES OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT REGARDING FATE OF HER SON, RAUL WALLENBERG, SWEDISH DIPLOMAT WHO DISAPPEARED IN HUNGARY IN JANUARY 1945 FOLLOWING ARRIVAL OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THAT CITY. ALTHOUGH SOVIETS INITIALLY INFORMED SWEDISH AUTHORITIES THEY KNEW NOTHING OF WALLENBERG'S WHEREABOUTS, IN FEBRUARY 1957 FOMIN GROMYKO NOTIFIED STOCKHOLM THAT MAN BELIEVED TO BE WALLENBERG HAD DIED IN MOSCOW PRISON ON JULY 17, 1947. HOWEVER, LATER WITNESSES REPORTED WALLENBERG STILL ALIVE IN EARLY 1950S. REPEATED EFFORTS OF SWEDISH AUTHORITIES TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WERE UNSUCCESSFUL, INCLUDING LAST EFFORT BY SWEDISH PM ERLANDER WITH SOVIET PM KOSYGIN IN MAY 1965. WALLENBERG HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED DEAD IN SWEDEN AND HIS CASE, ALTHOUGH INACTIVE, IS STILL CONSIDERED OPEN.

2. MRS. VON DARDEL IS NOW 80 YEARS OF AGE AND WOULD LIKE TO CLEAR UP QUESTION OF HER SON'S FATE. SHE HAS REQUESTED US ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER BECAUSE OF FACT THAT WALLENBERG UNDERTOOK MISSION TO BUDAPEST AT REQUEST OF THEN US MINISTER TO STOCKHOLM. REPORTEDLY DUE TO HIS EFFORTS, THOUSANDS OF JEWS ESCAPED DEATH AT HANDS OF NAZIS. IN VIEW

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OF THIS, AND IN LIGHT OF COMPASSIONATE NATURE OF REQUEST, DEPT BELIEVES IT PROPER TO MAKE INQUIRIES OF SOVIETS, ON OUTSIDE CHANCE THAT INFORMATION MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING WHICH WOULD DETERMINE QUESTION OF WALLENBERG'S FATE. HOWEVER, MRS. VON DARDEL HAS BEEN CAUTIONED NOT TO BE OPTIMISTIC IN THIS REGARD.

3. ACTION REQUESTED: EMBASSY SHOULD APPROACH FOREIGN MINISTRY AT LEVEL DEEMED MOST ADVISABLE TO INQUIRE ABOUT INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON WALLENBERG CASE.44

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FORM DS 322(OCR)

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EUR/NE: JPOWENS:MLB
EXT. 29336

EUR : MR. WALTER J. STOESEL, JR.

EUR/NE: MR. GEORGE
EUR:MR. ARMITAGE
S/S -

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INQUIRIES OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT

1. DEPT HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY MRS. FREDRIK VON DARDEL OF SWEDEN TO MAKE INQUIRIES OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT REGARDING FATE OF HER SON, RAUL WALLENBERG, SWEDISH DIPLOMAT WHO DISAPPEARED IN HUNGARY IN JANUARY 1945 FOLLOWING ARRIVAL OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THAT CITY. ALTHOUGH SOVIETS INITIALLY INFORMED SWEDISH AUTHORITIES THEY KNEW NOTHING OF WALLENBERG'S WHEREABOUTS, IN FEBRUARY 1957 FOMIN GROMYKO NOTIFIED STOCKHOLM THAT MAN BELIEVED TO BE WALLENBERG HAD DIED IN MOSCOW PRISON ON JULY 17, 1947. HOWEVER, LATER WITNESSES REPORTED WALLENBERG STILL ALIVE IN EARLY 1950S. REPEATED EFFORTS OF SWEDISH AUTHORITIES TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WERE UNSUCCESSFUL, INCLUDING LAST EFFORT BY SWEDISH PM ERLANDER WITH SOVIET PM KOSYGIN IN MAY 1965. WALLENBERG HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED DEAD IN SWEDEN AND HIS CASE, ALTHOUGH INACTIVE, IS STILL CONSIDERED OPEN.

2. MRS. VON DARDEL IS NOW 80 YEARS OF AGE AND WOULD LIKE TO CLEAR UP QUESTION OF HER SON'S FATE. SHE HAS REQUESTED US ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER BECAUSE OF FACT THAT WALLENBERG UNDERTOOK MISSION TO BUDAPEST AT REQUEST OF THEN US MINISTER TO STOCKHOLM. REPORTEDLY DUE TO HIS EFFORTS, THOUSANDS OF JEWS ESCAPED DEATH AT HANDS OF NAZIS. IN VIEW

CONFIDENTIAL

WJS
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S/S

7315337

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Continuation Sheet

FORM DS 322A(OCR)

CONFIDENTIAL

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2

OF THIS, AND IN LIGHT OF COMPASSIONATE NATURE OF REQUEST, DEPT BELIEVES IT PROPER TO MAKE INQUIRIES OF SOVIETS, ON OUTSIDE CHANCE THAT INFORMATION MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING WHICH WOULD DETERMINE QUESTION OF WALLENBERG'S FATE. HOWEVER, MRS. VON DARDEL HAS BEEN CAUTIONED NOT TO BE OPTIMISTIC IN THIS REGARD.

3. ACTION REQUESTED: EMBASSY SHOULD APPROACH FOREIGN MINISTRY AT LEVEL DEEMED MOST ADVISABLE TO INQUIRE ABOUT INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON WALLENBERG CASE.44

CONFIDENTIAL

(35)

January 10, 1974

Honorable William S. Moorhead
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C., 20515

Dear Mr. Moorhead:

I have received your inquiry dated December 14 concerning Miss Ferne E. Crosby's interest in the fate of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg.

According to the records of the Department of State, Mr. Wallenberg was assigned to the Swedish mission in Budapest, Hungary during World War II, and in January of 1945 disappeared following the arrival of Soviet troops in Budapest. In response to repeated inquiries by the Swedish Government, the Soviet Government in February 1957 stated that Mr. Wallenberg had died in a Moscow prison on July 17, 1947. Despite the fact that the Swedish Government has officially raised the issue of Mr. Wallenberg's fate on a number of subsequent occasions, citing the fact that several persons claimed to have seen Mr. Wallenberg alive during the 1950's, the Soviet Government has provided no additional information.

The mother of Mr. Wallenberg, Mrs. Fredrik von Dardel, has continued to pursue the question of the fate of her son with the Swedish Government and the Swedish Red Cross. These bodies are thoroughly familiar with the case of Mr. Wallenberg, and are in the best position to make further inquiries with the Soviet authorities in the event it is believed that further representation may prove helpful.

I regret that my reply cannot be more encouraging in this matter, but please continue to call on us whenever you believe we can be of assistance.

Sincerely yours,

Drafted: EUR/NE:JP Owens:mlb:024124 (CW)

Concurrences:

EUR/NE: NAndrews

EUR/M: Armitage

EUR/SOV: WDeess

Marshall Wright

Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

MICROFILMED

P740043-1102

36

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1974

O/FADRC/DR
FILESAttention Mrs. Trombly
Keep this study together

Dear Mr. Ramel:


Thank you for your letter of February 20, 1974, in which you request certain information concerning the fate of Mr. Raoul Wallenberg, on behalf of his mother, Mrs. Maj von Dardel.

First, let me say that I sympathize deeply with the efforts of Mrs. von Dardel to find out definitely what happened to her son. It is indeed tragic that so many years after the end of World War II her son's fate remains undetermined. Further, I am fully conscious of the humanitarian contribution made by Mr. Wallenberg in saving so many from the Nazi concentration camps.

In response to your request, and that of the Swedish Government, a search was made of our files to determine if the United States Government possessed any information which might be helpful in shedding additional light on the fate of Mr. Wallenberg. Unfortunately, this search disclosed no data in our files which would be of assistance in clarifying the fate of Mr. Wallenberg, and the Swedish Government will be informed accordingly.

I am sorry that my reply cannot be more encouraging.

Best regards,


Henry A. Kissinger
MICROFILMED
BY S/SIMr. Stig Ramel, Director,
Nobelstiftelsen,S-11436 Stockholm,
Sweden.Drafted: EUR/NE:JPowens:mlb
3/14/74; ext. 21563

Clearances: EUR/NE:WABucll, Jt

EUR/SOV:Mr. Dyess

INR/RES:Mr. Zook

INR:WHYland

EUR:JARmitage

37

P750119-1318

United States Senate

JUL 11 1975
ACTION
is assigned to
EJR

Respectfully referred to:

CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON OFFICE

Because of the desire of this office to be responsive to all inquiries and communications; your consideration of the attached is requested. Your findings and views, in duplicate form, along with return of the enclosure, will be appreciated by
Sen. Stanley H. Hoenesberg re case of Raoul Wallenberg

ATTN: SCOTT SKLAR
202-224-6443

[Signature]
U.S.S.

James E. Javits

Form #2

11

INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR THE REPATRIATION OF RUSSIAN JEWS, INC.

55 WEST 42ND STREET, SUITE 1936 • NEW YORK, N. Y. 10036

TELEPHONE: (212) 354-0519

REC'D JUL 7 1975

July 2, 1975

STATE



RY/AT

Hon. Jacob Javits
321 Russel
Senate office Bldg.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Javits:

I am writing to you at the suggestion of our honorary president Samuel Hausman. Our organization has often worked with Simon Wiesenthal of Vienna on problems of mutual concern. Mr. Wiesenthal was the one who traced Adolph Eichman and other Nazi war criminals.

In his letter of June 23, Mr. Wiesenthal requests our help in the case of ~~Reoul~~ Wallenberg. Apparently, he has been working on the matter and has uncovered witnesses indicating that Wallenberg was alive in 1962 although reported dead by the Russians in 1948.

I wonder if you might take the trouble of looking through the material sent to Senator Jackson last February. Unfortunately, the senator never replied. What pressure can be brought on the Soviets at this time to determine if Wallenberg is still alive?

Again, our thanks for your interest and assistance.

Sincerely,

Stanley Greenberg
Dr. Stanley Greenberg
Executive Director

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DAVID SPIEGEL
H
H. SOUSTICE

7/30/75
P750126-0008

38

July 30, 1975

Honorable Jacob K. Javits
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Javits:

Thank you for your communication of July 11, with which you enclosed a letter from Dr. Stanley Greenberg, of the International League for the Repatriation of Russian Jews, concerning the case of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg.

According to Department of State records, Mr. Wallenberg was assigned to the Swedish mission in Budapest, Hungary, during World War II, and disappeared in January of 1945 following the arrival of Soviet troops in Budapest. In response to repeated inquiries by the Swedish Government, the Soviet Government in February 1957 stated that Mr. Wallenberg had died in a Moscow prison on July 17, 1947. Despite the fact that the Swedish Government has officially raised the issue of Mr. Wallenberg's fate on a number of subsequent occasions, citing the fact that several persons claimed to have seen him alive during the 1950's, the Soviet Government has provided no additional information.

Mr. Wallenberg's mother, Mrs. Fredrik von Dardel, has continued to pursue the question of the fate of her son with the Swedish Government and the Swedish Red Cross. These organizations are thoroughly familiar with Mr. Wallenberg's case and are in the best position to make further inquiries to Soviet authorities in the event that further representation would be believed helpful.

I regret that our reply cannot be more encouraging in this matter.

Sincerely,

GW
Robert J. McCloskey
Assistant Secretary-
for Congressional Relations

Drafted: EUR/SOV: LWilliams: vt
119-1318, 7/23/75 x28670

Cleared: EUR: JG Lowenstein JGL/PLW
H: PFlaten RF/PLW

CONFIDENTIAL

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10/19/55

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

The Army has informed MLE that Sgt. KUMISH, whom we had hoped to question concerning Raoul WALLERBERG, is mentally deranged and unable to give any information covering period of his imprisonment.

I passed this information to Mr. Crowley and he agreed that it would be fruitless to attempt to question KUMISH at this time. We shall request the Army to keep us informed of KUMISH's condition.

758.00/10-1955

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10-19-55

CONFIDENTIAL

Not released by State
to CIA or news -

and response to
legislation

(40)

If or I am
saying copy to
Mr. Crowley (BNA)
with covering note
Bum me.

H2

V/V/V
For our Wallenberg
file

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT

25th & Constitution Avenue, N.W.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

21 December 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. A. Sidney Buford, III
Director, Office of Libraries and
Intelligence-Acquisition

SUBJECT: Information Concerning Raoul WALLENBERG

1. Your memorandum of 3 November 1955, addressed to Mr. T. L. Beyer, Central Intelligence Agency, has been referred to this organization for reply as the Strategic Services Unit is charged with responsibility for liquidating the affairs of the Office of Strategic Services. A thorough review of our files as well as consultation with former officials of the OSS have resulted in the firm conclusion that WALLENBERG was in fact never employed by U. S. intelligence in any capacity. The following background information concerning subject was developed in the course of our research, which, however, may be of assistance to your Department.

2. During World War II WALLENBERG, while in Stockholm, was in contact with Mr. Iver C. OLSEN who was then stationed at the American Legation as Financial Attache, as a representative of the Treasury Department; secondly, as an OSS representative; and thirdly, as Stockholm representative of the War Refugee Board. It is understood that it was solely in this latter connection that WALLENBERG had dealings with OLSEN who was later instrumental in the selection of WALLENBERG for the mission to Budapest.

3. Following WALLENBERG's assignment to the Swedish Legation in Budapest he was supplied by OLSEN with funds for use only in assisting Jews in Hungary. These funds were made available to WALLENBERG through an account opened by the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) in the Stockholms Enskilda Bank, Stockholm. OLSEN drew on this account whenever WALLENBERG indicated a need for additional funds. The funds were then forwarded through Swedish Foreign Office channels. With the exception of 10,000 Swedish kronor which were given to WALLENBERG from the President's secret fund, all other funds came from the account in Stockholm and were used only in connection with refugee work.


4. Subsequent to WALLENBERG's disappearance in Budapest, the Stockholm account was closed, and the remaining balance, which is understood to have been fairly considerable, was returned to the JDC. Fuller

SECRET

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SECRET

documentary details of OLSEN's dealings with WALLENBERG are said to be found in a 3 volume TOP SECRET report on War Refugee Board Activities in Sweden, of which your Department is believed to hold a copy.



GARDNER B. MacPHERSON
Executive Officer
Strategic Services Unit

SECRET

(21)
CONFIDENTIAL

Not released
Sent to CIA
+ memo
May 1, 1956
File - Wallenberg
(41)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

Subject: Wilfred A. Cumish

In April 1955 Mr. Crowley, the Swedish Desk Officer, asked this Office whether we could ascertain the whereabouts of Wilfred Cumish, an American soldier who had reportedly been seen in 1954 in a Soviet prison. Mr. Crowley hoped that through interrogation of Cumish we might secure some information concerning Raoul WALLENBERG, the Swedish diplomat who disappeared in 1945 and is believed to have been imprisoned by the Russians.

Mr. Crowley's inquiry led to a positive identification of Cumish as a U.S. Army Sgt. who had disappeared in Vienna in 1948. The Department delivered a note to the Soviets requesting his release. In September 1955 the Soviets returned Cumish into the custody of U.S. military authorities in Berlin. He had served 7 years of a 20 year sentence in Vladimir Prison.

This Office immediately requested the Army to either permit a Department representative to question Cumish or to service questions which would be submitted through normal channels. The Army replied that Cumish was mentally deranged and incapable of providing any information covering the period of his imprisonment, but that if at any future date he appeared able to answer questions we would be notified. In view of this information it was agreed that it would be fruitless to question Cumish regarding his possible knowledge of Wallenberg.

As we had received no further word on this case since September, I asked Mrs. Matlack a few weeks ago to let me look at the Army file on Cumish. I found a voluminous file filled with reports of detailed interrogations carried out by military personnel in Germany. Contrary to the information we had received Cumish appeared to remember a great deal about his experiences in Soviet captivity. Among other things he supplied the names of 8 or 10 people, possibly Americans, whom he had known or heard about at Vladimir Prison. It would have been entirely feasible to have asked him in the course of these interrogations whether or not he had seen or heard of Raoul Wallenberg. The Army records show that Cumish was to have been discharged dishonorably from the Army at Fort Dix in October 1955. However, he apparently escaped from Army custody immediately after disembarkation at New York and has not been heard of since. He is technically AWOL, but the Army is understandably disinterested in making much of an effort to find him. If he is found, however, the Army has agreed to notify us prior to his discharge.

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758.00/5-156